

Helped or Hindered?
Pauline Hanson's One Nation and the Party
Cartelisation Thesis

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Abstract

In the course of arguing that party systems are not in decline but simply changing, Katz and Mair caution that the change from catch-all to cartel may prove counter-productive - in particular, by creating a rallying cry for parties of the extreme right. This paper examines this claim in relation to changes in the Australian party system, and the rise of Pauline Hanson's One Nation. It argues against the idea that One Nation represented a mobilisation against an ideological consensus, that it broke through an electoral system rigged increasingly against minor parties, and that it was disadvantaged by the growing reliance of the major parties on state subventions, especially public funding. In important ways, the major parties have been sharply divided. Insofar as they have operated as a cartel, this dates from the first half of the twentieth century, a period Katz and Mair associate with mass parties, even catch-all parties, not with cartels.

In their widely celebrated article on changing party models in liberal democracies, Richard Katz and Peter Mair argue that since the 1970s parties have increasingly 'become part of the state apparatus itself' (1995, 14-15) and that this has set 'the stage for the emergence of a new party type', the cartel party, 'in which colluding parties become agents of the state and employ the resources of the state (the party state) to ensure their own collective survival' (1995, 5). The cartel party adds a new model to an evolutionary line: the elite party of the nineteenth century, the mass party that dominated from the 1880s to the end of the 1950s, and the catch-all party that emerged after 1945 (1995, 18)

Under a cartelised party system, the 'essence of democracy' continues to lie 'in the currying of public favour by elites, rather than public involvement in policy-making', a characteristic feature of the catch-all system. However, in relation to the parties alternating in office it is 'fundamentally different'. With cartels all the main parties are 'parties of government' and 'none of the major parties is ever definitively "out"'. This generates a sense that 'the rulers control the ruled, rather than other way around'. As a result, elections become part of the 'dignified' part of the constitution, to use Bagehot's description, rather than part of the 'efficient'. Elections implicate voters in legitimising rituals and, in the process, delegitimise other, potentially more effective, channels of participation and involvement (1995, 21-2).

With the established parties 'unwilling or unable to express some demands', elections fail to perform 'even the minimal feedback function that the new [catch-all] model of democracy assigns them' (1995, 23; but cf. Kitschelt 2000). This may give rise to the 'demand to "break the mould" of established parties' or it may see the birth of 'alternative organisations', including some on the extreme right that may be 'short-lived and strident', but which tap into 'radical dissatisfaction', express 'a profoundly undemocratic and often xenophobic opposition to the consensus' and assume a capacity 'to break up what they often refer to as the "cosy" arrangements that exist between the established political alternatives'. This is not a challenge to parties as such; rather, it is a challenge to parties that operate as a cartel (1995, 24-25).

The distinguishing characteristics of cartel parties can be grouped under three broad headings: ideological, electoral and organisational. The *ideological* dimension is easily stated. According to Katz and Mair, under a cartelised system party programs become increasingly similar. Whereas with mass parties the contest over the distribution of privileges – social reform or opposition to it - is central, and under the catch-all model the parties do battle over issues of 'social amelioration rather than wholesale reform', in the age of the cartel claims and counter claims are limited to questions of 'efficient and effective management'. This, in turn, reinforces the sense of rulers versus ruled.

In relation to *electoral* matters, they argue, cartel parties regard themselves as agents of the state rather than as delegates of specific constituencies (the mass party model) or entrepreneurs at large (the catch-all model). Instead of belonging to civil society, as representatives of newly relevant segments (mass party), or as brokers competing between civil society and the state (catch-all), cartel parties become part of the state. And while mass parties' attempt to 'segment the electorate into a series of exclusive constituencies', and catch all parties compete for foot-loose voters around 'questions

of policy effectiveness', a cartel party's 'limited incentive to compete' is sometimes replaced by incentives not to compete' (1995, 19-20).

Looked at in *organisational* terms, cartel parties are 'capital intensive, professional and centralised'. They rely on 'subventions and other benefits from the state'. And they have privileged access to state regulated channels of communication. At every point, they use the state to erect barriers to 'the emergence of new groups'; often by tying state subventions or privileged access to the electronic media to 'prior party performance or position, whether defined in terms of electoral success or parliamentary representation'. Mass parties, by contrast, are 'highly labour intensive', depend on membership fees and subscriptions, and have their own independent channels of communications. Catch-all parties, too, are quite different. Although they represent the beginnings of a more capital-intensive stage, they are largely funded by their memberships; while partly dependent on members for campaign work, they also rely on a variety of other sources; and while maintaining their own channels of communication to reach supporters, they rely more on access to a non-partisan communication network via 'professional publicists and media experts'.

Where does the Australian party system fit in all this? Katz and Mair flesh out their account of changing party systems by focusing on Europe. They are at pains to emphasise that their account is ideal-typical: 'all of these models represent heuristically convenient polar types, to which individual parties might approximate more or less closely at any given time' (1995, 19). They are even prepared to acknowledge contrary trends (1995, 25 note 4 for Britain). But there is nothing explicitly on Australia.

This paper, by testing how well the thesis applies in Australia, goes some way to filling this gap. It is partly concerned with the case for thinking of the Australian party system as one that is dominated by a cartel; or, more to the point, for thinking

that Australia's politics is dominated by a cartel that did not emerge until the 1970s. It is partly concerned with the argument that the major parties have combined in recent years to make conditions for minor parties increasingly difficult. And it is partly concerned with establishing whether the emergence of Pauline Hanson's One Nation is best understood as representing a revolt against all of this; a central correlate of the cartel model is that it should. Each of these parts is integral to the whole.

To see whether the theory of the cartel illuminates the Hanson phenomenon we need to consider both the extent to which the parties have behaved as a cartel, and the nature of The One Nation challenge, across each of the domains covered by the theory: ideological, electoral and organisational.

Ideological Consensus

Much of what has been written about the rise of Pauline Hanson – by Hanson, herself, though not by her alone – argues that she articulated the concerns of an electorate whose views on a range of issues had been ignored by the major parties. The electoral success of Hanson and One Nation, 'were rightly seen as results of the failure of the established political parties – Labor, Liberal and National - to give the people what they want', argues Judith Brett (1998, 26), from the left. Or as Paul Sheehan, from the right, put it, quoting Hanson's maiden speech: 'the key to Pauline Hanson's rise in Australian politics are these words – "for far too long ordinary Australians have been kept out of major debates by the political parties"' (1998, 222). On important issues, so the argument runs, the parties of government had become indistinguishable from one another and the positions they held were at odds with 'the people', or 'ordinary Australians', wanted. Under these conditions, One Nation simply moved into 'virgin space abandoned by the major parties' (DeAngelis 2003, 91).

The areas in which the major parties, allegedly, had failed to distinguish themselves ranged from issues of social liberalism, particularly around race, to issues of what has become known in Australia as economic rationalism – roughly speaking, the idea that governments should make themselves scarce and let the market rip. Public opinion, many said, had grown hostile to Aboriginal demands, was overwhelmingly opposed to immigration (especially Asian immigration) and to multiculturalism, and had never supported economic rationalism or the neo-liberal agenda in any of its guises – the privatisation of government enterprises, the dismantling of protection or the opening up of the country to foreign investors. Yet both the Labor and the Liberal-National parties pandered to Aborigines, maintained immigration and multiculturalism, and were hell-bent on policies that stripped away protection and exposed Australian workers to the chill winds of international competition.

But had the parties converged? Let us start with policies towards Aborigines; this, of course, is where Hanson herself started. Although none of the major parties endorsed her attacks on 'governments' for 'shower[ing Aborigines] with money, facilities and opportunities that only those people [Aborigines] can obtain', endorsed her accusations that Aborigines themselves were 'the main instigators of crimes and violence', or lent their support to her assault on the courts for giving Aborigines 'lenient sentences' (*Queensland Times*, 6 January 1996; *Courier-Mail*, 15 February 1996) – for the Liberals, her views in the *Courier-Mail* proving the last straw (Dodd 1997, 39-42; Williams 1997, 245-51) - it hardly follows that the Government and Opposition shared a platform on every important aspect of Aboriginal policy.

On the contrary, on major issues the two sides were very much at odds. While Labor attempted to legislate for land rights, John Howard had long seen land rights and any notion of 'hereditary guilt' as 'fundamentally wrong' (cited in Barnett and Goward 1997, 508). Nor was he the only member of the Opposition to take the fight to Labor. 'It should be remembered', Labor's Minister for Aboriginal Affairs, 1990 and 1996, recalls 'that Pauline Hanson did not pioneer cruel and baseless attacks on

Aboriginal people and organisations: the coalition developed them into an art-form during the Mabo debate', in 1993; Tim Fischer, the National's leader, was 'first off the starting blocks' - with John Hewson, Liberal leader, not far behind (Tickner 2001, 132).

'For all of us', the Liberal Party's campaign slogan of 1996, was designed to capitalise, among other things, on a view in the electorate that Labor was too focused on Aboriginal issues. By 1994 Labor's polling in Western Australia and in Queensland was said to have shown that spending on Aborigines was seen as wasteful, even counter-productive. Worse, the provision of money and services to Aborigines had become 'a source of strong resentment among battlers'. The Party 'would have to begin working to correct the view that it stood only for minority causes' (Williams 1997, 47). This, apparently, it failed to do. In the election that saw Labor defeated, the Minister for Aboriginal Affairs lost his seat (Hughes, NSW) on an above average two-party preferred swing (11.3 percentage points compared with the state average of 7.0 percentage points). At the same time, the candidates most critical of Labor's Aboriginal policies - Pauline Hanson (appearing on the Oxley ballot paper in Queensland as a Liberal) and the National's Bob Katter (Kennedy, Qld) - recorded swings well above the average in the opposite direction - 17.3 percentage points in Oxley, won 'largely', Hanson was to tell the Parliament, 'on an issue that has resulted in me being called a racist'; and 11.6 percentage points in Kennedy, compared with a state-wide average of 8.7 percentage points (Jupp 1997, 81; Mackerras 1997, 211-3; Dodd 1997, 221 for Hanson's maiden speech).

What of immigration? Again, the idea of a bi-partisan consensus - even conspiracy - on this issue was not confined to Hanson. In an influential contribution to public discussion, written shortly before the 1993 election, Ian McAllister claimed that immigration was an issue that 'party political elites' had 'almost totally ignored' - and had done so, he insisted, for good reason. While Labor's policy was 'unpopular', and the issue opened up 'great electoral opportunities' for their opponents, all parties

needed to 'avoid issues' that could 'jeopardise internal party unity', 'divide the social bases' on which they depended for 'electoral success', or threaten 'regime survival'. So, in the post-war years, there had been a 'consensus' between the major parties to keep immigration off the electoral agenda (1993, 161-4; 2002, 404). In launching the book in which McAllister's chapter appears, the then Prime Minister, Bob Hawke, singled out his chapter. What McAllister had observed, he said was absolutely true and the fact that it was true was a cause for celebration (Devine 1998). Since then, the chapter has been widely cited in the public debate by commentators as dispirit as Margot Kingston (1993, 2) on the left and David Flint (2003, 10) on the right.

But what sort of consensus had there been under Hawke? In 1984, after Geoffrey Blainey launched his attack on the rate of Asian immigration, the Shadow Minister, Michael Hodgman - galvanised by a survey that indicated large numbers might change their vote over the issue (Goot 1984, 22) - complained 'increasingly stridently about deliberate discrimination against those of British stock and an anti-English speaking bias against prospective immigrants'; not until another front-bencher, John Howard, intervened to extoll the virtues of 'tolerance, diversity and a non-discriminatory policy' did the Party retreat (Rubenstein 1993, 151). In 1988, Howard himself, now Party leader, 'provoked intense debate and sustained criticism' - which the Victorian Liberals thought helped cost them an election and which eventually cost Howard his job - after he supported calls for Asian immigration to be 'slowed down a little' and attacked multiculturalism as 'divisive'; on Asian immigration, at least, he was supported by National Party leaders Ian Sinclair in the House of Representatives and John Stone in the Senate (Rubenstein 1993, 153; Kelly 1994, 460ff). And in the course of the 1990 federal election campaign, when the Coalition seemed destined for defeat, the new Liberal leader, Andrew Peacock, made an issue of Labor's proposal for a multi-function polis - a Japanese-sponsored technological city - by rejecting any development that 'would establish an enclave', be 'socially divisive' and 'risk a backlash against foreign investment and immigration'. On this occasion, it was Hawke himself who accused Peacock not of 'dog whistle' politics -

the term had not entered the lexicon - but of being 'dangerously opportunistic' and of running a line that, like Howard's in 1988, had racial resonances. This 'unexpected issue' ran for several days (Warhurst 1990, 27-8; Lloyd 1990, 105).

'Immigration and multiculturalism', Hanson conceded in her maiden speech, 'are issues that this [Coalition] government is trying to address' (cited in Dodd 1997, 224). Did voters distinguish between the parties on immigration? They did, on the evidence furnished by Newspoll and the Australian Election Study (AES). From mid-1990 until the founding of One Nation, in April 1997, Newspoll's respondents almost always said that the 'best party' to 'handle immigration' was the Coalition. In September 1996 and January 1997, in the last polls taken before the launch of One Nation, roughly two-thirds of respondents said that either Labor or the Coalition would be 'best' on immigration, with the Coalition leading Labor by 17 percentage points in the first poll and 13 in the second; on only four of the other twelve issues – the balance of payments (the Coalition ahead by 25 points in November, 29 points in January), inflation (20, 24), interest rates (18, 22) and taxation (12, 15) – was the Coalition's lead over Labor as great as it was on immigration (newspoll.com.au). In the AES, also conducted after the 1996 election, two-thirds of the respondents preferred the Coalition to Labor, or vice versa, on immigration, the Coalition enjoying a net lead of 25 percentage points. Of the other twelve issues, only two – unemployment (a 23 point margin in favour of the Coalition) and taxation (a 20 point margin its favour) – generated comparable figures (Bean, et al. 2001).¹

What of economic issues? While One Nation, together with New Zealand First, may have been 'the first radical right-wing populist party to try to build a broad populist movement against globalisation' (Betz 2002,), Hanson, herself, gave such issues much less emphasis than she gave issues of ethnicity or race. In her maiden speech she lamented the high level of unemployment; she sought an end to further privatisation, though without putting forward any proposal to renationalise; she decried the decline in Australia's standard of living and the rise of foreign debt; she

called for lower interest rates, though only for business; and she railed against foreign aid, the World Health Organisation and the UN. Yet, apart from the issue of unemployment and immediately related issues like tariffs, which received passing mention, and the reintroduction of national service, for which she argued at greater length, Hanson devoted little more than a sentence or two to any of these things. Roughly half her speech was devoted to Aborigines, immigration (with little attempt to link it to unemployment), and multiculturalism; barely a fifth was concerned with unemployment, privatisation, interest rates, or the standard of living. Neither her maiden speech nor the speech she delivered at the launch of One Nation, seven months later, paid much attention to foreign investment, multinational businesses or international trade (see Dodd 1997, 221-33).

Whatever the stress on economic issues, the argument that the major parties had converged on matters of the economy is as questionable as the argument that they had converged on Aborigines or immigration (Goot 2004). Certainly, there is not much evidence in the polls for this convergence. In 1996, on the issue of unemployment, two thirds (67 per cent) of those who responded to the AES survey thought either the Coalition or Labor was 'closer' to 'their own views', the margin in favour of the Coalition (23 percentage points) being quite substantial. On privatisation, more than half (55 per cent) thought one side closer to their own views, with the margin in favour of the Coalition a more modest one (9 percentage points). And on interest rates, slightly less than half (48 per cent) thought one side closer to their own views, with a margin in favour of the Coalition (10 percentage points) again modest. Unfortunately, questions to do with which party was closer to the respondents' own position on issues like foreign investment, multinational businesses or international trade, were not raised.

If the data suggest that on the sorts of issues – Aborigines and immigration - that made Hanson's politics most distinctive respondents saw, or were very likely to have seen, major party differences, it is difficult to argue that One Nation emerged out of a

sense that on the issues the major parties offered little choice. On the contrary, the fact that the Coalition enjoyed a substantial lead over Labor as the side to which survey respondents felt closer counts against the view that 'opportunities for extreme rightist mobilization depend on the convergence between moderate left and moderate right parties' (Kitschelt 1995, 53; see also Betz 1994, 35, 41, 169-70; 2002)³. Instead, it lends weight to the view that it was precisely because the Coalition had opened up and thereby legitimised certain positions, that Hanson and subsequently One Nation were able to win votes (Brett 1997, 9; Johnson 2000, 20). As Piero Ignazi has argued, more generally, 'the shift to the right of the conservative parties' in Europe 'did not inhibit the emergence of more extreme [right] parties'; rather, 'it paved the way' for them (1992, 20; 2003, 208-12).

As to the question of what issues actually mattered, respondents in the 1998 AES who said they had voted for One Nation appear to have been driven by their attitudes to Aborigines, their concerns about immigration, and their general political alienation. While many have attributed the rise of One Nation to Hanson's opposition to globalisation (see, for example, Sheehan 1998, 245, 271; Howard, cited in Johnson 2000, 20; Kelly 2000, 152; DeAngelis 2003, 86ff; but cf. Betz 2002,), there is little to warrant it. One Nation respondents may have been opposed to lower tariffs, for example; but so, too, were most respondents. Financial insecurity among One Nation voters explained very little. In so far as policy issues rather than political alienation mattered at all, it was not economic rationalism or their status as the 'victims' of globalisation that drove their vote (Goot and Watson 1999, 179, 187; also Peel 2003).

At a more abstract level, those who voted for One Nation were able to distinguish between the Coalition and Labor. Asked, in the 1998 AES, to rate each of the parties on a left-right scale, One Nation respondents put themselves on the right (6.1 on a 0-10 scale, mid-point of 5.0), with the Liberals (5.9) and Nationals (5.7), and Labor on the left (4.1), with the Democrats (4.4) and Greens (3.8); whatever the party for which

other respondents had voted, they placed One Nation on the right as well - 5.9 according to Liberals, to 6.8 according to the Greens (Bean 2000, 145-6). It is difficult to imagine that One Nation voters, or voters who supported in any of the other parties, placed Hanson's party close to the Coalition because of some commonality on economic issues; easier to think that what they had in mind had to do with issues of a different stripe.

With Katz and Mair - and even Kitschelt (2000, 166) who is otherwise critical of their thesis - arguing that policy convergence helps explain why it matters less to voters these days which party wins (1996, 530), the evidence from Australia hardly reassures. Survey respondents were just as likely to report 'a good deal' of difference between the major parties in 1993 as they were in 1946 or 1948; or, just as unlikely in 1998 and 1996 as in 1973 or 1967. And respondents were no less likely to care 'a good deal' which party won in 1998 or 1996 than they were in 1969 or 1967 (Goot 2002, 37-38).

The Electoral System

Australian electoral systems are multifaceted, differ between jurisdictions, and change over time. Compulsory enrolment and compulsory voting for citizens' aged 18 and over (or permanent residents who arrived from the Commonwealth before 1984) are almost the only things they have in common. Since the 1970s, the period Katz and Mair associate with the rise of party cartels, every electoral system has changed in some significant way. However, it does not follow that the changes have strengthened the grip of the major parties or that whatever cartel-like practices the parties have developed date from this period.

Compulsory Voting

In Australia, compulsory voting dates from the 1920s, from the heyday of the mass party. Both sides of politics supported its introduction because it saved them the trouble of getting out the vote and addressed what was at times an embarrassingly low turnout. Moreover, it was not clear that compulsory voting would favour either the Labor Party or the main non-Labor party, at least where provision was made for absentee voting (Goot 1985, 192-3, 203-4). But far from 'favouring the two major party groupings' at the expense of the minor parties (Weller and Fleming 2003, 21), the minor parties were 'obvious beneficiaries and keen supporters' (Jackman 2001). Without compulsory voting, those dissatisfied with the major parties would be inclined to sit out the election; with compulsory voting, they are likely to vote for a minor party instead.

A major party cartel might have moved against a system that helped minor parties. But no such move was ever contemplated. By the mid-1980s, evidence began to mount that Labor benefited from compulsory voting at expense of the Coalition (Goot 1985, 204-5; McAllister 1986). Increasingly it was clear that on this issue the two sides did not share an interest. In the mid-1990s, when the Liberals attempted to end compulsory voting in South Australia, and recommended its removal from federal elections as well, not only did the minor parties oppose the move; the Labor Party did, too (Jackman 1999).

Exhaustive Preferential Voting

Exhaustive (or compulsory) preferential voting pre-dates the introduction of compulsory voting. Under this system a vote is valid only if all the candidates on the ballot paper are ranked; importantly, those who vote for a minor party ultimately have to express a preference for one of the major parties on the ballot. These preferences may be distributed if no candidate enjoys an absolute majority, and occasionally they reverse the result.

Far from discouraging a minor party vote, exhaustive preferential voting may have encouraged it (Reilly 2001, 78). The system allows each side of politics to maximise its vote by having more than one of its candidates contest an election; however, generally the non-Labor side pushed for it and used it. During the 1950s and 'sixties, following the Labor split, exhaustive preferential advantaged the Coalition in another way: it helped it harvest the votes won by the DLP; in turn, this encouraged Labor to think of ways of changing it (Reynolds 1974, 70). But exhaustive preferential voting could also limit the threat posed to a major party by minimising the damage minor parties could inflict when they split the major parties' vote; in marking their ballot, electors who wanted to punish a party were encouraged to give the preference that 'really counted' back to the party whose position on other issues remained closest to their own. Thus, for much of the 1990s the partisan impact of exhaustive preferential voting was reversed. The highpoint was 1990 when Labor secured a disproportionate share of preferences from the Australian Democrats and the Greens – enough to get itself elected and to give minor parties a government relatively well-disposed to their concerns (Reilly 2001, 84-8).

'Preference distribution in Australia', Ben Reilly notes, 'has almost never facilitated the common collaboration of both major parties' (2001, 89). However, many saw the major parties' response to Hanson as changing that. In the 1998 federal election, Labor, the Liberals (except in Western Australia) and the Nationals (except for five of their Queensland candidates) placed One Nation last (Jaensch 2000, 15; Ward and Rae 2000, 114). Nowhere was the effect more significant than in the Queensland seat of Blair where Hanson secured 36 per cent of the first preferences, easily led the field, but failed to win the seat; placed third, a Liberal won Blair with just 22 per cent of the first preference vote. The conclusion seemed unavoidable: here was a clear-cut case where 'the major parties decided effectively to eliminate what they saw as a dangerous aberration in the political system by bringing their combined forces to bear against One Nation in general and Hanson in particular' (Reilly 2001, 90-1; see also: Kingston 1999, 233; Ward et al. 2000, 10).

Is another reading possible? It is. Labor's decision to place not just Hanson but all One Nation's candidates last – a decision driven by its ideology, by its keen sense of self-preservation, and the opportunity to drive a wedge into the Liberal's electoral base - dated from the 1998 Queensland election. On that occasion, both the Nationals and the Liberals placed One Nation ahead of Labor in every seat except one (Sunnybank, where One Nation had pre-selected a candidate of Chinese background). The Nationals put One Nation ahead of Labor because they felt, correctly, that their seats were under threat both from One Nation (whose support was to be secured by an exchange of preferences) and from Labor; the Liberals may have directed their preferences to One Nation because they did not want to be out of step with the Nationals, their putative partner in a coalition. If the strategy of the National and Liberal parties paid off outside Brisbane, where it won five seats from Labor and failed only narrowly to secure the re-election of the Borbidge Government (Ward and Rae 2000, 114), in Brisbane the strategy badly back-fired: urban voters 'punished' the Liberals for directing preferences to One Nation (Reynolds 2001, 156).

Labor had no common cause with the Coalition on this issue; on the contrary, it would have suited the Party well if the Liberals, in particular, had continued down the same path from the state election to the federal election. The fact that the Liberals decided not to do so had nothing to do with any arrangement with Labor and everything to do with protecting its own base – and not from One Nation so much as from the Labor Party. Hanson, herself, was both a key target and collateral damage.

Optional Preferential Voting

If exhaustive preferential voting, which has long operated at the federal level, is not weighted against minor parties, what of optional or non-exhaustive preferential voting? When New South Wales Labor introduced an optional system for Legislative Assembly elections, in 1981, it wanted to achieve two ends: firstly, a reduction in the

level of informal voting occasioned by having both an exhaustive preferential system for the Legislative Assembly and a system of optional preferential voting (electors only having to list 15 candidates) for the Legislative Council, a complexity that had damaged Labor in 1978 (Turner 1985, 80); secondly, disruption to the exchange of preferences between Liberals and Nationals in three-cornered contests. While optional preferential voting did not have much impact on the level of informal voting (Turner 1985, 82), the slippage in the exchange of preferences and the rise in exhausted votes (ballots where some names were left unmarked) made the continuation of three-cornered contests by the Coalition 'highly dysfunctional' (Chaples 1985, 224-5, 233, 281-2). From 1981, three-cornered contests and parties running multiple candidates declined and eventually the Nationals adopted a policy that prevented the Party from participating in three-cornered contests; only recently has that policy been dropped (Allen 2003).

When Labor re-introduced optional preferential voting into Queensland in 1992 - it had been used previously between 1893 and 1941- it did so because it had committed itself in advance to implementing the recommendations of the Electoral and Administrative Review Commission, a body mandated by the Fitzgerald Commission. Happily, optional preferential voting suited Labor; the opposition, fearing its implications for three-cornered contests, opposed it (Reynolds 2001, 1-4).

In the 2001 Queensland election, in what John Wanna described as 'the most impressive and masterful tactic of the campaign' (Bennett 2001, 11), Deputy Premier Terry Mackenroth, followed by Premier Beattie, advised voters to 'Just vote 1'; in 1984, Labor in New South Wales had not allocated preferences (Turner 2001b, 245). Apart from disrupting the exchange of preferences between Liberal and National, and between Liberal, National and One Nation, it reduced the chances that Labor's preferences would help elect a Liberal, National or One Nation candidate. No fewer than nine of the 23 Nationals elected in 1998 had depended on Labor preferences and

'many' National MPs, 'facing a strong One Nation challenge, would not be elected without ALP preferences' (Wanna 2001, 40).

On Labor voters, the effect was dramatic. In the eleven seats in which individual ballots were subsequently examined and in the two seats with three candidates where Labor finished last ((Reynolds and Daw 2002, 14; author's calculations from Bennett 2001, Table 3), more than three-quarters of Labor ballots were exhausted. In 1998, the exhaustion rate among Labor voters appeared to be closer to a third (Reynolds 2001, 7).

The impact on the non-Labor vote varied; the variations reflected differences in the ability of each party to influence its own voters. For the Liberals, the exhaustion rate in 2001 appears to have been no higher than it was in 1998. The Party derided Labor's no preference policy as 'climbing into bed' with 'a racist rabble' (cited in Bennett 2001, 5). In no seat did the Liberal Party ask voters to 'Just vote 1'; everywhere it put One Nation last, with only a third of the Liberal vote, in the Reynolds and Daws sample, allocating preferences contrary to the Party's advice. By contrast, the request by Rob Borbidge that the Nationals place One Nation last was widely ignored; between 19 (Bennett 2001, 5) and two-thirds (Wanna 2001, 41) of the Party's 50 candidates defied the leader. With National voters themselves just as likely to ignore the official line as to follow it, the proportion of exhausted ballots rose. One Nation had asked voters to preference against sitting members; half of them, however, declined to do so (Reynolds and Daw 2002, 14). The exhaustion rate – around 50 per cent - for One Nation, City Country Alliance and Independent voters appears to have been the higher than for any other group of non-Labor voters.

If, as Reynolds argues, optional preferential has 'radically' transformed Queensland electoral politics, it has happened at the expense not only of One Nation and the City Country Alliance - the 'pariah parties', as Reynolds calls them, disdainful of others

and 'unloved by anyone else' – but at a cost to the Liberal and National parties as well (Reynolds 2001, 5; Wanna 2003, 96; Reynolds and Daw 2002, 16).

Reduced Quotas for Upper Houses

At precisely the time when the major parties might have been forming a cartel, according to the timetable laid out by Katz and Mair, the chances of minor parties influencing legislative outcomes were being enhanced – not weakened – by another change, this one to Legislative Councils in New South Wales, South Australia, and Western Australia, and to the Senate.

Effective from 1978, Labor in New South Wales introduced a universal franchise for elections to the Legislative Council based on proportional representation. Arguably, this boosted the legitimacy of the Legislative Council, whose powers are largely co-equal with those of the Legislative Assembly; it established a relatively low threshold for parties seeking seats in a state-wide ballot (6.25 per cent in 1981, for the election of 15 members; 4.55 per cent, since 1995, for the election of 21 members); and it opened the way for minor parties to hold the balance of power, something forced on Labor by the Council's non-Labor majority (Turner 1985, 79-81; Green 1995, 17). Ticket voting was added in 1988; used by 86 per cent of voters in 1988 and 89 per cent in 1991, it has helped minor parties – not just major parties - control the flow of preferences.

In South Australia, Dunstan Labor had already negotiated the reform of the Legislative Council, effective from 1979; indeed, it was the model for New South Wales. Universal suffrage replaced a property suffrage; proportional representation was introduced; and, in an eleven-seat chamber the quota for election, 8.3 per cent, opened the way for the Democrats to hold the balance of power. A stronger party in South Australia than in any other state, the Democrats held the ring from 1982 to 1993 (Jaensch 1981, 230; McAllister et al 1997, 165).

In Western Australia, Labor under Brian Burke also negotiated a deal to reform the electoral system of the Legislative Council. From 1987 the state was divided into three metropolitan and three much smaller non-metropolitan regions, each with three electorates - two with five members, one with seven (Moon and Sharman 2003, 203; Phillips 1991, 234). With a quota of 12.5 per cent in the seven-member constituency, this arrangement also made it possible, though not easy,³ for minor parties to hold the balance of power.

Nor was the lowering of such thresholds confined to the states. In 1984, federal Labor persuaded the Nationals, against Liberal Party opposition, to support the idea that the House of Representatives be expanded (Richardson 1994, 144-7). Because of the constitutional nexus between the two chambers, this led to a larger Senate as well. The number of Senators elected from each state increased from ten to twelve. This reduced the quota for a seat from 9.1 per cent to 7.7 per cent at elections for the full Senate, and from 16.7 per cent to 14.3 per cent at elections for half the Senate.

For One Nation, in particular, the electoral reform of the upper houses, state and federal, had real consequences. In the 1998 election for half Senate, One Nation in Queensland polled 14.8 per cent, enough to see its number one candidate, Heather Hill, elected at the expense of the National Party's Bill O'Chee. Would she have won her seat if the quota for election had not been lowered? Almost certainly not; the recent analysis of the 1984 reform, arguing that made no 'substantive' difference to the 'the number of small parties' (Donovan 2000, 480), is mistaken. The only parties that directed preferences to One Nation were small parties of the right – Australia First, Citizens Electoral Council, and the Confederate Action Party – each of which garnered only a fraction of one per cent of the formal vote. Even if all their preferences had been delivered, Hill would have fallen some 20,000 votes short (Green 2003b, pers comm.). Again, without the reform of the New South Wales Legislative Council, One Nation's David Oldfield would not have not have been

elected; in 2003, with just 1.9 per cent of the vote, Pauline Hanson herself only narrowly missed out. And in Western Australia, where the Party inadvertently helped to elect two Greens, One Nation would have held the balance power to the upper house had it realised how well it and the Greens were to poll and had it played its preference card right.

Party Organisation

In terms of its organisation, One Nation has also benefited from changes made since the 1970s. Of particular relevance to the argument advanced by Katz and Mair are the introduction of public funding of campaigns, the registration of political parties, and the extension of access to state-run media.

Public Funding

Australia was 'one of the last western democracies to introduce public funding' of party campaigns (Amr and Lisowski 2001, 53). But public funding, coming on top of a long established rule that allowed tax-deductible election expenses by candidates, is now an important feature of four jurisdictions – New South Wales, the Commonwealth, Queensland and Victoria. In each case it was introduced by a major party; and everywhere it has been the major parties that have reaped the greatest windfalls, especially since nothing in the rules prevents parties from topping up their income from other sources – from trade unions and corporations especially. Nonetheless, the introduction of public funding was hardly the work of a unified cartel. And if the major parties have been the largest beneficiaries of the change, they have not been the only ones; on the contrary, it might be argued that the minor parties have benefited disproportionately. Certainly, those wanting the electoral barriers to minor party success dismantled had pressed for public funding (for example, Mayer 1980, 350). While it might be correct to say that in no democracy could the major parties organise a system of subsidies that entirely excluded the

minor parties (Katz and Mair 1996, 531), such a statement underestimates the extent to which minor parties have benefited from the system.

In New South Wales, the Wran Labor Government introduced public funding in 1981. The Coalition opposed it. Indeed, before the Liberal and National Country parties reversed their stand – the Liberals going so far as to seek funding retrospectively - both parties ‘tried to make opposition to the Public Funding Act a major issue of the 1981 election’, both ‘refused to register for funding’, and both ‘pledged to abolish the system if they won’ (Steketee and Cockburn 1986, 134; Chaples 1989, 79-80; also Starr 1980, for the Liberal’s case). Under the legislation, two-thirds of the funds were to be paid for each vote won by a party at the election for the Legislative Council; entitlements were to be determined on the basis of the current election not the previous one; and a threshold was set at half an election quota or 3.125 per cent of the state-wide vote. The rest of the money was to be divided equally among the contested seats for the Legislative Assembly and allocated on a proportional basis – save only that to qualify candidates had to have won at least one-fifth of the winner’s first preference vote, the same vote candidates needed to recover their deposit (Chaples 1989, 78-9; Turner 2001a, 194-5). New and minor parties benefited by the low thresholds, by the weight of money set aside for Legislative Council elections, and by fact that entitlements were determined on the basis of the current election not the previous one. Since they would have the lion’s share of the vote, the major parties were the main beneficiaries; but the Australian Democrats and the Call To Australia group also benefited from ‘significant funding’ (JSCEM 1983, 153; Chaples 1989, 81, for the disbursements in 1984).

For federal elections, public funding was introduced in 1984, under Hawke, after the First Report of the Joint Select Committee on Electoral Reform had recommended it (JSCEM 1983, Ch. 9). Again the Liberal and National parties opposed the move, partly on the grounds that it would favour incumbents. If such a system were to be introduced, the Liberals wanted two-thirds of the money set aside for candidates in

the Senate, and one-third for seats in the House (parallel to the split in New South Wales), with parties wishing to qualify needing to have won at least 10 per cent of the vote at the previous election for the Senate or 10 per cent of the vote in an election for the House. Labor wanted to reverse the allocations proposed by the Liberals for the Senate and the House, with a fifth of the money for House contests allocated to constituency campaigns rather than to the parties' secretariats; but, like the Liberals, it wanted a 10 per cent threshold too. The Nationals suggested that tax payers should be able to support the parties on a voluntary basis by assigning part of their tax to the parties; that under these conditions there should be no threshold; and that monies ear-marked for the parties should be allocated evenly between the candidates, the state organisation and the national body. The Democrats, the only minor party then in the Parliament, favoured the introduction of public funding and argued against any threshold.

In the event, the Committee recommended a 4 per cent threshold, closer to the Democrats' position than to that of the major parties; with a lower threshold, it was argued, fewer taxpayers would be funding parties for which they had not voted. While the threshold was 'considerably more lenient' than that adopted by Labor in New South Wales (Chaples 1989, 83), it discriminated against parties that received fewer votes than the Democrats (5 per cent in the House and nearly 10 per cent in the Senate in 1983) and to that extent made it 'harder for new entrants to break into parliament' (Weller and Fleming 2003, 29). Funding per vote was set at twice the value of a postage stamp, votes for seats in the Senate were set at half the value of votes for seats in the House, and paid to parties not candidates, something supported by the Government in the end and by the Democrats but opposed by the Opposition (Chaples 1989, 86). In addition, payments were to be based on the previous election, a rule that discriminated against new entrants whose chances of borrowing money, even on the basis of a promising performance in the opinion polls, were likely to be less bright than those of the major parties; it was to be set against campaign expenditure, paid only on the production of receipts; and it was to be paid in

advance of the next campaign. All of this was subsequently changed. Public funding is now only paid after an election, it is based on that election, and it is paid regardless of what the party actually spent.⁴ In 1996, the dollar value of a vote won in elections for the Senate tripled and was placed on a par with the value of a vote won in elections for the House (Amr and Lisowski 2001, 63); from 1998, One Nation – along with the Democrats and Brian Harradine - would be a substantial beneficiary.

When Queensland Labor introduced public funding of election campaigns in 1994 it essentially followed the Commonwealth model. Parties or candidates had to secure more than 4 per cent of the total formal vote, and the funds were only to reimburse properly documented campaign costs. These rules have remained unchanged. When Victorian Labor introduced public funding in 2002, it adopted this model as well (Orr 2003, 30).

Party Registration

A precondition of party funding everywhere was party registration. For minor parties this conferred significant benefits. It signified that the party was not 'bogus' (Tully 2003, 146). It allowed the party's name to appear on the ballot paper; since most electors do not recognise the names of candidates, the failure of a party to register would lower their candidates' vote. In 1991, the Australian Democrats forced the Wran Government to include party names on ballot papers, something that had been a feature of the federal ballots since 1984. For small parties, struggling to hand out how-to-vote cards at every polling booth, this was something of a boon (Mayer 1980, 350; Green 1995, 13; Turner 2001c, 316; Smith 2003, 57-8). Registered parties could also benefit from tax-deductible donations of up to \$100 per annum, though these were not available to corporations. For a party like One Nation, probably more dependent on a large number of small donations than a small number of large donations, these provisions 'suit it well' (Orr 2003, 28). At a cost of \$2000 to register

in New South Wales, and \$500 for federal elections, it was a price worth paying (Tully 2001, 147).

The rules for registration varied; though in every jurisdiction that introduced public funding, except Victoria, the registration requirements favoured parties and independents already represented in parliament, by absolving them of the need to have any extra-parliamentary members. In New South Wales, parties not represented in the parliament were required to have 250 members. This figure was raised to 750 after a review of the 1999 Legislative Council election revealed that with 85 parties on the ballot paper, above the line voting, and Byzantine preference deals, the system allowed 'at least one or two candidates to be elected virtually by chance'. After 1999, at the behest of the Greens, electors voting above the line were given more control over the flow of their party's preferences; and on the suggestion of the Shooters' Party, the 'special treatment' of parties already in the parliament was abolished (NSW 1999, 3382-3).

At the federal level, the number of members required by parties not in the parliament was set at 500; when Queensland introduced party registration, in 1992, it also set the number at 500 for parties not in the parliament with no membership requirements set down for parties that were represented. In Victoria, which also legislated for party registration in 1984, 500 members were required whether parties were in the parliament or not. In every other jurisdiction, except the Northern Territory, parties are required to register even though there is no provision for public funding. Thus, Western Australia requires 500 members; South Australia, 150 members, or a member in any Australian parliament; Tasmania, 100 members; and the ACT, 100 members or a member of the ACT parliament (Orr 2003, 30-1).

The most spectacular victims of the registration rules, it has recently been suggested (see, for example, Green 2003a), were two directors of Pauline Hanson's One Nation in Queensland. But Hanson and David Ettridge, jailed under that state's Criminal

Code for dishonestly inducing registration of a political party (and, in Hanson's case, defrauding the public purse) were not the hapless victims of a rule that formally - though not substantively - discriminated in favour of parties already in the parliament. Although some political scientists were insisting, as late as 1998, that 'emerging minor parties would have no access to public funding' (Jaensch and Mathieson 1998, 181), a party supported by a group the size of Pauline Hanson's Support Movement - estimated by Ettridge, in early 1997, to number 35,000 (Ward 2000, 100) - could easily have met the conditions of registration had it wished. Many members of Hanson's support movement wanted to belong to her Party; indeed, some 5,000 paid fees on the understanding that they were members (Ward 2000, 100). What brought Hanson and Ettridge undone was not the height of the hurdle set by parliament but their own decision to eschew a large membership while pretending to have one.

Privileged Media Access

Finally, the question of privileged media access for the major parties compared to the minor ones. In Australia, if not elsewhere, the right of any party to access free media time on state-run television and radio is a prize of limited and declining value. The amount of time given to parties is small, especially in comparison with the time they buy on television; and audience reach, not to mention frequency, almost certainly pales by comparison with what the parties pick up, gratis, in the press, on television and radio news (Goot 2002, 17-20), or on talkback (Goot 2000, for Hanson), or in the leaders' debates (Ward and Walsh 2000). Moreover, as part of their quest to access non-party channels of communication, the major parties in particular have been putting increasing effort into more targeted, 'below the line', strategies like telephone canvassing, mail drops, even the Internet (Gibson and Ward 2002).

Attempts by Labor, in 1991, to prohibit all paid political advertising on television and radio stations during election campaigns and to require commercial television and

radio licensees to provide free time to the parties during election campaigns were opposed by the Coalition; after being passed by the Parliament, with the support of the minor parties, the legislation was struck down by the High Court. Not only would the legislation have narrowed the advantage enjoyed by the major parties, by prohibiting the spending of large sums of money on advertising and placing strict limits on the number of free broadcasts; it would have improved the position of minor parties by allocating 90 per cent of broadcast time to the parties represented in Parliament in proportion to their vote at the last election and by reserving 10 per cent of broadcast time for parties not represented in the Parliament at all (Chaples 1994, 32-5).

With the defeat of this legislation, the rules governing the parties' access to the commercial electronic media reverted to the principles laid down by the *Broadcasting Services Act* 1992. Under this legislation, broadcasters were required to give 'reasonable' opportunities for the broadcasting of election matter to all parties in all elections. But this did not extend to broadcasters who did not transmit election matter; it did not require broadcasters to make time available free of charge; and it did not apply to parties not already represented in the Parliament (Armstrong 1995, 168).

Questions about how much 'free time' the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (formerly, the Australian Broadcasting Commission) should hand over to the parties, which parties, and how it should be divided, for the most part have not been answered directly by government; they have been left to the discretion of the ABC (Armstrong et al., 1983, 156-7).⁵ 'For smaller parties', as the Commission's historian noted, 'the rules were changed from time to time'. In 1946, parties putting up ten candidates in two or more states were afforded fifteen minutes of radio time. The minor parties that qualified were the Communist Party of Australia (which contested fourteen seats and won 1.49 per cent of the total vote) and the Services Party of Australia (seventeen seats, 1.24 per cent of the vote). In 1949, parties not represented

in the Parliament had to contest at least fifteen per cent of the seats in at least three states; that is, at least 18 electorates in an enlarged chamber of 121 seats. This excluded Lang Labor. But the CPA was also excluded not because it failed to meet the criteria (it contested 35 seats across all mainland states) but because of an addition to the rules. The new Broadcasting Control Board had instructed all commercial radio stations to relay the election speeches from the ABC. But the Chifley Labor Government did not want the CPA to have access to either commercial or non-commercial stations. So it asked the Control Board to rescind its decision and to meet with the ABC to work out a new policy. As a result, the ABC introduced a third consideration – ‘sufficient significant public support’. A party’s support would be judged ‘sufficient’ if one of its members had been elected to the House or Senate or if the party had won 5 per cent of the vote at the previous election (Inglis 1983, 171-2; Hughes and Graham 1968, 374-85).

In the lead-up to the federal election of 1961, the ABC relaxed its rules. Every candidate within the areas it reached was offered three minutes of television time for a policy statement; the offer extended not only to the major parties but also to independents and minor parties, including those from the CPA. The programs went to air, notwithstanding the government’s objections to the presence of Communists and an all-but total Liberal Party boycott (Griffen-Foley 2003, 106-7).

A generation later, in denying the fledgling Australian Democrats air time, the ABC argued that while it reserved ‘to itself the right to grant or withhold broadcasts at its discretion to political parties, including those not presented in Parliament’, it would allocate time to a party ‘which contests at least five per cent of the seats in any election’ and has an elected member or received at least ‘five per cent of the valid votes cast at the immediately preceding election’; representations by their parliamentary leader, Don Chipp, based on the Party’s performance at the preceding state elections, the size of their membership, and the number of party branches left the Commission unmoved (Hewat and Wilson 1978, 106-7).

By the time One Nation shot to prominence, in 1998, the national broadcaster had relaxed its rules once more. No longer were the claims of new parties to be ignored. While the ABC retained the right to allocate time to such parties at its 'discretion', and to do so on the basis of 'demonstrated public support, the number of seats contested and any other factors deemed relevant', One Nation met 'the twin criteria of contesting at least 10% of the seats' and demonstrating 'at least 5% public support' – the latter, through 'a recognised published independent poll'. Unlike the other parties, One Nation needed the ABC to help film and produce the material (Kingston 1999, 160). But the claim that parties formed after the previous election were 'simply not eligible' for broadcast time (Jaensch and Mathieson 1998, 181) is mistaken.⁶

At the 2001 Queensland election, One Nation and the Country City Alliance (a breakaway formed by some of One Nation's original parliamentary members) were each given five minute television slots; the Coalition and Labor were give four such slots; and the Coalition and Labor were also given ten minutes for their policy launch (ABC 2001). This was some distance from being proportional to 'demonstrated public support' (Wanna 2001, 35 for the polls), and, in the event, the allocations proved too generous to both the Coalition and the City Country Alliance. Following the 2001 federal election, the ABC decided that where parties contested 'at least 20 per cent of the seats' and demonstrated 'at least 10% public support', their entitlement would double from one 'five minute announcement on ABC radio and television' to two (ABC 2002).

Responding to two criticisms of their thesis - that 'privileged access is not everywhere restricted to the major parties', and that 'more importantly, the role of the independent mass media is not given a proper place in the description of the cartel party' (Koole 1996, 519) – Katz and Mair insist that 'equal access' to 'publicly controlled electronic media' is not just about access at election time and that outside of election times 'it is only the bigger parties, and those that have a substantial

position in public office, that continue to be privileged by the media' (1996, 529-30). However, to sustain the first line of defence the authors would have to show that outside of election times the major parties enjoyed substantial access to publicly funded media for reasons other than their news value; to make good the second they would have to show that both the government and the opposition enjoyed privileged access to non-publicly funded media, and that this added significantly to the access they enjoyed on quite different grounds. In Australia, at least, the chances of showing either are remote.

Conclusion

On none of its three fronts – ideological, electoral or organisational – does the cartel thesis offer a persuasive account of the conditions that led to the rise of One Nation or the constrictions against which it had to struggle.

Far from being ideologically indistinguishable on matters of policy central to One Nation's appeal, the major parties were seen in the electorate as reasonably distinct. The positions adopted, or at least some of things said, by the Liberal and National parties in relation to Aborigines, immigration or multiculturalism may not have gone far enough; but that the Coalition was not as one with the Labor Party on these matters was quite widely understood. Many of those attracted to One Nation were simply alienated from Australian politics in general rather than drawn to any of its policy positions in particular.

In relation to the electoral system, the major parties, far from behaving like a cartel, have been even more divided. They have been at odds over whether to maintain compulsory voting; the Coalition parties regarded Labor's introduction of optional preferential voting as transparently partisan; and the parties were far from united, variously, on whether to introduce or lower upper house quotas. In a political culture marked by fierce competition for political office, this should not surprise. The ways

in which the electoral systems have changed over the last twenty-five years have not necessarily strengthened the grip of the parties of government; in some cases they have weakened it, making it easier for minor parties – notably, One Nation - to break through. This, it should be stressed, is not a question of what the reforms were intended to achieve; rather, it is a question of what as a matter of fact they did achieve – much of it, to be sure, unintended.

On the organisational side, the story is much the same. Public funding, generally opposed by both the Liberals and the Nationals, was welcomed by the minor parties and proved a boon to One Nation. The introduction of a system of party registration discriminated less between major parties and minor parties than between those already in parliament and those still out; even so, the problems generated in Queensland for One Nation were entirely of the company's own making. And the rules governing access to the ABC, far from becoming ever more restrictive were relaxed in ways that it made it easier for One Nation – and the City Country Alliance – to get broadcast time than it was, in the early years, for the Australian Democrats.

If the cartel thesis is unpersuasive this is not (contrary to Kitschelt) because cartels involve a prisoner's dilemma where '*Each* participant has an incentive to defect from the co-operative arrangement *all* participants which to maintain' (2000, 168; emphasis in the original). On none of the three fronts did each of the participants necessarily have an incentive to defect; on none of the three fronts did all of the participants face an arrangement they necessarily wanted to maintain.

Insofar as the major parties have developed cartel-like practices, these generally date from the period of mass parties, much earlier in the twentieth century, or even from the age of elite parties, formed in the nineteenth century, following the granting of self-government. Complaints about the parties being essentially indistinguishable, the introduction of single member electorates – the single most important aspect of almost all Australia's electoral system – even the importance of capital intensive

politics and privileged access to state regulated channels of communication go back a long way, much further than the Katz and Mair typology allows.

None of this is to say that the thesis is without merit; simply, that it does not fit the Australian case. Contrary to Katz and Mair (1996, 532), we do not believe the cartelisation of party politics in liberal democracies 'to be a basically agreed phenomenon'. Whether Australia is the exception rather than the rule (as implied by Kitschelt 2000, 173-4) is another matter.

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¹ In the Newspoll surveys, respondents could choose parties other than Labor or the Coalition as the 'best party'. In the AES study, they could only choose between Labor and the Coalition. This may explain why the margin in favour of the Coalition is greater in the AES than in Newspoll. 'Aboriginal and native title issues' figured on Newspoll's list, but not on the AES list.

² The evidence on party distance to which Kitschelt appeals are assessments across fifteen liberal democracies, not including Australia, by political scientists rather than the general public, and are based on a range of dimensions, none of them to do with immigration or race.

³ Malcolm Mackerras (2000, 228) insists that we call such systems 'semi-proportional'. But in the absence of any criterion by which to distinguish semi-proportional from fully proportional systems, this arbitrary label seems difficult to defend.

⁴ The contrast with the Canadian experience, where legislation introduced in 1974 was made more regressive in 1993, is striking (cf. MacIvor 1996, 325-9).

⁵ In Canada, by contrast, broadcast time, paid or unpaid, is allocated by Parliament and skewed heavily in favour of the major parties (MacIvor 1996, 327).

⁶ Curiously, in a book devoted to cataloguing and classifying over 500 minor parties since 1910, One Nation passes without mention.