

Australian Multiculturalism: Its Rise and Demise

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Multiculturalism merits special attention because of its significance as a national policy of accommodating migrants from diverse cultural backgrounds. Multiculturalism is more significant because of the larger claims it made about the actual or preferred character of the Australian people and national culture. These embellishments were promoted by a relatively small coterie of elites, as Mark Lopez has painstakingly documented,¹ and became standard formulations used in official accounts of Australian national identity and citizenship. While the sting has gone out of multiculturalism and the national debate has moved on to issues of citizenship and refugee policy, multicultural formulations still inform official documents. According to this view, Australia is now made up of people of diverse cultures that should be given equal status with the Australian mainstream. Australian citizenship is then invoked as the glue that binds these different groups into a national unity. The multicultural account of Australia as a nation of diverse cultural groups has been taken over by the Australian Citizenship Council in its prescriptions for *Australian Citizenship for a New Century*.² The Citizenship Council eschews any notion of common national identity or shared culture in favour of 'public acceptance of diversity' and abstract civic values. Such values underpin citizenship, according to the Citizenship Council, and these together define and unite Australians.

In the following paper we give a critical account of the evolution of multicultural policy and the conceptual muddle involved in extending it to national identity and citizenship. Multiculturalism merits praise as a humane policy for accommodating migrants from non-English speaking backgrounds, and also as a cultural policy for enhancing the richness and variety of Australian life. It is a poor description of what we have in Australia, however, because migrants are for the most part geographically dispersed; they educate their children in English along with other Australian school children; and those children have a high propensity to marry out of their parents' ethnic group. Australia does not have distinct cultural groups that endure in any significant way. Boxing up the cultural differences that first generation migrants bring and the declining remnants that endure to the second and third generations makes little conceptual sense. However, some, including those who write official citizenship reports, still cling to its conceptual framework that they now infuse with notions of civil values and citizenship. To appreciate recent public thinking and prescriptions about Australian citizenship, we need to work through earlier policies and the phase of multiculturalism that was dominant for several decades as well as look at government practices concerning the process of adjustment that takes place before migrants become citizens. Multiculturalism began in a series of enlightened policy measures that were designed to assist migrants in becoming Australian without jettisoning their previous cultural heritage.

Becoming Australians

'Assimilation' was the official term used to describe government policy for migrants settling in Australia in the immediate postwar period. The basic idea was that, as soon as practicable, migrants should become part of the Australian way of life and be treated in the same way as other Australians. That would entail getting a job, finding a house, settling into the local community and eventually becoming Australian citizens. Migrants could apply to become citizens, under the terms of the *Nationality and Citizenship Act 1948*, once they had lived in Australia five years and could speak English. Becoming a citizen entailed taking a pledge of allegiance and loyalty at a special ceremony held in a local community. The new citizen joined as a fully-fledged member of the political community with the right and obligation to vote at elections, stand for political office or join the public service, and the duty to serve on a jury or in the armed forces if required to do so. Becoming a citizen was the formal step of affirming membership of the Australian political community and endorsement of the Australian way of life. It meant an allegiance to all that Australia stood for and allowed the privilege of becoming an active participant in, and potentially contributing to, politics and civic involvement.

The Commonwealth and State governments jointly set up annual Citizenship Conventions that reviewed how migrants were settling in and whether they were becoming citizens. At these conferences, the term 'assimilation' was used with gusto in the early 1950s, only to be jettisoned from the 1960s in favour of 'integration'. Even in the 1950s there was a strong pragmatic sense that labour market and housing segmentation would lead to isolation of ethnic communities that would be detrimental both to migrants and to broader Australian society and its political life. At the same time, there were minimal resources devoted to settlement of migrants, given competing priorities of postwar reconstruction. The Commonwealth Department of Immigration employed personnel to manage the reception of migrants, and sponsored a Good Neighbour Council movement that relied on local volunteers to help migrants settle. Priority was given to learning English with the Australian Broadcasting Commission playing a major role in broadcasting radio programmes for adults.³

Despite such policies, migrants often felt isolated in a new country and were typically housed in old army bases and segregated from ordinary civilian life. Displaced persons were sent to work on projects in remote locations. Limited recognition of overseas qualifications meant migrants often worked in low paid jobs, often with compatriots, and congregated where rent was cheap, typically the inner suburbs of capital cities. Such practices and conditions were hardly conducive to assimilation with the larger community despite the intent of the overall policy. For their part, Australians had been culturally insular for decades and were wary of outsiders from different cultural backgrounds. For all of these reasons and because they were different, first generation migrants were prone to associate with their fellow migrants and establish their own clubs and associations. Despite strong assimilation pressures through work places and schools where their children learn English, migrants from non-English speaking backgrounds were somewhat tentative about joining in with the broader Australian community and taking out citizenship. Entering so fully into Australian civic and political life through public affirmation of loyalty and belonging required a long process of settling in and developing personal attachments to Australia.

Arthur Calwell was keen to promote that process of settling in and was adamant that Australians should refer to migrants as 'new Australians'. The Department of Immigration had only a rudimentary understanding of the requirements for assimilation. It struggled with making the naturalisation process a meaningful one, upgrading the naturalisation ceremony in the early 1950s and moving it from the courtroom to municipal offices. Officialdom remained puzzled as to why so few new Australians became citizens despite commissioning studies to look at the low uptake rates in the 1950s and '60s. The suggested reforms included streamlining the application process, but this had little effect and even in the 1960s only about half of those eligible applied for citizenship. According to Jordens, and Zappala and Castles, this low uptake rate was because Australian citizenship was seen as a 'status

based on British ethnicity and culture'.⁴ As such, it was entirely foreign to newcomers from Europe and superfluous to those from Britain. They argue that uptake of citizenship improved dramatically in the 1970s because official policy shifted towards multiculturalism with its explicit recognition of the acceptability of cultural difference.

While such an account dominates contemporary thinking on Australia citizenship and is behind the promotion of citizenship devoid of cultural content, it is not an adequate explanation of the upturn in citizenship acquisition. There were other factors at work that made Australian citizenship more attractive to migrants who had become increasingly attached to Australia through living here and seeing their children growing up as Australians. During the 1970s there was a surge of Australian nationalism, one of the consequence of which was the removed of automatic citizenship privileges granted to British migrants. The 1970s was also an era of political activism when postwar migrants were becoming politically involved. With leadership from amongst the most successful and articulate, ethnic communities became a significant political force in Australian politics. Winning 'the ethnic vote' became important at all levels of politics, and the political strength of ethnic communities was recognised institutionally in the formation of the Ethnic Affairs advisory councils at national and state levels. Ethnic lobby groups were successful in getting funding at last for agencies and services specifically designed to help migrants settle in and maintain their cultural heritage.

Along with funding for these services, a policy of multiculturalism was launched to promote appreciation of ethnic diversity. This was buttressed by anti-discrimination legislation. These measures provided a foundation for mutual adaptation between new Australians and other Australians that resulted in workplace diversity, intermarriage and a cultural hybridity that enriched Australian national culture. Unlike Americas or Canadians, Australians from ethnic backgrounds rarely referred to themselves in hyphenated terms as Maltese-Australians, Italian-Australians or Vietnamese-Australians. When ethnic associations and welfare groups that were previously informal networks became more formalised and politicised through funding, they were not the rallying points for identity politics for those from non-English speaking backgrounds. Australia has not experienced the ethnic ghettos of American cities or the periodic race riots that have erupted there or in Britain.

Nevertheless in times of economic downturn and with the impact of economic globalisation, marginalised groups in Australia expressed their grievances by hostility to any groups receiving special assistance, irrespective of the logic of such positive discrimination. Ethnic groups, made more visible though institutionalised recognition of settlement services, have been the subjects of racial abuse by some minority groups. Recent public attention to international terrorism and militancy among fundamentalist Islamic movements has stirred up prejudice against Muslims in some sectors of Australian society. In order to avoid concentrations of unskilled ethnic migrants and avoid backlash politics, the Australian government has adopted a policy of recruiting permanent settlers on the basis of skills and capital, selecting those most likely to integrate easily and become self sufficient. This policy was underwritten by legislation passed in 1992 and 1997 that denies welfare benefits to migrants for an initiation period following settlement. In addition multiculturalism policy has been reoriented from a focus on settler groups to the broader constituency of all Australians with the mission of promoting harmonious community relations and building social cohesion in a way that inhibits and prevents racism.

Despite the adoption of such policies, Australia has not become a multicultural society in any strong sense of the term; rather, migrating people have become Australianised. Although often only partial for first generation new Australians, integration into Australian culture is more encompassing for the second and third generation. As leading Australian demographer Charles Price has shown through painstaking research, there is a strong propensity for second, and especially third and subsequent generation descendants of migrants to marry outside of their parents' ethnic group. The result is extensive ethnic

intermixture with large numbers of third and subsequent generation Australians having three or more ancestries. As Price summarises Australian's ethnic intermixture:

Speaking generally, over 60 per cent of the third and later generations, and about 45 per cent of the total population, have three or more ancestries, while over one-quarter of the third and later generations, and nearly one-fifth of the total population, have four or more. Moreover, it is clear that many Australians of mixed ethnic origin are not simply mixtures of English, Irish, Scottish and Welsh, but have at least some element of non-Anglo-Celtic in their ancestry. In 1996 population terms it seems that over 8 million Australians have at least three ancestries, and over 3 million have four or more; of these at least 4 million and 2.2 million respectively have some non-Anglo-Celtic origin.⁵

Those with mixed Anglo-Celtic and non-Anglo-Celtic ancestries, some 5.5 million, are the fastest growing section of the Australian population, and are more numerous than any single unmixed ethnic group, be they English, Italian or any other.⁶

A recent study has confirmed that the second generation, or children of migrants, from non-English speaking migrant parents achieve higher secondary and tertiary education participation than the general population.⁷ This is true for youth whose parents were born in Malaysia, China, Greece, Italy, Poland, Hungary or Lebanon. It is also the case for those who come from families of lower socioeconomic status. Combining these two trends of marrying out from the ethnic group and higher educational participation in education than the Australian peer group, we see the powerful forces at work in the integration of migrants across generations.

Migrating peoples have been Australianised through a process of integration into Australian society and through taking out Australian citizenship that makes them members of the Australian political community. While migrants can become fully Australian citizens through their own choice after satisfying certain minimum conditions, becoming Australian is a much more diffuse and gradual process that differs among individuals and ethnic groups. It is a process that takes some considerable time, and will likely be only partial for new Australians from different cultural backgrounds. However, their children and grandchildren are progressively absorbed into the Australian mainstream through education, mixing and marriage. What it means to be Australian also changes in the process of integrating large numbers of migrants. As the architects of postwar migration anticipated, Australian culture and society have been enriched and changed, becoming less mono-culturally British and more complex and diverse.

Our concern with multiculturalism is not primarily with its adequacy as a descriptive account of how migrants from non-English speaking backgrounds have settled into Australian life. It is ironic, however, that assimilation was official policy at a time when postwar migrants were most culturally distinct in the 1950s, while multiculturalism became dominant as they were entering more fully into Australian life in the 1970s. Multiculturalism is perpetuated as an official description of what Australia is or should be despite the increasing integration of second generation descendants of postwar migrants that is working in the opposite direction of breaking down cultural distinctiveness.

Our concern is mainly with assessing the prescriptive account of Australian citizenship that multiculturalism has spawned. It has been used to hollow out what it means to be and become an Australian citizen, depriving citizenship of its cultural base in a distinctive Australian nationality. Multiculturalism rejects the unity of Australian society in favour of an aggregate of different Australian communities and identities. The political corollary is to deny citizenship its cultural content and ignore the associated sentiments of affiliation, attachment and affection for national heritage and traditions. Citizenship is reduced to commitment to abstract principles of civic obedience and participation. This deprives citizenship of its basic affirmation of membership in a shared political association able to serve the common good, and shared attachment to a unifying heritage and traditions that

transcend other differences. It is through sharing a common culture and heritage that people most readily form a viable and vibrant political community in which differences can be resolved. Unfortunately, the mantra of multiculturalism has muddied official discourse about citizenship. The Australian Citizenship Council, established in 1996 to enquire into the meaning of citizenship, endorsed the tenets of multiculturalism so as to include everyone but engage no-one.

Throughout this book we argue, to the contrary, that Australian citizenship entails being a member of a particular political community that has a primary unanimity supported by a distinctive political culture. Being Australian involves sharing in both, albeit in limited ways by first generation migrants who retain strong identification with their original cultures and traditions. In the rest of this chapter we show how the policy of multiculturalism was extended beyond policies of humane settlement and modified integration to become a full-blown prescriptive account of Australian society that distorted the understanding of citizenship.

Creeping Multiculturalism

Multiculturalism began its Australian life as a catchy title for a new set of programs addressing the social and economic disadvantages suffered by those from non-English speaking backgrounds (NESB). It was a rhetorical flourish on the part of Al Grassby, colourful Immigration Minister in the Whitlam Labor government, whose 1973 address unveiling the programs was titled 'A Multi-Cultural Society for the Future'.⁸ This title had intimations of a larger project of national reassessment. The term was borrowed from Canada where Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau used 'multiculturalism within a bilingual framework' to sum up his Liberal government's 1971 responses to the findings of its Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. The Canadian formula was ingenious in responding to the primary English-French division between its two founding peoples that split the nation, and at the same time recognised other migrant groups who made up the mosaic of Canadian society. Bilingualism was the main purpose of Canadian policy, and multiculturalism a secondary recognition. Only multiculturalism was relevant for Australia, and without the larger bilingual split it would have a different context and character on the other side of the Pacific.

While Grassby used the phrase 'multicultural family of the nation' to describe Australia, his and Labor's main policy purpose was to improve the welfare of migrants from NESB, some of whom were among the most disadvantaged groups in society. NESB migrants who did not work—the unemployed, wives who were home-makers, and the aged—often did not learn English and needed special assistance and welfare services provided in ways that suited them. In the workplace and in schools, those from NESB were often disadvantaged compared with other Australians. The groundwork for special welfare policies for such groups had been laid by demographic, sociological and economic studies. These included pioneering work on migrants by Jean Martin, foundation professor of sociology at La Trobe University, demographic studies by Professor W.D. Borrie, from the Research School of Social Sciences at the Australian National University (ANU), and the 1970 survey of poverty by Professor Ronald Henderson of Melbourne. Both Borrie and Martin worked closely with Peter Heydon, secretary of the Department of Immigration, and Henderson's findings attracted national attention. Academics and public intellectuals had also begun to provide issue papers for the Australian Citizenship Council in the 1960s that broadened the thinking about integration of migrants. One of these was Professor Jerzy Zubrzycki, a Polish immigrant and sociologist from the ANU, who, with Heydon's encouragement, proposed to the 1968 Citizenship Convention that migrants should retain their ethnic identity and be encouraged to participate in activities of their own ethnic group. In part, Zubrzycki gave legitimating voice to what was already happening; in part, he was suggesting a new way for policy makers to think about accommodating NESB migrants.

With a handful of others, this group provided the intellectual drive for multiculturalism. They were influential in shaping the thinking of special advisory committees and councils and in drafting their reports and recommendations to government, providing what

Zubrzycki has termed 'a coherent philosophical basis for the management of ethnic diversity'.⁹ Zubrzycki was the most influential. He chaired the Australian Ethnic Affairs Council that advised the Minister for Immigration and drafted its proposals for *Australia as a Multicultural Society* in 1977.¹⁰ According to Zubrzycki, this was 'the first formal definition of multiculturalism' and its policy guidelines of social cohesion, equality of opportunity and cultural identity. Zubrzycki paired up with Borrie, chairman of the other advisory council on immigration, the Australian Population and Immigration Council, to write the 1979 report, *Multiculturalism and its Implications for Immigration Policy*.¹¹ This report reassured traditionalists that multiculturalism should complement rather than supplant established features of Australian life and strengthen democratic government.

Meanwhile, during the 1970s multiculturalism was making significant political and policy inroads. Malcolm Fraser had become sympathetic to the special needs of NESB migrants while opposition leader. His Liberal coalition government elected in 1975 embraced multiculturalism with an emphasis on cultural maintenance for ethnic groups. The Whitlam government had abolished the Department of Immigration in 1974, main-streaming its welfare responsibilities in education, social security and housing, and combining immigration with labour planning in a new Department of Labour and Immigration. The Fraser government reversed this by reconstituting a separate Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs in 1976. The expanded title signalled the government's higher priority for ethnic affairs. This was further bolstered by special advisory councils: the Australian Population and Immigration Council and Australian Ethnic Affairs Council referred to above that were both set up in 1976. Besides putting the institutional infrastructure in place, the Fraser government in 1977 commissioned prominent Melbourne lawyer, Frank Galbally, to chair a Review of Post-arrival Programs and Services for Migrants. The committee's task was 'to examine and report on the effectiveness of the Commonwealth's programs and services for those who have migrated to Australia'.

The Galbally report, *Migrant Services and Programs*,¹² embraced multiculturalism and recommended the consolidation and expansion of a raft of welfare and education services for migrants. Galbally was the medium for transmitting multicultural thinking to policy practice. The report was emphatic about the 'need to encourage multiculturalism', but rather vague about its meaning—it was 'a broad concept'—despite devoting a whole chapter to the matter. Galbally proposed four guiding principles: equal opportunity and access to programs and services; each person to maintain their culture and be encouraged to appreciate other cultures; needs of migrants to be met by general programs wherever possible, but special programs and services were necessary to ensure equality of access and provision; and programs and services should be designed in consultation with clients. These principles were couched in jargon that was hard to take issue with: multiculturalism was largely presupposed and its sting depended upon whether cultural maintenance was hard or soft, and how far it would be pushed.

The Fraser government embraced the report and most of its proposals, including the establishment of an Institute of Multicultural Affairs to commission research and educate 'the community in all aspects of multiculturalism'. In his inaugural address to the Institute in 1981 Prime Minister Fraser praised multiculturalism as 'Australia's unique achievement'. Fraser was careful, however, to limit multiculturalism to an umbrella policy directive and equity tool for enabling migrants to participate fully in, and benefit from social, economic and political life. Fraser's view of multiculturalism was pragmatic and policy oriented:

It is not an abstract or alien notion, not a blueprint holding out utopian promises, but a set of guidelines for action which grows directly out of our society's aspirations and experiences. That is why multiculturalism has so quickly entered our political and social vocabulary and become a central reference point.¹³

But others were pushing it further into a national ideology and a make-over of national identity. The high point was reached in the 1982 Ethnic Affairs Taskforce's report, *Multiculturalism for All Australians: our Developing Nationhood*. Zubrzycki chaired this

taskforce of the Australian Council of Population and Ethnic Affairs, a body that amalgamated the two earlier advisory councils where his ideas had been dominant. The report unambiguously put multiculturalism at the heart of Australia's developing nationhood and national identity. It proposed four basic principles as being essential for a successful multicultural society: social cohesion; the freedom to maintain one's cultural identity; equality of opportunity; and equal responsibility for, commitment to and participation in Australian society.¹⁴ The mild language and unexceptional claims of such principles meant they were hard to take exception with or refute. Who could be opposed to social cohesion, freedom to maintain cultural identity, equal opportunity and equal responsibility for participating in Australian society? And yet the report was putting forward these principles as a means of giving effect to a radical new understanding of Australia as a multicultural society.

According to its author, 'formulation of the philosophical foundation for multiculturalism as an ideology reached its most comprehensive expression' in this 1982 report.¹⁵ Multiculturalism was part descriptive and part prescriptive: it purported both to describe an actual state of affairs and to impose a preferred vision of what ought to be the case. That Australia should be a multicultural nation made up of distinct cultural groups, all of which are of equal value and should be equally valued, is a normative proposition. That Australia is this sort of nation is a factual proposition. Mixing up the normative and the factual is typical of ideologies, and invariably produces a confusing picture in which preferred normative vision colours factual appreciation. Multiculturalism as ideology is no exception. The confusion that has dogged multiculturalism ever since originates in this 1982 report and its mixing of the normative and factual, so it is important to see just how that was done.

Multiculturalism could be used in at least two ways, according to the report:

First it is used to describe the relationships and institutional arrangements between diverse cultural groups that affect access to resources, privileges and participation in decision making. The second usage, not always distinguished from the first, is a term for the philosophical basis for a culturally diverse society, i.e. the belief that certain institutional arrangements ought to exist.¹⁶

Multiculturalism was therefore much more than the provision of special services to minority ethnic groups and had become a way of looking at Australian society and a prescription for national identity. The Zubrzycki report had gone the whole hog with multiculturalism as the new Australian national identity. The Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs soon followed suit in a report titled *Multiculturalism for All Australians: National Consultations on Multiculturalism and Citizenship*. According to the Department:

Multiculturalism for All Australians is not a survey of current social arrangements, but a model to be worked towards—a vision for the future. The paper's major theme is that multiculturalism should not just mean majority group assistance for minority cultural groups, but rather should be a way of perceiving Australian society as a whole.¹⁷

The 1980s saw a continuation and consolidation of multicultural policies and programs by the Fraser government in 1982 and subsequently by the Hawke Labor government that won office in 1983. Labor continued to support the array of multicultural policies, its traditional emphasis on equity and welfare coupled with support for ethnic groups that now had vocal leaders and political muscle in Labor electorates. Labor in turn commissioned James Jupp, a prominent political scientist specialising in immigration, to do a major review of migrant and multicultural programs in 1986. The Jupp report, *Don't Settle for Less*, recommended more of the same with additional review mechanisms such as a special parliamentary committee on multicultural and ethnic affairs and a monitoring agency to ensure compliance in access and equity practices.¹⁸

This was to be the end of the forward march of multiculturalism that had so far proceeded without much controversy as a top-down ideology and strategy. Not surprisingly, the policy had strong support from larger ethnic groups whose mobilisation it had helped promote and fund. Despite bipartisan support of the major political parties, multiculturalism was not well-known or popular among ordinary Australians. There were increasing rumblings about 'buying the ethnic vote' and 'pandering to the ethnic lobby' that had some plausibility. Ethnicity should not be given priority over class according to those on the left, nor over gender argued feminists. Aboriginal leaders had never accepted that the special status of indigenous people could be properly acknowledged by multiculturalism. Other larger policy concerns such as economic and public sector restructuring were taking centre political stage as Australia opened its protective state to the world economy and sought to meet the challenges of globalisation. Australians in vulnerable sectors such as protected manufacturing, manual and unskilled jobs, and rural communities were feeling the pinch. There was mounting resentment at special policies for migrants groups when others were suffering, and reaction against regarding Australian national culture as some kind of multicultural stew.

For all these and financial reasons, the Hawke government slashed spending on multicultural programs in its 1986 'horror budget', as one of Labor's leading ethnic parliamentarians described it.¹⁹ Funding to multicultural institutions, English-language and post-arrival programs were severely cut, and the Australian Institute of Multicultural Affairs disbanded. This was harsh treatment, according to Colin Rubenstein's sympathetic view, because the AIMA had been 'remarkably effective in discharging its statutory obligations and had made a real contribution to awareness and responsiveness of Australian society and institutions to multicultural realities'. Its abolition was 'greeted with horror throughout ethnic Australia but reinforced the view amongst critics on the right that multiculturalism was nothing more than a divisive and wasteful racket'.²⁰ Rubenstein fails to mention that Labor's socialist left faction was also highly critical of multiculturalism and considered the AIMA to be ineffective.

The AIMA's final report *Future Directions for Multiculturalism* sought to confirm multicultural ideology as an inclusive and prescriptive policy for Australia and all Australians. Multiculturalism was 'a social policy embracing all Australians, setting out a way of perceiving our rights and duties with respect to other Australians'.²¹ Multiculturalism was 'a social policy for all Australians, based on the premise that each member of our community can be both Australian and yet maintain aspects of his or her ethnic culture'.²² Multiculturalism was also normative and prescriptive, describing 'certain policies, institutional arrangements and community attitudes that ought to exist. Multiculturalism in this sense is an ideal extending to all Australians'.²³ Such eloquent reaffirmations of multicultural ideology were not enough to save the AIMA; indeed they were probably provocative by this stage if its critics had bothered to read the report.

The AIMA was replaced by an Office of Multicultural Affairs located in the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet and an Advisory Council on Multicultural Affairs. These institutions would preserve a somewhat chastened multiculturalism for the following decade, that emphasised mainstreaming of services, whereby managers of all government services would be required to think about, and plan for, accessibility of all ethnic groups. The lead up to the 1988 Bicentenary of first European settlement provided the occasion for a good deal of national introspection and stock taking both on citizenship and multiculturalism. The that was Sir James Gobbo, a senior Victorian judge with a national profile for his work in the Italian community who would be appointed Governor of Victoria in the 1990s, chaired the Advisory Council on Multicultural Affairs that prepared a revised *National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia*. This was launched by the Hawke government in 1989 and endured until 1996. It reiterated the need for multicultural policies to assist migrants to participate in Australian life and broadened the aim of the policies to target all Australians in supporting cultural expression, social harmony and justice. The national agenda merged multiculturalism with broad social goals:

The fact is that the challenges of a multicultural society do not simply resolve themselves. Government action, in the form of multicultural policies, is needed in certain areas to promote social harmony, to ensure a fair go and to harness our human resources in the most productive way for Australia's future.²⁴

By the end of the 1980s multiculturalism had become a blueprint for all Australians. It was linked less specifically to migrant settlement services and more to celebrating and accepting cultural difference within Australian society. This also profoundly affected the way that citizenship was viewed. The policy of encouraging permanent settlers to become citizens was continued, and the waiting period before applying for citizenship was reduced to two years by 1984 legislative change. Citizenship was defined in terms of abstract civic values, with an emphasis on tolerance and diversity, that people from different cultures could share. National unity would be based more upon respecting diversity rather than sharing a distinctive and identifiable Australian national culture. Despite bland formulations in official reports, this hollowing out of Australian citizenship soon became controversial as it filtered down to an unappreciative public and was questioned by critics.

Multiculturalism Contested

Serious disquiet about multiculturalism came to the fore in the 1988 report of the committee to advise on Australia's immigration policy chaired by Dr Stephen FitzGerald, one of Australia's leading Asian scholars. The FitzGerald committee was charged with investigating current and future directions of Australian immigration policy. In so doing it opened the Pandora's box of multiculturalism.

The FitzGerald report, *Immigration: a Commitment to Australia*, was a ringing endorsement of large-scale immigration for Australia based upon non-discriminatory principles. There should be a sharper focus on economic criteria while retaining a balance between social and economic considerations, it recommended. Immigrants should be required to respect the principles and institutions of Australian society and democracy, and reciprocally Australia should be committed to facilitating the equal participation of immigrants in society. FitzGerald recommended some expansion of the family reunion program, refinement of the refugee and humanitarian program, boosting the annual intake to 150,000 per year, setting long-term targets, and paying more attention to both economic criteria and the national interest. The recommendations and concerns of the FitzGerald report were strongly nationalistic: it called for the articulation of a national philosophy of immigration in which 'emphasis is given to Australia, the Australian identity and commitment to Australia'.²⁵

Although the committee's terms of reference did not include any mention of multiculturalism, its decision to review multiculturalism was justified because it had become the domestic face of immigration policy. More significantly, a popular revolt against multiculturalism was threatening to tarnish immigration policy as well. The FitzGerald committee found little popular support for multiculturalism and a great deal of opposition and disquiet. It was a 'sad irony', the committee concluded:

that this first real effort in recent times to bring immigration into the mainstream without forced assimilation has tended to assist keeping it out. Multiculturalism has come to be seen as something for immigrants and ethnic communities only, and not for the whole of Australia. Aboriginals, for example, have not wanted to identify with it. Many other older generation Australians believe it has nothing to do with them.²⁶

This was the first official exploration of the disquiet about multiculturalism in the Australian community. While the report did not condemn settlement programs for migrants, it highlighted problems with the term itself and with its larger claims about national identity. The committee could find 'little to rejoice at in the suspicion towards immigrants and immigration which is reflected in community suspicion of multiculturalism'. The

concerns were widespread across the political spectrum, 'from traditional Labor voters to traditional Liberal and National voters, from trade unionists to business people, from blue collar workers to academics, and from older generation to newly arrived Australians'. The main problems were with the term itself and its over-blown claims about Australian national identity:

Perhaps part of the problem is the word itself. Perhaps too much is expected of the concept. It appears that it cannot accommodate the many definitions which are forced upon it by exponents and opponents. Its laudable original intentions have become obscured. Multiculturalism provides important support for immigrants, but as a concept it is not something with which many can identify. Just as Australia is a democracy but has its own identity, so also is it multicultural, but nonetheless identifiably Australian. It is the Australian identity that matters most in Australia.²⁷

If the government were to strongly affirm Australian identity, Fitzgerald suggested, 'multiculturalism might seem less divisive or threatening'.

The FitzGerald committee found a gap between public opinion and top-down public policy:

It is clear that while public policy may have accepted multiculturalism as the appropriate philosophy for contemporary Australia, much of the community has yet to agree.²⁸

There was also suspicion that multiculturalism was being foisted on the community and immigration policy was being used to bolster it:

To some extent multiculturalism has come to be seen as the motivating factor for immigration itself. Critics claim government strategies are intended to build up language groups and ethnic communities through policies favouring particular regional or national groups. They have read in the utterances of some exponents of multiculturalism an intention by government to use immigration as some form of social engineering to achieve racial diversification in Australia.²⁹

Although using rather neutered language, the FitzGerald report was devastating in its findings on multiculturalism. 'Multiculturalism does not appear to have been a persuasive vehicle for analysis and community education about the beneficial social impact of immigration', it concluded. It did 'not seem to have enhanced the two-way commitment which is so essential to immigration's success'. Multiculturalism was 'undermining public support for immigration' and giving it a bad name: 'The fact that multiculturalism is so linked in the public mind with immigration and that it is also perceived negatively, as sectional and divisive, cannot be ignored in the framing of immigration policies.' The FitzGerald report put its finger on two underlying problems: one was the lack of serious public debate on multiculturalism; the other uncertainty about national identity. The voice of opposition to multiculturalism had to be taken seriously, 'not dismissed as simply the voice of extremism, or racism'. The report surmised that the debate on multiculturalism might suggest to some 'a community in search of identity'. More likely, it was reaction against having a concocted identity foisted on Australians from above.

Responses to the FitzGerald report were mixed. *The Australian* newspaper endorsed it as possibly one of the most important reports ever commissioned in Australia, offering the government 'a vision, a blueprint, a way forward that could capture the nation's imagination' and a way of establishing 'a new consensus for a liberal, sensible, fair and economically viable' immigration policy.³⁰ The Hawke Labor government, however, was wary and turned a deaf ear to the warnings on multiculturalism. Labor's Minister for Immigration, Clyde Holding, appeared to give overall endorsement to the report but then to contradict most of its major findings and recommendations. In its response, the government noted the popular mistrust of multiculturalism, but reasserted its commitment to a National Agenda for Multicultural Australia that it was developing.

Despite the government's cool response and modified commitment to multiculturalism, the FitzGerald report was a timely wake-up call for Australia. It reported widespread antagonism to multiculturalism and called for the development of a new national philosophy of immigration that was unashamedly Australian. This was the catalyst for a robust public debate on multiculturalism that signalled the end of bipartisan support. Professor Geoffrey Blainey, an eminent historian from Melbourne University, had become a leading critic of immigration policy and multiculturalism from the mid 1980s. His characterisation of multiculturalism as a dangerous slogan and a form of cultural apartheid in March 1988 sparked a parliamentary debate. Dr Andrew Theophanous from the Labor side led the charge with an affirmation of commitment 'to the establishment of a multicultural society in Australia'.³¹ Despite its title, the text of the affirmation was careful to stay clear of claims about national identity and was supported by speakers from both sides of the Houses. In a subsequent article, Theophanous affirmed that the kernel of multiculturalism was 'that a diversity of cultures have a right to contribute to the evolving Australian culture'.³²

Blainey remained unconvinced, calling the parliamentary motion that was carried without a dissenting voice, 'a mindless response by politicians to well-organised racial and ethnic lobbies'. He blasted multiculturalism as a 'thorough sham':

Multiculturalism has quietly become a sophisticated form of racism which, in the dubious name of equality, subsidises certain ethnic groups at the expense of others. It is often the height of hypocrisy but its voice is angelic. ...
The credo, so revered in Canberra, is largely double talk. I know these seem harsh words but multiculturalism, as espoused by both parties, is utterly shoddy. Morally, intellectually and economically it is a sham.³³

Political consensus on multiculturalism was shattered when John Howard, leader of the opposition, took up Blainey's attack. Intent upon shoring up his leadership and embarrassing the Labor government, Howard was a staunch believer in traditional Australian values. At a National Press Club address he branded it 'a confusing, even aimless concept' and an 'aimless divisive policy'. Multiculturalism was part of a more widespread national malady of apologising for being authentically Australian, Howard told the Queensland division of the Liberal Party's annual convention at Surfers Paradise. 'We're apologising to the Aborigines about our past, we're apologising to this or that section in the community for having offended them and in the process we're apologising for our history and our identity as Australians'. Howard pushed for a number of policy changes: one was for an adjustment of the mix of migrants; another was for a 'One-Australia' post-arrival strategy where Australian culture and values took precedence over cultures of origin.

Howard broke the consensus of the major parties over multiculturalism, although the Hawke Labor government remained committed to the policy and the Labor party's platform professed the goal of 'Working Together for a Multicultural Australian'. Under Howard's leadership, the Liberals jettisoned multiculturalism in favour of a new 1988 draft policy 'One Australia—From Many Cultures and Many Nations'. A slightly modified version of this, 'Building One Nation', became part of the Liberal-National policy and the policy statement, 'Future Directions: It's time for plain thinking', that Howard took to the 1990 election. It claimed that the original aims of multiculturalism had been subverted by the Labor government and 'woolly minded idealists and their friends in the bureaucracy'. The Liberal policy manifesto proclaimed 'a united Australian nation proud of its distinctive identity and history' in which all enjoyed equal opportunities. Some 'so-called multi-cultural programmes' were said to have ensnared individuals in ethnic communities and denied them the opportunity to participate fully in Australian society.³⁴

In its section on post-arrival policy titled 'From Many Cultures Towards One Nation', the new Liberal policy gave a coherent articulation of a common Australian identity as an alternative to multiculturalism. It acknowledged that such an identity had been developed from migrants

from many countries and was continuing to evolve. This was a more positive contribution than sniping at multiculturalism and flirting with racial restrictions. The policy affirmed that Australia's identity was unique, and had been forged by successive waves of immigrants from many nations. In bringing their cultural traditions and heritage to Australia, many immigrants had enriched Australian society by opening it up to new influences and a wider understanding and appreciation of different backgrounds. The result was the development of a nation with a uniquely Australian lifestyle.

We want to see one Australia proud of its diverse heritage and able to benefit as a nation from its individual groups. We do not want to see an Australia of individual groups, each stressing their differences and only linked in the loosest of ways by a mutual tolerance of diversity.³⁵

Howard lost the leadership of the Liberal party and the Liberal National coalition lost the next two elections in 1990 and 1993. However, the FitzGerald report's findings and Howard's crusade highlighted the growing disquiet with multiculturalism.

Beyond Multiculturalism

The sting had gone out of multiculturalism before John Howard became Prime Minister after the Liberal National party coalition swept to national office in 1996. More pressing issues had replaced immigration and multiculturalism on the national agenda, and the even the architects of multiculturalism were in favour of moving beyond what they now saw as an outmoded policy and an ugly word. In the lead up to the constitutional centenary of nationhood in 2001, greater focus on national unity and a more balanced historical perspective were apparent across the political spectrum.

Paul Keating, who succeeded Hawke as Labor Prime Minister in 1993, was a strong nationalist, committed to Aboriginal reconciliation and republicanising Australia's head of state. Labor's earlier 'National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia' was supposed to give shape and direction to the policy but was pretty much a reiteration of previous policy formulations and prescriptions. This national agenda was reviewed in 1995 by the National Multicultural Advisory Council's report *Multicultural Australia: The Next Steps towards and beyond 2000*. Australia was still described as 'an inclusive multicultural society', although the emphasis was now on national identity and the dominant Anglo-Irish culture on which it was historically grounded. In a 1995 speech Prime Minister Keating emphasised the central place of British and Irish cultures in Australia and the long history of enrichment and development from receiving immigrants from other cultures:

[O]ur landscape was interpreted by painters, scientists and explorers from Germany, Switzerland, Poland and France as well as Britain and that this artistic and intellectual tradition was consolidated in the 20th century... And I think we must also always bear in mind that the dominant cultures of our history those of the British Isles and Ireland far from being hostile to the growth of a culturally diverse society, provided in democratic institutions and ideas its essential precondition.³⁶

Multicultural policy, according to Keating, was based squarely on liberal democratic values and had become essentially a restatement of Australian political values. Multiculturalism had come to mean:

a policy which guarantees rights and imposes responsibilities. The rights include those of cultural identity the right to express and share individual cultural heritage, including language and religion. The right to social justice and the right of every Australian to equality of treatment and opportunity, regardless of race, ethnicity, religion, language, gender or place of birth.

The responsibilities might be summarised as follows: that the first loyalty of all Australians must be to Australia, to its interests and its future; that all Australians

must accept the basic principles of Australian society, including the constitution and the rule of law, parliamentary democracy, freedom of speech and religion, English as the national language, equality of the sexes and the right of every Australian to express his or her views and values. That is the essential balance in the multicultural equation: the promotion of individual and collective cultural rights and expression, on the one hand; and on the other, the promotion of common national interests and values.³⁷

While multiculturalism was largely subsumed by the notion of cultural diversity, the word itself was now questioned by its original architects. Zubrzycki who had given the term its fullest ideological rendering and embellished it in numerous reports now dismissed it as ambiguous and pompous. Speaking at the 1995 Global Cultural Diversity conference, Zubrzycki admitted that the introduction of the term multiculturalism to Australia was 'almost accidental' and an 'on-the-spot' decision of a politician who thought it would be a suitable tag for a range of policies dealing with migrants. He questioned whether it was still necessary to use 'the clumsy, pompous word "multiculturalism" to celebrate the diversity of our cultural makeup'. The derivative 'multicultural' was still necessary to refer to the actual demographic diversity of Australia, Zubrzycki said, but the 'polysyllabic noun "multiculturalism" had outlived its purpose' and was associated 'with all kinds of negative attitudes and incidents of political separatism'. Instead he proposed the slogan: 'Many cultures. One Australia'.³⁸

Sir James Gobbo, then chairman of the Australian Multicultural Foundation, gave qualified support for this view. He too thought the phrase should be phased out, not so much for its ambiguity or negative associations, but because its purpose had been achieved. As the core principles of multiculturalism were more and more accepted, there would be less need to use the word 'other than in describing its historical development and role'. Some years before Gobbo had expressed the hope that by the end of the decade both the words, 'multicultural' and 'ethnic', would be largely unnecessary. In his 1995 speech, Gobbo also responded to the common reproach of critics that multiculturalism had displaced or eroded traditional national identity. Except perhaps for short periods, history did not 'demonstrate any such clear national identity', he said. There needed to be recognition of 'our continuing cultural diversity' as well as 'a core culture, which, though open to modification, nonetheless occupies a central place, or, put in another way, forms a very large part of the river into which all cultures flow'. Acknowledging such a core culture made good sense, even if Gobbo's invocation of the 'imagery of the outback and bronzed drovers squinting across brown lands to a distant sunset' was well and truly dated as an expression of Australian identity.³⁹

As Prime Minister, John Howard pointedly avoided using the 'M' word, multiculturalism. He insisted it not be used in the joint parliamentary resolution rejecting racism that was passed in 1996, and avoided it in speeches that nevertheless courted the ethnic constituency. The Howard government effectively marginalised multiculturalism as an issue by keeping some of its paraphernalia while emphasising common political values and national unity. As we have seen, that was essentially what multiculturalism had already become in the Keating Labor rendition. There was some scaling down of immigration but, more significantly, an increasingly shrill rhetoric of border control and mandatory detention of asylum seekers.

Philip Ruddock became Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs in the Howard government, and in 1997 revamped membership of the National Multicultural Affairs Council under the chairmanship of Neville Roach, a senior Melbourne business executive and former Asian migrant. The Council issued a discussion paper *Multicultural Australia: The Way Forward* in December 1997, seeking input into its inquiry about a policy and implementation strategy for the next decade. Its terms of reference had greater emphasis on unifying values and national unity than on cultural diversity. According to chairman Roach's introduction, shared 'core values, principles and institutions' with a special Australian quality were the basis of national unity. These included 'a "fair go", mutual

respect, egalitarianism, parliamentary democracy, the rule of law, freedom of religion and expression, equality of opportunity irrespective of race, religion, origin, language, gender, physical or mental capacity or social and economic circumstances, and the rejection of bigotry and prejudice'.⁴⁰ In launching the discussion paper at the Melbourne Town Hall, Howard showed how difficult it was, even for him, to stay clear of at least some derivative of the 'M' word. 'What this paper does is to open up some of the issues', he said, 'not to call in question the commitment of Australia to multiculturalism or to diversity or to the underlying principles'.⁴¹ If multiculturalism was bad enough, multiculturalism was even worse. Chairman Roach preferred to stick with the old term, but his rendition of it was effusively inclusive:

The reality is that multiculturalism is about and for all Australians. Multiculturalism is about mainstream Australia, because mainstream Australia is multicultural. Our cultural diversity touches all Australians, benefits all Australians; its success has been achieved by all Australians and it should be cherished and celebrated by all Australians.⁴²

Howard's distaste for multiculturalism was long-standing but motivated as much by political expediency as personal taste. Howard's attack on multiculturalism had backfired upon his leadership position in 1988, but a decade later his strong commitment to traditional Australian values was a political advantage in heading off the appeal of Pauline Hanson's One Nation party. Hanson had burst on the national political stage in 1996 by winning a House of Representatives seat as the member for Oxley, Bill Hayden's old Ipswich seat that was traditionally Labor voting, after being expelled from the Liberal party for her racist comments. Critical of Asian migrants and Aborigines, Hanson provided the public voice for a rump of traditional voters resentful of the changes to Australian society and political economy. The election of ten One Nation candidates in the 1998 Queensland election (relying upon National party preferences) sent shock waves through the mainstream parties and seemed in danger of compromising the Liberal party in Queensland and Western Australia and undermining the National party. As prime minister, Howard refused to condemn Hanson in the unequivocal terms that many thought were needed to arrest the spread of her appeal and preserve Australia's reputation abroad. Instead, Howard persisted with his championing of Australian traditions and national unity. That plus a brave commitment to tax reform including a new goods and services tax was sufficient to retain office in 1999. By adopting tough government policy and rhetoric on refugees and border control, Howard had outflanked Hanson. By the 2001 election, Hansen was a spent force and claimed that Howard had taken over much of the content of her policies.

By this time multiculturalism had been effectively gutted as a national policy. In cultural terms, it had been reduced to acknowledging diversity by its architects and political leaders. Such diversity was not that of enduring separate cultures, but of an enriched and more pluralistic national culture that was predominantly English speaking and derived from earlier British and Irish migrants. In policy terms, multiculturalism had become an invocation of Australian liberal democratic values and political institutions. Linguistically, according to its leading progenitors such as Zubrzycki and Gobbo, the term had become inappropriate.

Prime Minister Howard finally accepted 'Australian multiculturalism'—with strong emphasis on Australian—at least sufficiently to launch the National Multiculturalism Advisory Council's report *Australian multiculturalism for a new century: Towards inclusiveness* in April 1999. That report, however, was a rather innocuous and somewhat garbled version of multiculturalism as Australian values and citizenship. Australia has a 'pluralist democracy', the report affirmed, and 'Australian multiculturalism has been built on the evolving values of Australian democracy and "citizenship"'. Diversity was recognised as a fact rather than as an end in itself, and valued as 'a great cultural, social and economic resource'. The report claimed that 'Australian multiculturalism' had 'at its core ... the same values that are embedded in the notion of "citizenship", including tolerance and a commitment to freedom and equal

opportunity'. Even John Howard's old favourites, mateship and a fair go, were incorporated in the revamped version.⁴³

Multiculturalism is now used more by governments at the national and state levels as rhetoric of community relations that aims at social cohesion. The Council for Multicultural Australia, was established in July 2000, and charged with implementing *A New Agenda for Multicultural Australia*. Its purpose is to promote the benefits of diversity to business and to oversee the implementation of a charter of public service in a culturally diverse society. Its vision statement proclaims:

A united and harmonious Australia, built on the foundations of Australian democracy, and developing our continually evolving nationhood by recognising embracing, valuing and investing in our heritage and cultural diversity.⁴⁴

Symbolic of this reorientation of multiculturalism is Harmony Day that has been officially promoted on 21 March of each year since 1999 to coincide with the United Nations International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. Schools, businesses and voluntary organisations are all encouraged to plan events of celebration in local communities. In 2002, the leading civil society groups such as the Guides, Scouts, Returned and Services League and Surf Life Saving clubs all sponsored Harmony Day with its emphasis on civic duty and the tolerance of all Australians. In a similar vein, Australian Citizenship Day has been declared as 17 September and launched in 2001. On Citizenship Day, local councils are encouraged to plan special affirmation ceremonies for those who are already Australian citizens as well as scheduling the more traditional citizenship ceremonies for new Australians.

Whether for these or other reasons, the uptake of citizenship by permanent residents has been spectacularly successful in the 1990s. According to the 2001 census, uptake among permanent residents eligible to take out citizenship has reached 95 per cent, compared with only 50 per cent in the 1960s and 70 per cent in 1991. This current high uptake figure is consistent with what we would expect for permanent settlers selected on the basis of economic skills and ability to integrate into Australian society. As well, the enhanced rates reflect widespread acceptance in the 1990s by many countries of the concept of dual citizenship that allows newcomers to become Australian citizens without renouncing allegiance to their country of birth.

High uptake rates are not everything. While it is now easier to become an Australian citizen, breaking the nexus between national culture and citizenship and understanding citizenship as civic practices means that citizenship entails less. Citizenship in Australia, as in other countries, has traditionally been nourished by sentiments of loyalty and patriotism that help sustain political community and national security. We might all be multiculturalists now, as Nathan Glezer said of America where multiculturalism has come to mean tolerance for different lifestyles.⁴⁵ But marrying a watered down multiculturalism with citizenship as has been done in Australia weakens citizenship and reduces it to an affirmation of civic values. These might be readily shared by all but have little attraction for most. If multiculturalism means Australian political values and citizenship, we might well ask why the term is not jettisoned altogether. Although having diminishing political salience and much real policy content, it continues to be used among ethnic groups and government officials nurtured on earlier policies. Prime Minister Howard avoids the term, while Labor in federal opposition and in some of the states has adopted 'Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs' as more acceptable nomenclature for their policies and institutions.

Multiculturalism was always a conceptual muddle of prescription and description. It mixed up alternative visions of what Australia might be, if cultural differences had been more significant and had persisted over time, with what was actually happening with the integration of postwar migrants and the development of a richer and more diverse national culture. Multiculturalism as a national ideology reified ideas about cultural differences that were exaggerated and, if pushed too far, politically perverse. 'We should stop pretending that

multiculturalism is a constitutive principle of the nation', as Viviani has concluded, 'and remove its role as the repository of special services for some groups'. Instead, it should have the more appropriate status as 'an accepted norm of decent behaviour'.⁴⁶ At the same time we should appreciate that there is a richer understanding of Australian citizenship as membership in a political community of people with a particular history sharing a unique country. Being or becoming an Australian citizen means sharing in that history and heritage.

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- ¹² National Multicultural Advisory Council, *Australian Multiculturalism for a New Century: towards inclusiveness*, pp. 6-14.
- ¹³ Jordens, *Alien to Citizen: Settling migrants in Australia, 1945-75*, and Jordens, *Redefining Australians: immigration, citizenship and national identity*.
- ¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 189; and Zappala and Castles, 'Citizenship and Immigration in Australia'.
- ¹⁵ Price, 'The Ethnic Character of the Australian Population', p. 84.
- ¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 85.
- ¹⁷ Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, *Second Generation Australians*.
- ¹⁸ Grassby, 'A Multi-Cultural Society for the Future', paper prepared for the Cairnmiller Institute's symposium *Strategy 2000: Australia for tomorrow*.
- ¹⁹ Zubrzycki, 'The evolution of the policy of multiculturalism in Australia 1968, 1995'.
- ²⁰ Australian Ethnic Affairs Council, 'Australia as a Multicultural Society', submission to the Australian Population and Immigration Council on the green paper *Immigration policies and Australia's population*.
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- ²² Review of Post-arrival Programs and Services for Migrants, Galbally (Chair), *Migrant Services and Programs: report of the Review of Post-arrival Programs and Services for Migrants, May 1978*.
- ²³ Fraser, *Multiculturalism: Australia's Unique Achievement*, p. 3.
- ²⁴ Australian Council on Population and Ethnic Affairs, *Multiculturalism for all Australians: our developing nationhood*, p. 27.
- ²⁵ Zubrzycki, 'The evolution of the policy of multiculturalism in Australia 1968, 1995', pp. 4-5.
- ²⁶ Australian Council on Population and Ethnic Affairs, *Multiculturalism for all Australians: our developing nationhood*, p. 2.
- ²⁷ Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, *National consultations on multiculturalism and citizenship, August 1982*, p. 2.
- ²⁸ Committee of Review of Migrant and Multicultural Programs and Services and Jupp, *Don't Settle for Less: report of the Committee for Stage I of the Review of Migrant and Multicultural Programs and Services*.
- ²⁹ Theophanous, *Understanding Multiculturalism and Australian Identity*, p. 61.
- ³⁰ Rubenstein, 'What's Wrong with Multiculturalism', p. 119.
- ³¹ Australian Institute of Multicultural Affairs, *Future Directions for Multiculturalism: final report of the Council of the Australian Institute of Multicultural Affairs*, p. 9.
- ³² *Ibid.*, p. 25.
- ³³ *Ibid.*, p. 30.
- ³⁴ Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet and the Office of Multicultural Affairs, *National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia: sharing our future*, p. 7.
- ³⁵ Committee to Advise on Australia's Immigration Policies, *Immigration, a commitment to Australia*, p. 119.
- ³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 10.
- ³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 11.
- ³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 58.
- ³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 59.
- ⁴⁰ *The Australian*, 4-5 June 1988, editorial.
- ⁴¹ *Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates*, House of Representatives, 17 March 1988, pp. 1003-5.
- ⁴² *The Australian* 14 March 1988.
- ⁴³ *The Australian*, 30 April 1988.
- ⁴⁴ Liberal Party of Australia, *Future Directions: its time for plain thinking*, p. 89.
- ⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 92-3.
- ⁴⁶ Keating, speech to the Global Cultural Diversity Conference, p. 12
- ⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 14.
- ⁴⁸ Zubrzycki, 'The evolution of the policy of multiculturalism in Australia 1968, 1995', p. 6.
- ⁴⁹ Gobbo, 'Criticisms of Multiculturalism', pp.16-17.
- ⁵⁰ Roach (chair), National Multicultural Advisory Council, *Multicultural Australia: The Way Forward*, p. 4.
- ⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 3.
- ⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 2.
- ⁵³ National Multicultural Advisory Council, *Australian Multiculturalism for a New Century: towards inclusiveness*, pp. 7, 9, 41-2.
- ⁵⁴ Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, *A New Agenda for Multicultural Australia*.

⁴⁵ Glezer, *We Are All Multiculturalists Now*.

⁴⁶ Viviani, 'Multiculturalism: why it's gone astray'.