

**Good, Healthy Hate:
Frontier of the Negative Emotions**

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Everyone is equipped with the emotional capacity to hate. We are able to hate individual persons we know well and groups whose members we do not know at all. We are capable of hating abstractions and general ideas. Hate is such an ordinary expression of the emotional repertoire that it has become entrenched in common parlance: I *hate* to get up in the morning. I *hate* to wash the dishes after dinner. 'I *hate you!*' a child will often say to a sibling.

In polite public discourse the term hate is commonly used to denigrate the action, speech or disposition of others, implying a reluctance to acknowledge hate as an acceptable disposition or behaviour. Thus *hate* as a substantive (verb or nominative) has been subtly changed in recent usage to an adjective ('hate speech,' 'hate crimes') characterising odious or illegal behaviour. Studies of anti-social and illegal behaviour use hate interchangeably as a synonym for racism, anti-Semitism or sexism. In polite and well as in scholarly discourse, these usages presuppose repugnance toward the disposition of *others* who are in various ways ignorant, socially dysfunctional, criminal or psychopathic.

This study follows a less comfortable path, exploring hate as a 'normal' feature of emotional development. In what sense is hate a natural or universal emotional expression? Is hate 'developmental' in the sense of normal biological, psychological and perhaps even social formation? The few studies which broach these questions typically do so apologetically and with reluctance. Even in studies which purport to analyse hate, the inquiry is quickly deflected to an analysis of love on the grounds that the emotions of love and hate are deeply connected: psychologically analogous, or parallel, or polar opposites.

Here I will endeavour to focus specifically on hate. My working hypothesis is that hate plays a role in normal psychological formation, and therefore is not obviously perverse or pathological. Hate is, of course, a strong emotion, potentially yielding a disposition to forceful action. But numerous other emotions are also powerful and may lead to vigorous, aggressive and harmful actions: love, for

example, or patriotism, fear, envy and greed. Thus hate, like other emotions, may have a range of normal expression even if, in extreme instances, it inclines us to violence and self-harm. The human emotions are powerful forces and, though potentially dangerous, without them we would surely not be the sentient and social creatures we imagine ourselves to be.

The Etymology of Hate

I chanced on this topic from a linguistic perspective. To my surprise, I found nothing interesting about the etymology of *hate*. Even very good dictionaries confirmed that, essentially, *hate* means ... hate. Based on the sound and orthography of the word, my assumption that it could be traced to Old English and Anglo-Saxon proved correct. The spellings were phonetic variants of the modern *hate*. French dictionaries revealed much the same for *hair* and *haine*. In the German dictionaries, it was *Hass*. This was like starting to dig a hole and finding bedrock at the first thrust of the shovel. It is not as if *hate* is an esoteric concept or a rare usage. Why then do dictionaries tell us nothing more than that *hate* means hate? Initial frustration quickly gave way to the hunch that there was something significant about this shallow root. Had I struck an artefact of speech that was basic – something linguistically rudimentary?

Pronouncing the English, French and German words over and over to myself reminded me, in a moment of lateral thinking, of the many neighbourhood cats that visit my canine-free back garden. Not at all rarely, two or more cats happen to cross paths, either unexpectedly or by stalking and lying in wait. When they do so, they make a sound that I ask you to imagine and imitate. Thus you will see how I associated those feline altercations phonetically with *Hass*, *haine* and *hate*. All three are, in technical terms, partially glottal aspirated palatals whereby the acoustic – a simple, forceful exhalation – is largely unmodulated by the tongue, teeth or lips. In

other words, the utterances resemble a call or grunt that, with greater aspiration, becomes a threatening or aggressive act.¹

The cognate etymology in the civilised climes of Greco-Roman culture reveals a somewhat different morpheme. *Odi*, the root for the Latin *odium*, is the nominative case for 'I hate.' A Latin synonym, *enmity*, is a derivative constructions for *enemy*. This brief incursion into the languages of the pagans² takes us to a primary source for an examination of the emotions.

Aristotle on the Emotions

Philosophers have shown considerable reluctance to render a systematic analysis of the human emotions.³ For Plato and Aristotle, the emotions were regarded as powerful features of passionate expression. Their formation through education and lawful governance constituted a formidable challenge to the rule of wisdom. Similarly, in modern and contemporary political theory, the analysis of human emotions has been hampered by a rational and scientific 'prejudice' that subordinates feelings and 'matters of the heart' to reason and logical mechanism. With a few controversial exceptions, the philosophical and moral 'opposition' to the power of emotions has privileged the governance of the head over the heart. The emotions have been regarded as antithetical to reason, subversive of the intellectual 'faculties' and therefore sequestered as morally dangerous. Indeed this view is used to justify the 'prejudices' that Aristotle held against rhetoric, since the orator must necessarily 'lower' himself to secure persuasion by acting upon the audience's emotions.⁴

¹ A 'hateful expression' is akin, in a profound sense, to a curse or hex. For example, when a small child shouts, 'I hate you, Mummy!', there are felt to be serious psychic and moral resonances. The speech is a weapon that wounds, and may have consequences for both mother and child.

² The Greek nominative for hate is *εχθος*, and the verb 'to hate, to be at enmity with' is *εχθραίνω*. Hatred is also expressed by the prefix, *μισος*, denoting hatred of something, as in *misogyny* or *misanthropy*. One Greek term is *μισοπολις* – hating the state.

³ Apart from Aristotle, there have been notable exceptions, especially Spinoza, who is discussed in great detail by Martha Nussbaum (2001, 500-10) in her own recent wide-ranging exploration of the emotions; and earlier in (1978).

⁴ Corcoran (1979, 38-43) discusses how Aristotle relegates rhetoric to the philosophically inferior status of appealing to the emotions for three important reasons: 1. Some topics turn upon matters of probability, which are beyond the reach of fact or logic. 2. Oratorical occasions, such as praise or blame, have little or nothing to do with questions of truth or falsehood. 3) A mass audience will

Nevertheless, Aristotle made the first, and still influential, attempt at a systematic definition of the human emotions.

The Emotions are all those feelings that so change men as to affect their judgements, and that are also attended by pain or pleasure. Such are anger, pity, fear and the like, and their opposites.... Anger [for example] may be defined as an impulse, accompanied by pain, to a conspicuous revenge for a conspicuous slight directed without justification towards what concerns oneself or towards what concerns one's friends. If this is a proper definition of anger, it must always be felt toward some particular individual, e.g. Cleon, and not 'man' in general (*Rhetoric*, 1378a20-36).

Aristotle on Hate

On the basis of his discussion of *ethike* in the *Nicomachean Ethics* as the virtuous mean between extremes of excess and deficiency, we might expect Aristotle to describe hate as an excessive response. He might have contrasted hate as an excess in relation to the deficiency of fawning and obsequiousness, with tolerance, or self-preservation, as the 'golden mean.' Or in Book I of the *Politics*, he might have regarded hate as a natural consequence of human association that is essential for community formation, identity and preservation – a kind of primitive 'negative liberty' to enforce propriety and repulse trespassers.

As it happens, Aristotle did *not* deal with hate and other negative emotions⁵ in that way.⁶ In Book III of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, courage and temperance are designated 'virtues of the irrational part' (1117e). The negative emotion of fear, though directly associated with courage and bravery, is itself neither vice nor virtue. Similarly, 'Shame should not be described as a virtue' (1128b). Nevertheless, negative emotions have a share in reason. For example, Aristotle notes that the

always be incapable of following, much less being persuaded or moved to action by, logical and philosophical reasoning.

⁵ Aristotle defines the emotions in *Rhetoric*, 1378a, at p. 1380 of *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), cited hereafter by Bekker numbering. Plato's works will be cited by Stephanus numbering.

⁶ Aristotle certainly does treat the emotions as natural, but in that respect they are distinct from the moral virtues, which are products of habit and training.

emotion of anger must be directed at 'the right people in the right way' (1126b).⁷ He makes this same point in the *Rhetoric* (1379e), where he discusses hate, not as a paired emotion with anger but rather as the opposite of friendship.

Proving that he did not accept Plato's lessons on the wisdom of always willing and doing the good, even to one's enemies, Aristotle argues that the emotion of hate is appropriately directed toward enemies, while friendship and love are directed to our fellow citizens, families and lovers. There is a crucial distinction between anger and hatred. Anger is described as a social emotion with respect to 'gatherings of men, in social life':

so much is plain, that the middle state [good temper] is praiseworthy – that in virtue of which we are angry with the right people, at the right things, in the right way' (*Ethics*, 1126b).

By contrast, 'Enmity and Hatred clearly should be studied by reference to their opposites,' namely, friendship, which he identifies with 'comradeship, intimacy, kinship, and so on' (1382e). The emotion of hate (enmity) is cold, remorseless and 'unaccompanied by pain.' It is how one deals with an implacable enemy in whom one has no hope or investment. Here is Aristotle's chillingly detailed definition of hate.

Now whereas anger arises from offences against oneself, enmity may arise even without that; we may hate people merely because of what we take to be their character. Anger is always concerned with individuals – a Callias or a Socrates – whereas hatred is directed also against classes; we all hate any thief or informer. Moreover, anger can be cured by time; but hatred cannot. The one gains at giving pain to its object, the other at doing him harm; the angry man wants his victims to feel; the hater does not mind whether he feels or not.... And anger is accompanied by pain, hatred is not; the angry man feels pain, but the hater does not. Much may happen to make the angry man pity those who offend him, but the hater under no circumstances wishes to pity a man whom he has once hated:

⁷ 'We feel anger with those who slight us in connexion with what we are as honourable men bound to champion – our parents, children, wives, or subjects' (*Rhetoric*, 1379e).

for the one would have the offenders suffer for what they have done; the other would have them cease to exist (1382a).⁸

Aristotle's allowance of a *telos* for the emotion of hate appears to acknowledge the Homeric morality of warfare⁹ conveyed by the poet Simonides in Plato's *Republic*, whom Polemarchus quotes as his guide for right action: 'to render each his due.... Friends owe it to them to do them some good and no evil ... and there is due and owing from an enemy to an enemy what is also proper for him, some evil' (*Republic*, 331e-332b). At least by implication, Aristotle accepts the definition of justice offered by Polemarchus but rejected by Socrates.

One must remember that the ancient Greeks had enemies aplenty – real enemies.¹⁰ Sometimes they were Greek, for example the Spartans. More profoundly and 'naturally,' foreigners – barbarians – were the enemy. It is apposite to Aristotle's view that Socrates, in the *Republic*, claims it to be 'unnatural' for Greeks to fight Greeks,¹¹ whereas it is natural that the barbarians would be enemies to the Hellenes.

I affirm that the Hellenic race is friendly to itself and akin, and foreign and alien to the barbarian.... We shall say that Greeks fight and wage war with barbarians, and the barbarians with Greeks, and are enemies by nature, and that war is the fit name for this

⁸ Since rhetoric is devoted to the conditions and possibilities of persuasive oratory, here Aristotle draws the lesson: 'It is plain from all this that we can prove people to be friends or enemies; if they are not [enemies], we can make them out to be so; if they claim to be [friends], we can refute their claim; if it is disputed whether an action was due to anger or hatred, we can attribute it to whichever of these we prefer' (1382a19-23).

⁹ Concerning the virtue of courage, the *Nicomachean Ethics*, especially at Book III, 8, circa 1116-17, frequently quotes from or alludes to the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*.

¹⁰ Aristotle claims in the *Politics* (1312b) that hatred is a disposition particularly directed toward tyrannies, that is, regimes which exclude the participation of its subjects. Such regimes are thus the object of condemnation and have no claim upon a person's sense of obligation or emotional attachment. Here Aristotle makes comparisons between anger and hatred, and it is significant that anger is characterised as irrational, while hatred is rational: 'There are two chief motives which induce men to attack tyrannies – hatred and contempt. Hatred of tyrants is inevitable, and contempt is also a frequent cause of their destruction.... Anger, too, must be included under hatred, and produces the same effects. It is oftentimes even more ready to strike – the angry are impetuous in making an attack, for they do not follow rational principle.... Hated is more reasonable, for anger is accompanied by pain, which is an impediment to reason, whereas hatred is painless' (*Politics*, 1312b19-33).

¹¹ This theme of unnatural combat is tragically mirrored in Shakespeare's *Coriolanus*, based upon Plutarch's account of the 5th Century BC Roman military hero, banished from his native city, allying himself with his former enemies, the Volcians, to do battle against his kinsmen.

enmity and hatred. Greeks, however, we shall say, are still by nature the friends of Greeks when they act in this way, but that Greece is sick in that case and divided by faction, and faction is the name we must give to that enmity (*Republic V*, 470c).

For Aristotle, hate is the natural disposition toward those who oppose, threaten, deprive, invade, oppress and bid to destroy our freedom and extinguish our lives. It would be unnatural, irrational and unmanly not to feel this. Aristotle's rhetorical and ethical systems assume that it is virtuous to know and hate our enemies and ultimately seek their destruction. In a Homeric moral universe, it would be perverse, cowardly and irrational to think or act otherwise.

A fanciful but perhaps elucidating biological analogy may illuminate and extend Aristotle's rather militant reading of human virtue. The gazelle on the African plains, knowing its enemy all too well, may hate the lion. But the lion surely does not hate the gazelle, and far more probably loves it – *hungers* for it – as a favoured meal. This is not a relationship of mutual enmity, but a relationship of different kinds: predator and prey. Here the attendant emotions are fear and desire (for escape; for a nice warm haunch of bloody meat).¹²

Humans know that neither the lion nor the gazelle systematically attacks and kills its own kind, whereas manifestly the Persians and the Hellenes, of the same kind, do. We easily imagine that they hate each other without remorse. Considering their decades of devastating war – the loss of sons, brothers and husbands; the wasting siege of women and children in despoiled cities – we may understand why. Aristotle would not, I think, be very interested in the conundrum of whether they attack because they hate, or they hate because they are attacked – a chicken-and-egg enigma that neuters contemporary moral inquiry. Such a narrow view of causality would seem trivial to Aristotle in the light of his understanding that primary, contingent, proximate and final causes drive the great hierarchy of divine *physis*.

¹² I do not rule out the possibility of other emotions on the part of these animals. For example, it is easy to imagine that the gazelle experiences fear when attacked by a lion. But it is also imaginable that the gazelle, in the dignity of the herd's enormous parading majesty in full daylight publicity, may feel disgust and contempt toward the lion's stealthy skulking, its paltry parasitism. The lion may seem to the gazelle much as we regard vermin, or imagine a monster.

Perhaps this ruthless, fateful worldview explains in part the all too human (or at least Homeric) conundrum that a victorious Hellene was capable of honouring the valour of his hated, vanquished foe.¹³

Scholars since Aristotle have tried, with a fair degree of consensus, to define, distinguish, classify and define the emotions. They are frequently divided into the positive emotions (desire, pride, joy etc.) and the negative emotions (fear, anger and, of course, hate). Indeed, some thinkers have suggested that love and hate encompass this polarity as the action or 'motion' we experience that impels us *toward* or *away* from persons, events, or other experiences presented to our senses directly or through the imagination. Love and hate are 'counterparts' (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1971, 6); we go to things we love; we shun, move away from and even attempt to destroy the things we hate.¹⁴

Judaeo-Christian Hate and Love

Aristotle's robust account of 'natural hate' is counterbalanced by a prestigious denial of its rightful place in civilised human affairs. Judaeo-Christian religious and civic morality has bred a paradoxical intolerance of hatred as a primitive, unseemly cultural legacy or a sickness of the mind. Hatred, one might believe, survives as little more than a recidivism, a recrudescence of a primordial phase of human psychological and social development.

However, there have been notable exceptions to the modern West's attempted renunciation of hate. Marx, Lenin and Stalin were robustly focused upon the scientific identification and ruthless annihilation of enemies. In retrospect, it is

¹³ Plato (*Republic V*, 469c-470a) gives a rather grisly utilitarian argument against plundering and defiling the corpses of defeated barbarians soldiers.

¹⁴ Sigmund Freud defined 'primitive' love as a form of aggression, a sadistic manifestation of the sexual instinct arising from the infantile attempt to dominate the (maternal) sexual object: 'Love in this form and at this preliminary state is hardly to be distinguished from hate in its attitude toward the object. Not until the genital organization is established does love become the opposite of hate. Hate, as a relation to objects, is older than love. It derives from the narcissistic ego's primordial repudiation of the external world with its outpouring of stimuli. As an expression of the reaction of unpleasure evoked by objects [which defy infant mastering], it always remains in intimate relation with the self-preservative instincts; so that sexual and ego-instincts can readily develop an antithesis which repeats that of love and hate.' Storr (1991), p. 17, quoting Freud.

chilling to consider the historic project of a century of Marxist intellectual enthusiasm. The idea, we ought to recall, was to inflame the consciousness of the masses in the form of class hatred, acutely focusing it for purposes of annihilating an enemy in a civilisational revolutionary war. Even in the new century, there is an uncanny symmetry in the righteous enmities that animate both 'progressive' Western and Islamic fundamentalist rhetoric. If hate has been morally and intellectually disreputable for two millennia, this has not been for lack of champions.

The Hebrew tradition is complex on the question of hate, in no small part because Jaweh was a very complicated and frequently disappointed Creator. The Old Testament frankly acknowledged hate as a divine prerogative. Its place among the human emotions was a special disposition toward the enemies of God.¹⁵ Jaweh commanded the Jews not to hate each other,¹⁶ but he invited those who love him to hate evil (*Psalms* 97:10). The Preacher counselled: 'A time to love, and a time to hate; a time of war, and a time of peace' (*Ecclesiastes* 3:8).

In the New Testament, Jesus and his disciples preached love, not hate.¹⁷ They rigorously condemned the hatred of one's brother, which was likened to murder itself.¹⁸ However, God's disposition to hate was transmitted into Christianity in that famous passage, 'Vengeance is mine, saith the Lord' (*Romans* 12:19).

Here Aristotle might have pointed out the importance of social experience in shaping institutions. Frequent injunctions *against* hate in the Judaic and Christian scriptures surely reflect the presence of a good deal of it both in and around the temple. The New Testament offers copious documentation of bitter strife among the

¹⁵ 'Ye that love the Lord, hate evil.' (*Psalms* 97:10) '...thine enemies take thy name in vain. Do not I hate them, O Lord, that hate thee? And am not I grieved with those that rise up against thee? I hate them with perfect hatred: I count them mine enemies.' (*Psalms*, 139: 20-22)

¹⁶ 'And let none of you imagine evil in your hearts against his neighbour; and love no false oath: for all these are things that I hate, saith the Lord.' (*Zechariah* 8:17)

¹⁷ Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good unto them that he you, and pray for them which despitefully use you, and persecute you. *Matthew* 5:44 ('Sermon on the Mount'). See also *Luke* 6:27-28.

¹⁸ 'Whosoever hateth his brother is a murderer.' (1 *John* 3:15) Also, *Leviticus* 19:17, 'Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thine heart.'

Hebrew tribes and sects, between the Gentiles and the Jews, and between the Romans and their captive nations.

Yet clearly the main teaching of the New Testament and Christian theology is love, not hate. Christ's Sermon on the Mount and St. Paul's famous paean to love in his letter to the Corinthians (*I Corinthians 13*) were seminal in forming this perspective. Even today these texts powerfully inspire the ideals of love, peace and universal human brotherhood, and serve as the secularised underpinning of conventional ethics.

The doctrine of Christian love was originally a courageous attempt to rebut traditional Greek and Roman morality. The Apostles' counsel to 'turn the other cheek,' 'love thine enemy' and meet the beggar's supplication with twofold gifts were explicit reproofs of pagan concepts of patriotism, military valour and proud self-sufficiency. The Greeks and Romans laughed at St. Paul's sermons and marketplace proselytising. Christian teachings were ridiculed for embracing weak, effeminate, cowardly and unpatriotic ideas. Loving your enemy, the pagans reasoned, would subvert and destroy the moral and patriotic foundations of the great Roman Empire. Five centuries later, when the decadent Empire's armies had been defeated and Rome sacked by barbarian armies from the East, St. Augustine's *City of God* was a vigorous defence of Christianity against these same charges.

Love was the overarching emotional tenor of the righteous 'new life in Christ.' Compassion, pity, self-sacrifice, and the embrace of the lowly were Christianity's emotional hallmarks. Courage, strength, pride and action gave place to the softer, passive virtues of discipline and bodily control eventually to be personified as feminine ideals in girls' 'Christian names': chastity, patience, charity, prudence, constancy, felicity, faith and hope. The moral prestige of this loving embrace has held firm throughout the gradually secularised Western political tradition.¹⁹ Hate

¹⁹ There have been rare exceptions, as in Adam Smith's acceptance of a necessary departure from communal intimacy, kinship and friendship in the emerging commercial society, where the paradigm of human contact is the contractual dealing with strangers. Thus neutrality and social distance – 'strangeness' – become ethical values. I am indebted for this insight to a paper on

became morally disreputable, as have in recent times the attendant 'manly' virtues of combative courage, bodily strength, and valorous pride.²⁰

However the moral ascendancy of love over hate is not the whole story. Pauline and Augustinian Christian doctrine presupposed a rough, sinful, proud, vicious and destructive human nature. It is 'natural' for a sinner to sin. 'To err is human, to forgive is divine.'²¹ This presupposition of moral failure survives relatively intact in contemporary thought, and not only in relation to politicians and priests. A miscreant's plea of 'giving in to human nature' is commonly offered to explain, even to justify, emotionally extreme, harmful and self-destructive behaviour.

Nevertheless, even those willing to acknowledge moral failings retain a special repugnance for hate. Hate is 'bad.' It is a sickness of the mind, a mistake in thinking, a departure from profoundly believed ideals of love, friendship, affection and mutual solidarity. Not, of course, that this stops us from hating all sorts of things.

The Wider Study of Emotions

Powerful emotions, as already noted, have long been treated with disdain by political theorists, who either ignore them or propose careful legal and social constraints upon their expression. In the case of love, most political thinkers (even many poets) have dismissed it as a debilitating 'sickness,' a particularly intractable, if common, form of insanity.²² Hate, an emotion invariably seen to have a kindred relation to love, has been similarly marginalised or dismissed by political theorists as dangerous and sociopathic.

Smith's *Wealth of Nations* given by Dr. Lisa Hill to the Political Theory Group at the University of Adelaide (2002).

²⁰ For example, the neologism '*triumphalism*' has lately become a shaming epithet.

²¹ Perhaps it is here that love and hate begin to be conceptualised as a pair of mutual opposites. Contrasted with the pagan view of love (divine but incarnate as 'erotic') and hate (rightful disposition to enemies of the state), the Christian view divinised love and 'demonised' hate. – But note that contemporary psychological and behavioural accounts of the emotions, while usually treating love and hate as closely related, argue that they are not mirror opposites or mutually exclusive.

²² Again, Martha Nussbaum's several works (1994, 1995) on eros and desire, principally in the Greek and Hellenistic thought, are noteworthy exceptions. I am indebted to Susan Duggin for lively discussions and incisive analysis arising from her doctoral thesis research, which demonstrates

Consequently, the systematic study of the human emotions has largely been the province of theoretical and clinical psychology (Harré & Parrot, 1996; Tomkins, 1963; Edelman, 1987). In recent decades wider attention has been paid to the social role and effects of the emotions, often drawing upon the interpretative concepts of Freudian psychoanalytic theory. Examples of this influence include Norbert Elias's historical studies of the evolving 'civilities and courtesies' in social manners (Elias, 1978); applied psychological research in criminology and mediation (Braithwaite, 1989; Scheff & Ratzinger, 1997); the sociology of emotions (Barbalet, 1998; Scheff, 1994, 1997); and in recent philosophical and literary reflections (Griffiths, 1997; Elster, 1999; Wollheim, 1999; Nussbaum 2001).

Hate in Modern Psychology and Philosophy²³

There have been attempts in several fields to classify or give a systematic account of the human emotions. These efforts have occurred principally in clinical psychology, Freudian psychoanalytic theory²⁴ philosophy²⁵ and, more recently,

how political theorists have long resisted, excluded or diminished the role of love in conceptualising the state and political community.

²³ I am indebted to Lauren Buchanan for her excellent bibliographical assistance on the literature canvassed in this section.

²⁴ An informative recent introduction to hate from a psychoanalytic and clinical perspective is Blum (1997, 359-75). For an account of the concept by important disciples (and revisionists) of Freud, see Klein and Riviere (1937). Also see Vitz and Mango (1997, 64-71). Other treatments include Alvarez (1995, 167-82); Shengold, (1999); Beck (1999); Brenan (1992, esp. 194-96); Parker (1995, 6; 57-65); Redl and Wineman (1951); Suttie (1935, 23) is admirably succinct: '...the whole instinct of self-preservation, including the potential disposition to react with anger and fear, is at first directed towards the mother. Anger is then aimed, not at the direct removal of the frustration or attainment of the goal of the moment...but *at inducing the mother to accomplish these wishes for the child...* Hatred, I consider, is just a standing reproach to the hated person, and owes all its meaning to a demand for love.... I would say "Earth hath no hate but love to hatred turned, and hell no fury but a baby scorned," for hatred, except for a preferred rival or a rejecting lover, does not seem to exist.' Emphases in original. This argument illustrates a psycho-biological perspective that stands at some conceptual distance from discussions of hatred based on chauvinism, race and homophobia, *inter alia*. A great deal of attention has been paid in the psychoanalytic literature to the issues of love and hate in transference and countertransference in the therapeutic setting arising from the groundbreaking work by D.W. Winnicott (1958 194-203). Also, Celenza (1995), 301-07); Friedman (1995 957-75); Gabbard and Winer (1994 219-31). An interesting discussion of the therapeutic experience based upon case studies is Gottlieb (1994, 8-19).

²⁵ Hamlyn, (1978 5-20), though demonstrating an aversion to hate in preference to analysing the emotion of love, offers a broad survey classical, literary and philosophical material. Hatred is analysed in classical literature by Fantham (1997, 185-212).

political theory.²⁶ In some accounts, scholars tend to *apologise* for giving time and serious attention to hate, treating both the concept and the manifested phenomenon of hate gingerly before taking a breath of relief and moving on to love, justifying the move by acknowledging love as the close relative of hate (Hamlyn, 1978). Here it must be said that psychologists, philosophers, and political theorists merely confirm what poets, song-writers and playwrights have long expressed, that hate is a ‘real,’ natural, universal human emotion.²⁷ Indeed the relationship between love and hate has given rise to speculation about a fundamental symmetry between the emotions of love and hate, or indeed that love and hate are the two overarching ‘master’ emotions.²⁸

Hate, according to many psychoanalytic theorists, manifests and operates in early infancy as a means of resisting threats and warding off discomfort, pain and danger. As such, it is a normal and organically essential developmental process. Psychologists from several clinical perspectives argue that hate (along with most other forms of emotional expression, ‘healthy’ or otherwise) is deeply and strongly associated with the experiences of identity formation, sexuality and love.²⁹

²⁶ Elster (1999, 64 *et seq.*) provides a comprehensive treatment of the emotions, with a careful review of Aristotle’s remarkable original inquiries. Solomon (1983, 323-24), briefly discusses hate, claiming that ‘hatred is not always unjustifiable; there is ‘healthy hatred.’ He speculates further: ‘There may even be a trust and intimacy in hatred that is to be found in few of the outwardly hostile emotions; it is for this reason that hatred is akin to love, so easily interchangeable with it, and so inevitably a part of it, but his support by allusion to novels and movies is not entirely convincing. Solomon (1995) returns to the relationship between a ‘passion’ for justice which embraces revenge.

²⁷ George Orwell’s narrative of the Two Minute Hate in the opening chapter of *1984* (1949) remains compelling after more than a half-century. The political prescience and psychological acuity in his depiction of a maelstrom of racism, anti-Semitism, sexual desire and perversity, animality and violence is both astonishing and emotionally disturbing.

²⁸ Kolnai (1998, 581-95), written in 1969 or 1970, is a careful and lucid account of these matters, and comes down on the side of asymmetry due to the complexity of fear, disgust and hatred as a ‘triad’ of modes of aversion.

²⁹ ‘Healthy hate’ is acknowledged for its therapeutic benefit of ‘renunciation’ in Baures (1996, 75). Hate is seen as ‘inevitable’ in psychiatric treatment (Gottlieb, 1994, 8); is ‘inextricably bound’ to love in intimate relationships by Gabbard, (1993, 229-31), Suttie, (1935, 60) and Redl and Wineman (1951, 20-21); provides a means of channelling, projecting discharging aggressive feelings for Klein, 1937, 14-15); and, for Gabard and Winer (1994, 227), ‘Hatred can be an adaptive bond. The attempted expression and containment of intense rage and destructiveness in hatred can also serve as a cover for need and love, an attempt at reversal of feelings of helplessness, vulnerability, shame, and humiliation, and a sense of power and control.’ This is view not shared by all psychiatrists, e.g. Kernberg (n.d. 1992?, 701-14). See also Miller (1995, 476-99); Lukacs (1997, pp. 437-41); and ‘T.M.’(1985, 1203-05).

The psychoanalytic literature tends to interpret the 'normal,' frequent occurrence of hate as a personal and individual (as opposed to social or political) phenomenon. Hate evolves as a developmental, and therefore potentially neurotic, response to deprivations or perversities in infancy; and then is reproduced in adulthood as unhappy, frustrated, asymmetrical and dysfunctional relationships.³⁰ The process is psychologically complex because the hated object may in fact be fantasised, or indeed displaced, re-directed and projected upon the self as self-hatred (Gilman, 1986, 1-21). Some speculative work has been done on how these privations and distortions might be reflected in group or societal attitudes and behaviour; indeed such speculation is now a thriving industry in journalism focused upon the supposed salience of hatred within and toward the Muslim world.³¹

A relatively recent body of literature in the humanities and social sciences has given serious reconsideration to the emotions as important social phenomena.³² For example, with respect to the emotion of embarrassment, Edelman (1987, ix) observes that 'the very experience of embarrassment can have a very dramatic effect on our day-to-day lives. It is systematically built into our social system, controlling and occasionally inhibiting our everyday behaviour and in particular our social behaviour.'

Scholars in several disciplines – mainly psychology, sociology, history and philosophy – have examined the emotions in relation to social structure and

³⁰ Fitness and Fletcher (1993, esp. at 943, 945 and 948); Gabbard (1993, 229) admirably summarises his argument in one sentence: 'When Freud (1915) observed that the opposite of love is indifference rather than hate, he was noting that love and hate are inextricably bound together in our most intimate relationships.'

³¹ A sampling of articles from *The New York Times* Internet edition (www.newyorktimes.com):
 Serge Schmemmann, 'Not Quite an Arab-Israeli War, but a Long Descent Into Hatred.' April 22, 2002
 Susan Sachs, 'Anti-Semitism Is Deepening Among Muslims.' April 27, 2002
 _____, 'Baptist Pastor Attacks Islam, Inciting Cries of Intolerance.' June 15, 2002
 Neil MacFarquhr, 'A Few Saudis Defy a Rigid Islam to Debate Their Own Intolerance.' July 12, 2002
 Nicholas Kristof, 'Hate, American Style.' August 30, 2002
 Edward Rothstein, 'Hateful Name-Calling Vs. Calling for Hateful Action.' Nov. 23, 2002

³² The serious treatment of the emotions begins with several works of Aristotle, principally the *Rhetoric* and *De anima* (Elster 1999; Garver, 1994). With respect to the place of the emotions in modern social theory, J.M. Barbalet (1998) has usefully emphasised Adam Smith's treatment of the 'moral sentiments' as important components in the regulation and modulation of social behaviour.

function, and as mechanisms of differentiation and control. Even scientific treatises on the neurophysiology and chemistry of emotions, taking their cue from Charles Darwin's foundational study of 1872, *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals*, reflect an appreciation of the evolutionary, social and relational context and adaptive functions of emotional behaviour.³³ For example, in Panksepp's highly technical neurophysiology textbook, an entire section, 'The Social Emotions,' relies upon what he calls 'unconventional' premises directly assimilable to phenomenological critiques of 'mind/body dualism.' He argues

that human and animal affective consciousness is based fundamentally on motor processes that generate self-consciousness by being closely linked to body image representations. I will try to show how an acceptance of such a seemingly incorrect premise – that the fundamental nature of consciousness is constructed as much from motor as from sensory processes – may help us resolve some key conceptual sticking points concerning the nature of consciousness, such as its apparent psychological coherence and unity.... The basic emotional systems serve adaptive functions that emerged during the evolutionary history of mammals. They help organize and integrate physiological, behavioral and psychological changes in the organism to yield various forms of action readiness. The emergence of emotional circuits, and hence emotional states...coordinate specific cognitive and behavioural tendencies in response to archetypal survival problems: to approach when SEEKING, to escape from FEAR, to attack when in RAGE, to seek social support and nurturance when in PANIC, to enjoy PLAY and LUST.... (Panksepp, p. 303).

Studies of the human emotions frequently cite the landmark studies of the historical evolution of the 'affectivity of human behaviour' by Norbert Elias (1939/1978) and the socio-psychological studies of Erving Goffman (1956, 1959). These works emphasise how self-regarding emotions, in particular embarrassment and shame, shape and constrain the 'presentation of the self.' What may seem initially paradoxical is that the 'negative emotions' of embarrassment, shame, guilt and anger are identified as 'social emotions.' These emotions have functional and adaptive effects in prescribing and regulating behavioural norms and preserving

³³ The leading exponent of the central role of affect and emotion in human neurophysiology is Antonio Damasio. A critique of Descartes and a revival of Spinoza on the mind-body relationship and

cultural values supportive of honour, esteem, status and moral appraisal (Gross & Stone, 1964).³⁴

What is especially powerful about the negative emotions is their dual capacity for social and self-control. *Self-enforcement* is induced by our experience of embarrassment for a real or imagined *faux pas* when our blunder is seen by an observer. Thus we feel shame in privately acknowledging our guilt and lowered self-esteem, and accordingly adjust our behaviour. *Social enforcement* is induced or intensified by fear, contempt and hatred of social groups and classes of presumed or real intruders.

The negative emotions signify a response to *challenges* to one's sense of security, worth or esteem, and thus are potentially reinforcing rather than subversive of the 'social bond.'³⁵ A leading social psychologist has described shame as the 'master emotion.' Extreme and negative affective expressions of emotion, often in displays with palpable physiological manifestations,³⁶ may be associated with wider and more complex cultural response patterns in response to death, catastrophe or impotence in the face of altered social or psychological boundaries (isolation or engulfment) (Scheff and Retzinger, 1997). In such conditions, anger, grief, sorrow, disgust and hate are not necessarily 'pathological' emotional responses. These intense emotional experiences and expressions may have highly beneficial and adaptive effects in domestic and social life. The biological and developmental case would seem to be

between reason and feeling, and an argument for the centrality of the emotions in human cognition are developed in Damasio (1995, 1999 and 2003).

³⁴ For a spirited discussion of social controls upon the expression of emotions, including the effects of gender, 'worldview' and social placement upon the way we 'perceive, organize, remember, interpret and emotionally experience the raw materials of life,' see Landman (1996, 90). Gender is the special focus of Lutz (1996). Cross-cultural issues are canvassed in Heelas (1996). Solomon (1995) offers a political philosopher's perspective on the 'passion for justice,' vengeance as a negative emotion and the relationship between emotion and reason; Elster (1999) and Wollheim (1999) discuss the emotions through the lens of linguistic and analytical philosophy.

³⁵ Scheff (1994, 53) makes the bold claim that it 'seems likely that shame is a genetically inherited emotion that is a human universal. Since shame identifies threats to the social bond and to the integrity of the self, it makes sense that sensitivity to shame signals would be adaptive, that this kind of sensitivity would have survival value for the individual and the group.'

³⁶ E.g. altered posture, respiration, heart rate and blood pressure, flushing, palour, tears.

strengthened if it is true, as some have claimed, that many animals display feelings in striking similarity to humans emotions.³⁷

In an area of inquiry that even specialists routinely describe as murky because of the mentalistic and subjectively experienced phenomena involved, it is not surprising to find a number of controversies and divergent classifications and interpretations. Nevertheless, it is encouraging to see scholars moving beyond obligatory 'critiques of rationalism' and 'Cartesian mind/body fallacies' to examine bodily self-awareness and self-control, intimate as well as public presentation, social norms and constraints, and the integration of emotional dispositions in relation to public markers of status, effectiveness and esteem.

This is not to say that perennial philosophical and theoretical issues have been solved or dismissed. Students of human emotion grapple with the question of what is universal and what is socially constructed in the range of emotional phenomena; what is epistemologically coherent or empirically verifiable when classifying or comparing emotional experiences; or measuring the intensity of emotions within or between individuals. Studies are generally candid in stating that the human emotions are 'heterogeneous' in so far as they defy classification according to any comprehensive system of behavioural, psychological or physiological coordinates. (Elster, 1999, 141-45; 239-44). The intuitively compelling pairs of similar, allied, or opposite emotions (for example, anger and fear, love and hate, pride and shame) seem irreducible to any convincing or verifiable scheme of composition, hierarchy or intensity. Nevertheless, one cannot deny that the emotions are important factors in shaping psychological, relational and social phenomena.

Perhaps it is not too bold a premise, felt intuitively at a personal level, to say that the emotional self *is* the personal self. It is possible to imagine a creature entirely lacking, or incapable of, emotions. But that being would not be a person in the sense

³⁷ As indicated *supra*, Charles Darwin is an impressive forerunner of the still controversial arguments of Moussaieff and McCarthy (1996). Nevertheless, the view that humans and animals have essentially shared emotional experiences is widely rejected by orthodox behaviouralist zoologists and students of animal behaviour.

of possessing a 'self' – that is, having an *identity* communicable or reciprocal to other selves. It is interesting that psychologists link the inability to be emotionally self-aware – to 'have feelings' and to show emotion – directly to the inability to disclose ourselves to others. A therapist (Swiller, 1988) quoted such a patient: 'I don't naturally express my feelings. I don't know what to talk about; I have no strong feelings, either positive or negative.' This patient's 'emotional flatness' was diagnosed as *alexithyma*, a Greek term meaning 'lack of words for emotion' (Sifneos, 1991).

The definition of emotion, *animi motus* in the Latin, may be best appreciated by focusing on the term itself, that is, the idea of 'motion' in one's inward feelings and self-consciousness. These inward motions of the 'soul' (*psyche*) signal and give rise to what we may tend to call 'moods,' inner *feelings* and *dispositions*. This self-awareness is a matter of *feelings* not *thoughts*: not facts or probabilities but the inward feeling, the emotional sense of ourselves and of our presentation to others. (Elster, 1999, 244-50; Goffmann, 1956, 1959; Harré & Parrott, 1996, 39-56). Thus emotions refer to how we sense our feelings and how we are disposed to act in the face of events, things (including our own actions and bodily self-presentations) and other people. An important distinction accepted by most psychologists and philosophers is that between our *disposition* (how we experience and display outward signs of the inner feeling, as in shame, fear, or anger), and any subsequent *action*, such as contrition, flight or aggression. The inner motion may or may not, depending upon circumstances, lead to externalised motion. Thus, for example, strong emotions may be expressed *outwardly* to presumed or actual observers and actors; *inwardly* (to the 'looking glass self' in the case of negative emotions of humiliation, guilt and shame); or *generally* to groups or classes of things. The emotion of anger, according to Aristotle, is experienced in relation to a known person, whereas the emotion of hate may be a more generalised disposition toward an entire class of people or things.

The Allure of Hate

The undeniably common experience of hatred – as a strongly felt disposition or a speech act – leaves little room for doubt that hate is a basic human emotional faculty. There is little point, politically, in debating whether this faculty is instinctual or socially constructed. The anthropologist from Mars would have no difficulty in documenting that hate is something Earthlings commonly express. From the nightly television news to the cinema and rock concerts, hate is sensationalised, commodified and readily available to consumers.³⁸

What do political philosophers think about this ugliest of human emotions? Indeed, is it the ugliest? I have already suggested that there are far more destructive human emotions: pride and anger, for example; perhaps even love. Think of the travesties perpetrated by family pride and love of country. Hatred might well make killing someone a little easier, but it is highly probable that some other emotion is the actual instigator: envy or greed, for example, or patriotism. This was, indeed, Aristotle's point in the *Rhetoric*.

Morally charged academic studies and feature journalism often use the term hate as a straightforward synonym for racism, anti-Semitism, sexism and associated 'hate-speech.' This especially occurs when *-isms* are rounded up with all the usual

³⁸ Examples in contemporary popular culture include *La Haine*, a French film by Mathieu Kassovitz, reviewed by Elstob (1997-98). A rock festival, Hammerfest 2000, attracted fans from Austria, Canada, France, Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain to a small American town in Georgia to hear punk and heavy metal music on the themes of pan-Aryanism, including songs such as *Third Reich*, by Canadian band Rohowa (an abbreviation of Racial Holy War), and *Six Million More* by a band called the Bully Boys. The two-day concert was sponsored by Panzerfaust Records and Resistance Records, two US labels specialising in neo-Nazi music. Internet radio streaming of such music emanates from more than 40 on-line distributors of recordings by 123 American bands and 229 other bands from around the world. *The New York Times*, <http://www.nytimes.com/2001/08/opinion/20HERB.html> (20 August 2001). A possibly more mainstream evocation of hate is expressed by the vituperative lyrics of rap and hip hop artists such as Ice Cube, *Waitin' To Hate*; Waterboys, *Be My Enemy*; Canibus, *Hate U 2*; Eminem, *3 Verses* or *Nail In the Coffin*. Their violent, obscene and nihilistic expressions of hatred – the gloating over crime, death, destruction and sexual despoliation – may for some be partly and purposefully subverted by irony, youthful bravado and the swagger of pop chart fame and riches. The aesthetic *frisson* of these songs trades on a righteous blurring of the line between anger and hatred. Television 'reality' and dating shows solicit a mass audience to 'eliminate' participants via telephone, website and e-mail messages that typically express ridicule, humiliation and hatred, especially for attractive female participants. My thanks to Sally-Ann Rowland for drawing my attention to these examples of hatred in popular representation.

suspects: nationalism, chauvinism, imperialism, colonialism *inter alia*.³⁹ Articles and books frequently have hate in the main title when the word, much less the concept, is hardly mentioned throughout the entire work (Gay, 1993). The very word hate offers to the eye and ear an almost unmediated promise of something prurient and salacious. It is thus an opening to publicity (Saleci, 1998).

Conclusion

Is hate a linguistically fundamental human expression? In the founding texts of the Judaic tradition, Cain killed his brother Abel – the first brothers in creation. It was a dispute over enclosing land: grazing or agriculture. The founding legend of Rome is another fratricide, Romulus killing Remus over possession and rule involving the building of walls around the city. But this is not only the stuff of myth. In our own era we know and have lived through civil, fratricidal and tribal boundary wars so vast that a term had to be invented to speak its horror – of such a magnitude that a legend about them would seem more preposterous than *Genesis* or the *Aeneid*.

Why is it so hard to acknowledge hate as a manifest, actual, important, and probably ineradicable feature of human existence? There is much said today in academic discourse about *situatedness* or *constructedness* – often, I think, as if success in gaining acceptance for these terms (thus expelling *nature*, *essential* and the like) is somehow a victory for truth and moral progress. But thinking of Aristotle, what if our ‘situatedness’ and ‘constructedness’ (perhaps along with the odd few essences, as well) are precisely what make us enemies? I don’t mean ‘differently endowed,’ or diverse, or the rich and cherished colours of the global cultural rainbow. I mean ‘enemies’?

One may ask, in turn, what is to be gained by such an acknowledgment? I might reply, perhaps unfairly, with another question: What is the *cost* of believing that love makes the world go round?

³⁹ Perlmutter (1999); Calvert (1997, 4-19); Sunstein (1991, 31-32) deals mainly with pornography; Moss, (1992)); Butler (1997, 376-77) discusses hate speech; Witoszek and Sheeran (1991, 11-27); Anthony Storr (1991).

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