

# Comparative Analysis of Streetsafe in Hobart and Launceston

Final Report

March 2006

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**TILES Mission:**

To conduct and promote evidence based research to improve the quality of law enforcement.

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# List of Acronyms

CCTV	Closed Circuit Television
CMU	Crime Management Unit
DPPS	Department of Police and Public Safety
FSST	Forensic Science Services Tasmania
MJTF	Multi Jurisdictional Task Force
NSCP	Northern Safer Communities Partnership
PACK	Presence, Attitude, Confidence, Knowledge
PIP	Partnership in Policing
RDO	Rest Day Off
SES	State Emergency Service
SMEAC	Situation, Mission, Execution, Administration, Logistics, Command
TILES	Tasmanian Institute Law Enforcement Studies



# Executive Summary and Chapter Outline

The objectives of this research were to develop an evidence-based good practice model for ensuring that community safety outcomes and outputs are achieved more effectively. Key objectives included identifying:

- the level of success of innovative community safety programs that involve multi-agency collaboration and multi-dimensional strategies;
- the strategies that contribute to a reduction in problems arising from under-age drinking;
- strategies that contribute to a reduction in public drunkenness;
- strategies that assist in the prevention of alcohol and drug-related offences and violence;
- strategies that contribute to an improvement in safe and responsible road usage;
- factors that promote public health;
- strategies that contribute to a decrease in the level of community concern about safety in public spaces.

The overall goal of the *Streetsafe* program was to positively influence the determinants of community safety. The program had five key objectives. They were to:

- reduce the problems arising from under-age drinking.
- reduce public drunkenness.
- prevent alcohol and drug related offences and violence.
- improve safe and responsible road usage.
- promote public health and reduce incidence of meningococcal disease and/or other communicable diseases.

Fundamentally, the key area of inquiry for this research was police Task Forces. This avenue was pursued because of the inherent difficulty in converting community or partnership policies into practical service delivery. To this end the structure and functioning of three Task Forces were examined and interviews were conducted with key players. Additionally, a comprehensive examination of police documentation, offence data and intelligence holdings took place.

Chapter One outlines the methodology that has been employed for the conducting of this research. The paper builds on foundational work that was undertaken in 2002. Chapter Two explores, albeit at a cursory level, the particular approaches to policing in an endeavour to provide an understanding of policing in contemporary society.

Chapter Three focuses more intently on setting the scene and provides an overview of both Tasmania and Tasmania Police. Moreover, it examines perceptions of community safety that existed in a neighbouring area in 2002. This is extended through an appreciation of an aspect of community safety that was explored in one of the regions in 2002. The essential finding here is that community safety, fear of crime and the visible presence of police matter to the general community.

Chapters Four and Five detail Task Forces that occurred across the period and provide indicative measures of performance that were aligned to State and Tasmania Police strategic directions. They also provide an overview of linkages with broader partnership groups and are intended to broaden our understanding of Task Forces.

Chapter Six returns to the issue of understanding policing and introduces new conceptualisations of approaches to policing. It then examines organisational capacity within broad parameters that can be applied across the police agency or at the Task Force level.

Chapter Seven draws together all of the essential elements of an evidence-based good practice model. Chapter Eight provides concluding comments.

The research findings do not seek to address conceptual issues surrounding the interplay of policing theory but instead to focus on practical outcomes that can be applied in any community safety focused Task Force. Essentially a critical success factor was, perhaps not surprisingly, found to lie within the governance arrangements that serve to direct the operations of a Task Force. Whilst, at first blush, this might appear obvious the reality is it carries with it an administrative burden that might disincline practitioners from preparing comprehensive operation orders. Nonetheless the investment of time and energy undoubtedly produces tangible results. The essential finding is that the application of the SMEAC model (Situation, Mission, Execution, Administration and Command) to all community safety operations will fundamentally improve potential outcomes.

# Chapter 1: Methodology

## 1.1 Project Objectives

This project was scoped to be a comparative analysis of two community safety programs (known as *Streetsafe* or *Street Safe*), one in Hobart and the other in Launceston, Tasmania. The aim was to develop a best practice model that is transferable to others sites in Tasmania and to other Australian states and territories.

The scope of the project was increased following the recognition that another Launceston based community safety program, known as *Operation Level*, was the precursor to the others. This program was incorporated into the project.

The implementation of *Streetsafe* and *Street Safe*, together with *Level*, in two alternative sites provided an excellent opportunity for a comparative analysis. The comparative analysis involved both *process* and *outcome* evaluations in order to develop a comprehensive understanding of the program and its implementation.

The project involved:

- interviews with key informants (community safety representatives and police officers); and,
- analysis of quantitative data (e.g. crime statistics).

## 1.2 Research Components

This research built on foundation work that was completed in 2003 and 2004. That work involved in-depth community surveying.

### Literature Review

An extensive literature review was conducted across a range of key concepts. These included;

- community policing;
- community safety;
- leadership;
- managerialism;
- partnerships;
- problem-oriented policing;
- strategies and tactics;
- task forces;
- team building; and,
- traditional law enforcement.

## **Police Documents and Data Review**

Tasmania Police approved access to extensive internal documentation that, in effect, provided a contemporaneous account of the various operations and enabled a clear appreciation of the structure, functioning and activities of the Programs and, in particular, the Task Forces that operated within them. The documents reviewed were analysed to gain a sense of the direction that the Task Forces were taking thereby allowing an assessment of where, in the policing continuum, the strategies were focussed.

The documentation reviewed included; operation orders, intelligence assessments, gazette notices, activity returns, weekly reports, and data holdings in relation to offence figures. Access was also provided to survey reports for surveys conducted by Tasmania Police.

Police related articles from Tasmanian Newspapers (*The Advocate*, *The Examiner* and *The Mercury*) for all of 2002 were also reviewed.

## **Field Interviews**

### **Partnership Committees**

Field interviews were conducted with representatives from partnership groups (either as individuals or as a group).

### **Police Officers**

Tasmania Police also approved access to a number of police officers for the purpose of interview. The interviews were conducted with senior police officers (in either rank or experience) and focussed on those who undertook a command role in the Program or Task Force.

These officers were of the rank of sergeant or inspector. The length of service ranged from twenty-five to thirty-four years service. All were males.

A total of ten interviews were conducted. Interviews were conducted in both Launceston and Hobart.

## **Quantitative Analysis**

Tasmania Police provided access to offence data holdings and facilitated the exchange of this information by providing access to resources to interrogate the data.

## **Ethics Approval**

This research was approved by the Tasmanian Social Science Human Research Ethics Committee at the University of Tasmania.

## Chapter 2: Understanding Policing

Much policing discourse has sought to untangle the complexity of policing: to enable it to be conceptualised within a framework that accounts for the rigour of academic validity and its everyday application by practitioners. The innate tension that this presents is, perhaps, a stumbling block for our understanding of policing and ‘what works’. Nonetheless the merging of the academic and practitioner approaches provide a tremendous opportunity to extend both our understanding and our capacity.

This research does not seek to explore, in any great depth, the various approaches to policing. Indeed whilst it relies on a high-level view of some of the key approaches that inform our understanding of policing in contemporary society, it is more focussed on the deliverables of Task Forces and ensuring that policy decisions are translated into practice. Police and policing is defined as:


*... an organised civil force for maintaining order, preventing and detecting crime and enforcing the laws ...[or] the regulation and control of a community a community especially with reference to the maintenance of public order, safety, health, morals, etc. (Macquarie Dictionary 1988; 1317).*

For some, discussion has centred on the different ‘eras’ of policing with policing seen to have progressed from model to model. Whilst this is represented diagrammatically in Figure 2.1 it is not relied on as an accurate (or necessarily appropriate) representation of policing from a temporal perspective. Clearly there has been a significant paradigm shift in policing. As Bayley states:

*The role of police services is changing rapidly. The 1980s saw a shift towards community policing, which was contrasted with what is now called 'traditional policing'. Traditional policing emphasised a rapid response to calls for service as the most effective way of dealing with criminal activity (Bayley 1999: 1).*

To Bittner (1980) is often attributed the idea that lawful force is the essence of the police institution. Bittner's argument is that, ‘while the police role is diffuse and wide-ranging, everything the police do falls into place when one recognises the unique feature of their office, their ability legitimately to apply force on behalf of the state’ (Fielding 2002: 149).

Figure 2.1 Approaches to Policing




## Order Maintenance

When examining the breadth of ‘policing’ it is instructive to consider an overarching conceptualisation. Suffice to say that policing, for our purposes, can best be understood as the maintenance of order through a variety of approaches including, but not restricted to, traditional law enforcement, community policing and partnerships. Each is not mutually exclusive, a precursor to the other, or indeed a necessary precondition. Instead, collectively they (with others) comprise the tools of the ‘order maintenance’ toolkit and are utilised as and when appropriate. Their interdependence and inter-reliability is the platform upon which order maintenance occurs.

Maintaining order in public places is often referred to as ‘public order policing’. In recent times public order policing tactics have become closely associated with community policing (Bass 2000: 153).

Figure 2.2 Understanding Policing



## Traditional Law Enforcement

In recent years, many police organisations have moved away from traditional law enforcement policing (the ‘crime-fighting’, ‘caped crusader’ model) where emphasis was placed on rapid response time, special investigations and arrests for serious crimes (Nolan et al 2004: 115). For many, the traditional (referred to also as the professional) approach was viewed cynically and assumed to be unsuccessful. The shift from reactive policing in the traditional professional model to the pro-active community-policing model was considered by Lumb and Breazeale to be nothing less than a revolution (Lumb and Breazeale 2002: 95).

## Community Policing

The move has been towards the community-policing model—where community involvement, problem solving and eliminating disorder are emphasised (Nolan et al 2004: 115). Community policing is seen to encourage police officers to find ways of dealing with situations without making an arrest (Garcia 2005: 67). It is, by its very nature, challenging for many police officers both culturally and in terms of service delivery. As Lumb and Breazeale state:

*Community policing places new and different demands on the police officer. The ability to solve problems, to be flexible, to have good interpersonal and communication skills, and to be authoritative rather than authoritarian are some of those demands (Lumb and Breazeale 2002: 96).*

Within the community policing approach is the concept of neighbourhood watch, where community empowerment, through increased vigilance and caring for neighbours and their property, is fostered. Neighbourhood Watch programs and youth programs then, increase social cohesion through empowering neighbourhood residents to fix 'broken windows' (Wilson & Kelling, 1982) and work in cooperation with the police in dealing with crime and prevention (Garcia 2005: 67).

Over time the notion of community policing has become less popular. Indeed some police forces in the United States will now not even refer to community policing although they may retain operational elements of it (Bayley 1999: 2).

## Partnerships

Progress, whilst perhaps falling short of revolutionary (as the initial burgeoning of community policing was described), has not halted. The new direction extends community policing into a partnership oriented model. Partnership policing 'developed during the 1980s when the model of police paternalism that was embedded in community policing, evolved into a new concept of independent agents working together in partnership with formal structures' (Oppler 1997: 1). Partnership policing may be defined as:

*... police taking a proactive leadership role in bringing disparate community groups such as the public, elected officials, government and other agencies together to focus on crime and community disorder problems (Oppler 1997: 3).*

Often now referred to as *Stronger (or Safer) Community Partnerships*, the relationship between key players is described as:

*... a multilateral response between community leaders, business, government, local government, non-government agencies and community organisations designed to combine energy, ideas, financial strengths and resources to take ownership of a broad range of issues facing a community. The central premise of this type of partnership is that communities are best situated and equipped to identify and resolve problems as well as to capitalise on opportunities (Heath, 2005:1).*

This interagency liaison has gone beyond 'collaboration' between law enforcement agencies. Within the partnership framework, extensive interaction within government agencies is seen to be increasingly beneficial. The paradigm is now one of 'cooperation' between police and other agencies (Shernock 2004: 70). Within Tasmania, the current emphasis is on 'joined-up' solutions that benefit individuals and communities. Known as *Inter-agency Support Panels*, the key elements are:

*Identification and participation by community leaders on a central committee;*  
*Strong governance principles and commitment to action;*  
*Accountable action groups; and,*  
*Performance measurement (Heath 2005, 4).*



Notwithstanding the above, the most successful community-police partnerships are in neighbourhoods that have existing community organisations that address a range of community issues rather than a single issue (Bass 2000: 151). As argued previously, these approaches cannot be viewed in isolation. Policing styles and approaches must be adaptable to the prevailing situation and capable of change – in essence reflecting the conditions of the neighbourhood (Nolan et al 2004: 115).

## Chapter 3: Setting the Scene

In Tasmania, considerable emphasis has been placed on the development of a *shared vision for the future*. The vision is detailed in the document ‘Tasmania Together’: a twenty year social, environmental and economic plan. It contains benchmarks and performance indicators that, in effect, provide a blue-print for the future. The document; based on widespread community consultation and subject to continual monitoring is a key driver to ensure that the ‘Tasmania’ of the future is what the people want it to be. Whilst the subject of some debate, the genesis of *Tasmania Together* lies within the notion of participatory democracy, the ‘joining-up’ of government and the creation of formal partnerships across and within the government and non-government sectors.

### 3.1 Overview

#### Tasmania

Tasmania sits to the south-east of the Australian mainland. It is an island with a total area of 68,049 kilometres (26,274 miles) and accounts for 0.9% of the total area of Australia. It is 296 kilometres (184 miles) from north to south and 315 kilometres (195.5 miles) from east to west (ABS).

Tasmania’s population is 484,000 and it is described as being the most decentralised State in Australia. There are five cities within Tasmania: Hobart, Clarence, Glenorchy, Launceston, Burnie and Devonport. Hobart is the capital city and, like the others, is considered to be representative of a regional population when compared to the likes of Melbourne and New South Wales.

Over recent years, Tasmania Police has reported a considerable decrease in crime rates and a considerable increase in crime clear-up rates.

#### Attitudes to Community Safety and Crime

In 2002, a broad-based community survey to determine attitudes of persons in the north-western quarter of Tasmania was conducted. The aim was to gain a greater appreciation of community attitude across a range of areas, including community safety and crime. Whilst not directly involving the specific communities it is indicative of general sentiment at the time that *Streetsafe* was being developed and implemented.


The survey was designed by the Devonport based *Partnership in Policing* (PIP) Committee and then extended by senior police in the Western District Management Group. The survey was approved by the PIP committee and conducted in Devonport. Police officers, Neighbourhood Watch volunteers, government employees, private businesses and youth were utilised to conduct the surveys. A local newspaper *The Devonport Times* also included the survey and the public was able to return completed surveys to a number of points around Devonport.

A total of 1033 persons were surveyed in Devonport. Fifty-four percent were female.

### Respondents by Age Group

Approximately 51.9 percent of the respondents (see figure 3.1 below) were aged 35 years or less. Notably, 22.7 percent of respondents were under 17 years of age.


Figure 3.1 Persons Surveyed by Age



### Respondents by Residential Area

Respondents were asked to identify the area in which they lived. The answers have been correlated into the three policing sub-divisions that exist in Devonport Division: Devonport, Latrobe and Ulverstone.

Figure 3.2 Persons Surveyed by Residential Area



In comparison with the known population base, the percentage of persons surveyed in the Ulverstone sub-division is less than desired. They are under-represented in this survey.

## Crime and Safety Issues

Respondents were asked to identify what crime and safety issues were important to them. Twenty-three percent (236) of respondents did not answer this question. Among those that responded, often more than one issue was cited. The issues reported, in order of rate reported, were:

**Table 3.1 Important Crime and Safety Issues**

<i>Issue</i>	<i>No. of times Reported</i>
Burglaries (all)	320
Personal Safety	232
Home Security	195
Offences to the Person	136
All issues	71
Drugs	49
Motor Vehicle Stealing	44
Damage to Property	21
Traffic Matters	17
Dog Offences & Control	13
Business Security	6
Mental Health	2
Neighbours	1
Firearms	1
Terrorism	1
Youth Suicide	1
Penalties for offending	1
Total	<b>1111</b>

## Feeling Safe - At Home or in Public

Respondents were also asked to list the things that make them feel safe at home or in public. Twenty-six percent (264) persons did not respond. Of the remaining, the following responses were provided (ranked in response rate order)

**Table 3.2 Feeling Safe – At Home or in Public**

<i>Feeling of Safety</i>	<i>No. of times Reported</i>
Home Security	308
Police Presence	285
Company of others	209
Neighbours	107
Dog Security	106
Street Lighting	99
Personal Safety	25
Safety House	5
Closed Circuit TV (CCTV)	4
Access to Telephone	4
Total	<b>1152</b>

## Street Lighting

Respondents were also asked if the extent of lighting in streets, car parks and / or reserves made them feel safer. Eighty-six percent of respondents indicated that it did.


## Responsibility for Community Safety and Crime Prevention

Respondents were also asked to indicate, from a list provided, who they thought should be responsible for community safety and crime prevention. As respondents were asked to indicate all those considered responsible, more than one answer could be provided. The categories provided were:

- Business and Retailers
- Council
- Service Clubs
- Police
- Neighbours
- Health
- Schools
- Other (specify)

Figure 3.3 (below) indicates that respondents viewed police (96 percent) as being primarily responsible for community safety and crime prevention. The respective local councils (71 percent) also featured prominently. Importantly, in terms of strategy design and delivery, responsibility was also seen to rest with the individuals themselves (64 percent) and their immediate (neighbours) community (62 percent). Moreover, schools were also seen (61 percent) as important players.

Figure 3.3 Responsibility for Safety



## Crime Prevention and Community Safety Information

The survey was also designed to be educative. Accordingly, respondents were asked if they would like more information on crime prevention and community safety for residences or businesses. Interestingly, seventy-six percent indicated that they did not. Of the twenty-four percent that did, fifty-nine percent of these indicated they wanted residential information, thirteen percent indicated they wanted business/retail information and twenty-eight percent indicated they wanted residential and business/retail information. Information was provided by mail to those requesting it.

## Vandalism Witnessed

Eleven percent of respondents reported that they had, in the previous 12 months, witnessed a person(s) committing vandalism that they did not report.

## Anti-Social Behaviour

Respondents were asked to identify what types of anti-social behaviour caused them concern (refer table 3.3 below). Again respondents could provide more than one response. Clearly, behavioural offences that are disorderly or involve alcohol are most concerning for the respondents. These returned a combined total of 572. Damage rated second with a combined total (public property, private property, business property) of 332. Offences against the person, in both public and private, were also considered important with a combined total of 170. The responses, in rate reported order, were:

**Table 3.3 Anti-social Behaviour that causes concern**

<i>Behaviour</i>	<i>No. of times Reported</i>
Disorderly Conduct	367
Drunkenness	205
Traffic Offences	118
Damage to Public Property	114
Damage to Private Property	110
Damage to Business Property	108
Drugs/Drug Offences	101
Offences to the Person (public place)	89
Offences to the Person (private place)	81
Burglary and Stealing (private place)	35
Burglary and Stealing (business)	35
Excessive Noise (persons, motor vehicles, etc.)	24
Burglary of Motor Vehicles, Stolen Motor Vehicles	19
Dog Offences	14
Total	<b>1420</b>

Respondents were also asked if they had personally seen anti-social behaviour that caused them concern in the last twelve months. Fifty-three percent indicated that they had. They were then asked to identify where the anti-social behaviour had occurred. They were asked to nominate if it occurred in a residential area or in a business/retail area. Sixty-two percent of these indicated they had witnessed it in a business/retail area, twenty-two percent in a residential area and one percent indicated it had not occurred in either of these areas (fifteen percent did not specify).

Respondents were also asked to nominate the areas that they had witnessed the anti-social behaviour occurring. Fifty-one percent (of the total number of respondents) did not respond. Of those that did respond, fifteen percent identified shopping Malls, almost three percent nightclub precincts and five percent identified general central business districts.

### **Policing Services**

Respondents were asked if there were any police activities that they would like increased. Seventy-one percent responded 'no', twenty-eight percent responded 'yes' and eleven percent did not respond. Those that responded 'yes' were asked to state what services they would like increased. The responses were many and varied but in the main are catered for within the following categories:

- more foot patrols
- more police (in all areas)
- more mobile patrols
- more police in schools
- more police involvement in youth activities

Respondents were asked whether or not they considered having police officers on foot-patrol was important. Eighty-nine percent stated that it was.

### **Launceston City Council Vandalism Survey**

The Launceston City Council conducted a survey in February 2002 that focussed on the issue of vandalism. Whilst numbers surveyed, response rates and further detailed information is not available, the people canvassed reported that, in general, Launceston required:

- more police
- increased police on patrol
- harsher penalties
- more education about the effects of vandalism.

### **Assessment**

As mentioned previously, the survey conducted in Devonport is considered reflective of general sentiment in 2002. Whilst it is noted that there is similarity between the vandalism survey findings and the Devonport survey again it should only be considered reflective of general sentiment.

Notwithstanding the above, it is apparent that increased police presence is rated highly in both areas. The efficacy of this statement as a strategy or tactic of traditional law enforcement, community policing or partnership policing is not commented upon. What is important, and what police practitioners must be cognisant of, is the desire of the public to be reassured. The presence of police officers on the streets, in and of itself, promotes the reassurance.

## Tasmania Police

Tasmania Police for many years recruited under the mantra ‘101 Jobs: one Career’. In and of itself this statement lends credence to the assertion that policing is complex. Indeed an examination of the corporate documentation for all Australian police agencies (e.g. Tasmania, Victoria, and New South Wales), provides an insight into their organisational structure. For Tasmania, with some 1189 sworn police officers, 350 state service employees and 500 state emergency service volunteers, the Department of Police and Public Safety (DPPS) is comprised of three main entities: Forensic Science Service Tasmania (FSST), the State Emergency Service (SES) and Tasmania Police. Tasmania Police itself is divided into the following (refer Table 3.4) command areas:

**Table 3.4 Tasmania Police Command Areas**

<b>Geographic</b>	<b>Support</b>	<b>Other</b>
• Eastern District	• Operations Support	• Internal Investigation
• Northern District	• Executive Support	• State Security Unit
• Southern District	• Human Resources	
• Western District	• Corporate Services	

Tasmania Police undertakes, amongst other things, the following:

- Coronial Investigation
- Criminal Investigation
- Drug Investigation
- Forensic Investigation
- Community Policing
- Marine Policing
- Road Safety Policing
- Street Policing
- Search and Rescue
- Counter-terrorism
- Dignitary Protection
- Prosecution Services

Viewing Tasmania Police through the lens of history, it was established as a centralised police organisation in 1899. Then there were approximately 266 police officers in Tasmania and the population base was 173,000 (a ratio of 1:650.4). Just as the scope and breadth of policing has increased greatly over the last one hundred and six years, so has Tasmania Police. Today there is an authorised police officer strength of 1189 (supported by 350 State Service employees). As the population is approximately 484,000 the current ratio of police to public is now 1:407 (refer Table 3.5 below). Over the period there has been an increase of police strength of 4.7 and a population increase of 2.8.

**Table 3.5 Ratio of Police to Public**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Police</b>	<b>Public</b>	<b>Ratio</b>
1899	266	173,000	1:650.4
2006	1189	484,000	1:407



## Chapter 4: Police Task Forces: Operation Level

Police organisations have historically established ‘special’ units to deal with ‘special crimes’. Known as Task Forces, membership of these crime-fighting units is considered prestigious (Cole & Smith, 1999; Garcia 2005: 65). Intriguingly, a review of the literature did not identify significant accounts of Task Forces that had a community safety focus.

Having said this, in the 1990s there was in the United States and United Kingdom a proliferation of what was known as the ‘multi-jurisdictional task force’ (MJTF). The MJTF has been defined as:

*... a special law enforcement organization with multi-jurisdictional authority created by agreement of several governmental bodies to more effectively combat a delineated crime problem and using the combined resources, both human and logistical, of several law enforcement agencies to more efficiently combat the stated problem for the term of the agreement." (Shernock 2004: 68)*

This approach, situated firmly within the partnership paradigm discussed above, led to a shift from the traditional (or professional) enforcement regime to one that concentrated on solving problems through a range of strategies (Shernock 2004: 71).

This research focuses on three Task Forces that were conducted in 2002 in Tasmania: *Operation Level* and *Operation Street Safe* in Launceston and *Operation Streetsafe* in Hobart. The following table provides an overview of the time-frames that applied to each.

**Table 4.1 Periods in which the Operations occurred**

Operation	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sept	Oct	Nov	Dec
<b>Launceston</b>												
Level		■	■	■	■							
Street Safe										■	■	■
<b>Hobart</b>												
Streetsafe						■	■	■				

Each of the Operations drew on experiences from across Tasmania and relied on stakeholder engagement from the government, business, education, health, justice and community sectors. Each Operation was, as discussed above, comprised of a strategic policy element and a tactical element. A police inspector, from Launceston, was the architect of all operations and actively involved in the strategic policy direction of each. Different inspectors were involved as Operation Commanders and a variety of sergeants undertook the roles of Officer-in-Charge of Field Operations.

## **4.1 Operation ‘Level’: Launceston**

*Operation Level* was, in many respects, the foundation stone upon which Operation Street Safe (in its various guises) was built. It commenced on 27 February 2002 and concluded on 19 May 2002. It was established in the Northern Police District and was focussed primarily on the Central Business District. *Operation Level* was also known as the ‘*Assault Task Force*’.

There were two distinct components to *Operation Level*. The first was at a stakeholder engagement strategic level and the second was operationally focussed; in effect policing strategies and service delivery (both proactive and reactive). The first involved an array of groups (including the Northern Community Safety Partnership, the Chamber of Commerce, City Promotions, and industry representatives). The second sought to give effect to the strategic direction that was set and to report on activities.

It was conducted in two phases, each of five weeks duration.

### **Operational Phase One**

#### **Week One**

The emphasis of the task force was on maintaining a highly visible police presence on the streets, in car parks, and inside hotels. A tactic employed in the hotels was moving through the establishment as a group of four uniformed police officers to ‘ensure that an obvious presence is created’. Plans existed for all hotels to be visited at least twice during the rostered hours and high-visibility was commended by hoteliers as a pro-active measure to improve patron behaviour. Extensive liaison with security personnel and hotel staff was a focal point with all parties being fully briefed on the aims and intentions of the Task Force. Moreover, these persons were provided with an opportunity to support the policing efforts. Police allocated a mobile phone for the Officer-in-Charge (a Senior Sergeant) of the Task Force and cards with the phone number were distributed to hotel staff. The aim of the mobile phone was to increase responsiveness to incidents and to provide an opportunity for hotel staff to call police prior to an incident escalating. This strategy was embraced enthusiastically and is reported to have enabled the immediate tasking of response teams of eight to ten police officers.

On the first two nights the mobile phone was called on three occasions. The third occasion involved an hotelier seeking advice from police following a taxi-driver’s refusal to convey an intoxicated female home. The hotelier advocated to police that other areas of the community, such as the taxi industry and the City Council, needed to ‘come on board and assist’. This attitude was heralded by police as being indicative of others within the business community being interested in ‘owning’ the situation that police were trying to address.

Responses to incidents were deliberately concentrated on both promptness and enthusiasm and relied on discretion and diplomacy. The response to anti-social behaviour was described in internal documentation as 'swift and firm'. Emphasis was given to briefings at the commencement of the shift and debriefings at the conclusion of the shift. Wednesday night was known to be the night that University students frequented the City nightclubs and Thursday was known to be the 'quietest' night of the week. Officers were allocated time on Thursday shifts for paperwork.

At the conclusion of the first week of operation, Task Force members made two recommendations. The first involved approaching the City Council to install chains or boom-gates to restrict access to car parks (thereby deterring 'young troublemakers' in vehicles). The second involved the running of a joint Tasmania Police Traffic Services and Transport Tasmania operation focussing on vehicle defects.

Issues that were considered prominent across the period mainly related to youths and vehicles, with the following comment illustrative:

*A lot of anti-social behaviour is a flow on from/or associated with the attitude and behaviour of young drivers doing so-called 'blockies' in modified vehicles. The vast majority of these so called drivers are on 'p' plates and the 'blockies' appear to be similar to a right (sic)of passage (Police Officer 1).*

## **Week Two**

The strategies employed over this week were substantially similar to those utilised in Phase one, week one. It had been planned that members of the Launceston Watch, a training station, would be utilised during the overlap shift (when night shift and afternoon shift personnel are on duty) with the Task Force. This led to an additional five newly graduated constables being allocated to the Task Force and was seen as a mechanism to increase their knowledge, skills and confidence.

Engagement of hoteliers and their staff continued to be a focal point. Some licensees expressed '*strong support for the continuation of the Task Force*' and indicated their intention to contact the Commander to discuss this. The 'blockie' element was described as being 'far more subdued'. Engagement of the media occurred and anecdotal feedback from Tasmania Police Radio Dispatch Services indicated that some operators perceived a decline in calls related to the Launceston CBD.

## **Week Three**

Similar policing strategies were employed again by the Task Force. Anti-social behaviour in and around hotels was described as 'improving significantly'. It was reported that:

*Quite a number of positive comments were received by Task Force members from a wide cross-section of the public, indicating an approval of the high visibility policing being adopted, as well as a sense of feeling safer on the streets within the CBD (Police Officer 1)*

Whilst groups of youths (and vehicles) were reported to be congregating in car parks the overall behaviour of the groups was reported as 'improved'. Drivers doing 'blockies' were targeted and the increased attention seen to have a positive effect.

Engagement with the Launceston City Council was evident, with an Inspector and the Mayor inspecting car parks and parks to discuss issues of street-lighting and access. Again the Task Force cooperated strongly with Watch personnel and the mingling of experience and inexperience was seen to be beneficial. At the fundamental level, an experienced senior sergeant advocated Watch personnel keep in mind the acronym PACK (Presence, Attitude, Confidence, Knowledge) as being the key attributes required by police officers.

## Week Four

Similar strategies were utilised for week four. The media continued to be interested in the Task Force and a regional television station took the opportunity to obtain ‘vision’ of officers on foot-patrol. Continued positive comments about the impact of the Task Force were received including from young nightclub patrons. A range of offences were detected; one of which came from observations via the Mall closed circuit television (CCTV).

## Week Five

No change in strategy occurred in week five. Whilst two assaults were reported, one was believed to be unfounded and the other resulted in the immediate arrest of the offender. Youths and vehicles continued to be an area of attention although there was a reported noticeable improvement in behaviour.

## Overview

Table 4.2 (below) provides an overview of the number of arrests made, traffic infringement notices and vehicle defect notices issued. Table 4.3 (below) provides more detailed information on the break-down of offences.

**Table 4.2 Phase One Interventions (Sample)**

Phase 1	Arrests	TINS	Defect Notices
Week 1	26	40	
Week 2	17	17	4
Week 3	11	30	7
Week 4	8	23	1
Week 5	10	29	1
Total	72	139	13

**Table 4.3 Phase One Interventions (Offence type)**

Offence Type	Arrests	Other*
Crimes	3	
Street offences	56	
Drug Offences	4	
Exceed 0.05%	9	
Drug Diversions		2
Street Offences (summonsed)		6
Licensing Offences (summonsed)		26
Traffic Offences (summonsed)		4

\*Note: includes proceeded against by summons, diversion notice, youth conferencing, etc.

## **Operational Phase Two**

### **Week One**

Given the perceived success of Phase One, Operation 'Level' was extended. Task Force personnel, with the exception of one member, remained the same.

Efforts were made to ensure that youth drivers considered at risk were advised of potential repercussions of their driving behaviour. Feedback from the community continued to be positive and included a perception of being safer on the streets, notwithstanding the fact that several violent incidents occurred. Licensed premises walk-throughs continued to be a high priority.

### **Week Two**

Week two included a public holiday for Anzac Day and saw increased activity in hotels and on the street on the night prior. Strategies continued as before. One member left the Task Force to attend a professional development course.

A senior officer requested a focus on a particular offence (committing a nuisance) and seven arrests were made. The majority of these related to persons urinating in public.

### **Week Three**

During week three, strategies remained consistent. A number of arrests were made for offences where, it was reported, *'alcohol and attitude combined and caused people to be abusive and antagonistic to Police'*.

### **Week Four**

Week four saw a continued focus on 'commit a nuisance' offences and also saw Task Force members being deployed to focus on repeat offences of 'tyre-slashing'. Young drivers were considered to have improved their behaviour considerably with offences proving *'harder to detect'*.

### **Week Five**

Week five saw a continued focus on 'commit a nuisance' offences with one arrest being made. Despite the low detection rate, it was considered that the offence was continuing. It was reported that:

*... the smell and visual evidence around the streets indicates that this behaviour is still very prevalent. There are also strong indications that this behaviour is practised by females as well as males (Police Officer 1)*

## **Overview**

Table 4.4 (below) provides an overview of the number of arrests made, traffic infringement notices and vehicle defect notices issued. Table 4.5 (below) provides more detailed information on the break-up of offences.

**Table 4.4 Phase Two Interventions (Sample)**

Phase 2	Arrests	TINS	Defect Notices
Week 1	15	27	1
Week 2	17	24	1
Week 3	18	20	1
Week 4	15	9	1
Week 5	7	14	1
Total	72	94	5

**Table 4.5 Phase Two Interventions (Offence type)**

Offence Type	Arrests	Other*
Crimes	0	
Street offences	15	
Drug Offences	0	
Exceed 0.05%	5	
Drug Diversions		5
Street Offences (summonsed)		17
Licensing Offences (summonsed)		19
Traffic Offences (summonsed)		1
Council Infringement Notice (Licensing)		3

\*Note: includes proceeded against by summons, diversion notice, youth conferencing, etc.

In the arrests, eighteen were for the new offence of ‘*failing to obey the directions of a police officer*’, eighteen were for ‘*committing a nuisance by urinating*’ and four were for injuring or destroying council property (including two of graffiti).

Overall, Task Force members were of the view that they each conducted between twelve-fifteen licensed premises checks per night. Noting that some of these were conducted in groups of four, the actual number of visits by police would be perceived by the public to be less than this (e.g. four police officers visiting one licensed premise would be recorded as four visits when in fact only one occurred, albeit it was attended by four police officers).

On each shift a concentrated focus was given to high-visibility policing, most often through foot-patrols. One police vehicle (at least) was mobile and briefed to be available to ‘pick-up’ foot-patrol officers to facilitate a rapid response to reported incidents. Interestingly:

*While there was an initial suggestion of plainclothes at times for the Task Force, team members were unanimous (as time progressed) that uniform was the preferred option from the public point of view – considerable feedback was received from a wide-cross section of the public that they felt far safer walking around the streets with a highly visible police presence around (Police Officer 1).*

The high-visibility and rapid response capability was described as ‘*having a significant deterrent effect on anti-social behaviour*’.

# Chapter 5 Police Task Forces: Street Safe

## 5.1 Operation StreetSafe, Hobart

*Operation Streetsafe*, Hobart, was conducted between 24 June 2002 and 25 August 2002. In December 2002, the Tasmanian Institute of Law Enforcement Studies (TILES) completed the report *Streetsafe Hobart Evaluation: Design, Implementation and Indicative Outcomes* (Alessandrini 2002). There it was identified that:

*Streetsafe began with a partnership approach, involving state and local government and several other appropriate groups. In this respect it was an example of an emerging and increasingly successful approach to policing based on consultation, liaison and appropriate partnerships at all levels. It consulted widely and combined the resources of several major stakeholders (Alessandrini 2002, 3)*

Diverse issues were identified. They included anti-social behaviour, illicit drug usage (including use of licit substances which, when used by youth, become illicit). A multi-dimensional approach was taken ranging from harm minimisation, compliance and prevention, to rigid law enforcement (Alessandrini 2002, 5). Prevention strategies included developing awareness within the community of the impact of substance abuse, penalties and consequences. A 'Party Hard, Party Safe' campaign was launched and advertised on public buses and in road safety campaigns (through the distribution of pamphlets). Wallet-sized information cards were also distributed about alcohol consumption and driving (including a promotional token for a reduced video/DVD hire prize). Compliance strategies included a focus on underage drinking, underage tobacco use, and anti-social behaviour (Alessandrini 2002, 5).

### Police Gazette Article

The *Police Gazette* of 31 October 2002 contained an article on *Operation StreetSafe*, Hobart. That article is reproduced in its entirety as it details the approach taken.

#### **Streetsafe**

*Between 24 June 2002 and 25 August 2002 Southern District conducted an operation called Streetsafe. This involved twelve members from Southern Uniform, CIB, Drug Investigation Services and Southern Traffic Services, with assistance from the Licensing Commission, Tasmania Fire Service and the Department of Health and Human Services.*

*The operation centred on hotels and areas around the Hobart CBD where it was identified there were problems in relation to assaults, drug offences and anti-social behaviour.*

*Streetsafe is a problem solving community driven approach to policing. It is designed to be adaptable and portable. It combines traditional and innovative policing methodologies to mitigate or resolve the community safety issues particular to a region.*

*Its process is as important as its specific outputs as the process delivers the strategic outcomes that outlive the initial expenditure of resources. It is a political process that is highly sensitive to the political agenda of the community.*

*Streetsafe is designed to resolve community and political concerns that are not reflected in normal corporate performance measures. These concerns or issues will vary from location to location. In this way the strategies developed will be adapted or modified appropriately.*

*Its objectives are numerous but the most important are :-*

- *to collaboratively identify the real and discursive community safety concerns in a particular area;*
- *to join up the resources of police and government agencies, NGO's, as well as local government;*
- *to guide and coordinate (rather than direct) those resources towards resolving the safety issues that the community identify;*
- *to develop ACTION NETWORKS in the community rather than forums that air concerns but not resolve them;*
- *to collaboratively develop HOLISTIC approaches to community safety issues;*
- *these approaches developed operate along a continuum from harm minimisation (passive) to enforcement (active).*

#### **Imperatives and Drivers**

*Streetsafe brings together the combined imperatives of:-*

- *Tasmania Together*
- *Local Government Partnership Agreements*
- *Tasmanian Drug Strategic Plan*
- *Tasmania Police Corporate Plan*
- *District Action Plans*
- *Tasmania Together Inter-Departmental Committee*

*Its outcomes can strongly support the CMG reporting requirements tactically and strategically. This process is now being utilised by the Northern District over the October to December period.*

## **Performance Measures**

There were a total of one hundred and nine persons arrested and a total of one hundred and forty-seven charges laid. The charges are detailed in Table 5.1

**Table 5.1 Charges Laid (Offence type), Streetsafe, Hobart**

<b>Offence Type</b>	<b>Arrests</b>
Crimes	7
Street offences	26
Alcohol Offences	41
Drug Offences	29
Exceed 0.05%	5
Road Safety Offences (other than X05)	2
Drug Diversions	4
Licensing Offences (summonsed)	27
Traffic Offences (summonsed)	6

The Task Force was considered to have varying degrees of success. Some negatives were seen to lie within the expectation of police, stakeholders and the broader community. Moreover, some command issues were not addressed initially which led to a period of uncertainty. For instance:

*... whilst there were objectives they were not prioritised and there was a feeling of being overwhelmed by some officers; in effect 'too much being done by too few' (Police Officer 5).*

*Not equipped (e.g. Radios) to properly run Task Force (Police Officer 7).*



Whilst there were some criticisms, there was also a considerable amount that was seen to be positive. Indeed, it was considered a:

*[p]ity it didn't go forever, a very positive thing – particularly if it had kept going into the summer months (Police Officer 7).*

Moreover, the personnel selected for the Task Force were a:

*... good mix of experience and keen juniors ...[it was a] saving grace that each team had a Sergeant (Police Officer 7).*

## 5.2 Operation Street Safe, Launceston

*Operation Street Safe* commenced on 14 October 2002 and is continuing; albeit in an altered format.

### Offence Data

An analysis of offence reporting (data held by Tasmania Police) revealed the main offence types reported in the Launceston Division during the 12 month period 3 October 2001 until 3 October 2002 (in order of volume), were:

- dishonesty
- damage (injury) to property
- assault.

Most offences were reported as having occurred in Launceston City or the northern suburbs. Assault reports were mainly focussed in Launceston and most of these occurred in the CBD and in the vicinity of licensed premises. The peak period for assaults was between 10pm and 4am.

### Northern District Community Audit

In October 2002, Northern District Police conducted a “Community Audit” to provide a snapshot of business community and police concerns in Launceston. Four hundred and fifty forms were distributed to the business community in Launceston through the Launceston Chamber of Commerce, City Promotions and to Licensees. Sixty-nine (15.3 percent) responses were received. Additionally, the two hundred and forty-two police in the Northern District were also canvassed with twenty (8.3 percent) responding.

**Table 5.2 Northern District Community Audit (October 2002)**

	Surveyed	Respondents	Total Response Rate (%)
Business Community	450	69	15.3%
Police	242	20	8.3%
Total	692	89	12.9%

## Vehicle Security Survey

The strategy also involved inspecting motor vehicles parked in two Council car parks within the central business district. This ‘security’ survey was focused on determining how many vehicles were:

- unlocked
- unlocked with valuables visible
- locked with valuables visible.

Of the three hundred and fifty-eight (244 and 114 in the respective car parks) motor vehicles inspected, forty-four (12.3 percent) had valuables clearly visible. Moreover, nineteen (12.3 percent) were unlocked or had a window down to such an extent as to enable access and, of those, seven (36.8 percent) had valuables clearly visible (refer Table 5.3 below). Items that were described as ‘valuable’ included those that were known to be attractive to offenders and included: mobile phones, compact discs, back bags, bags, clothing, sports equipment, etc.

**Table 5.3 Motor Vehicle Security Audit (total) Launceston**

<b>Launceston Car Parks (1&amp;2)</b>	<b>Locked (n)</b>	<b>Unlocked (n)</b>	<b>Locked (%)</b>	<b>Unlocked (%)</b>
Valuables Visible	37	7	10.3%	2.0%
No Valuables Visible	302	12	84.4%	3.3%
Vehicles Inspected (n=358)	339	19	94.7%	5.3%

**Table 5.4 Motor Vehicle Security Audit (Car Park 1) Launceston**

<b>Launceston Car Park 1</b>	<b>Locked (n)</b>	<b>Unlocked (n)</b>	<b>Locked (%)</b>	<b>Unlocked (%)</b>
Valuables Visible	30	5	12.3%	2.0%
No Valuables Visible	205	4	84.0%	1.7%
Vehicles Inspected (n=244)	235	9	96.3%	3.7%

**Table 5.5 Motor Vehicle Security Audit (Car Park 2) Launceston**

<b>Launceston Car Park 2</b>	<b>Locked (n)</b>	<b>Unlocked (n)</b>	<b>Locked (%)</b>	<b>Unlocked (%)</b>
Valuables Visible	7	2	6.1%	1.8%
No Valuables Visible	97	8	85.1%	7.0%
Vehicles Inspected (n=114)	104	10	91.2%	8.8%

## Police Gazette Article

The *Police Gazette* of 14 November 2002 contained an article on *Operation Street Safe*. That article is reproduced in its entirety.

## Street Safe

*The Northern District has recently introduced a Street Safe program into its policing methodology. Street Safe is a program that has an overall aim,*

### ***"To make Launceston a safer place to be."***

*Historically there has been a perception that Launceston has a high rate of crime, violence and anti-social behaviour particularly within the CBD area. Previous task force responses have been effective in targeting these activities and reducing the problem for a period.*

*These problems cannot be attributed entirely to a group of individuals, nor any particular type of business. Contributing factors include; challenged and homeless youth, the abuse of drugs (both legal and illegal), the irresponsible serving of alcohol, the urban design of the Launceston City, the numerous factors and pressures surrounding the education processes and the pressure placed on businesses to survive in the local economy.*

*There are many different stakeholders affected by these behaviours, ranging from the general community to business and various government organisations. All of these organisations are attempting to find solutions and commit resources.*

*It has been identified that these stakeholders will be better situated to find real solutions for the greater Launceston area problems by combining resources and having a co-ordinated approach to finding solutions. As a result of extensive consultation the concept of "Street Safe" has emerged where stakeholders resource differing projects and target outcomes from harm minimisation, prevention, detection and re-direction.*

*Street Safe not only incorporates a task force to once again target these activities but also endeavours to adopt an holistic and intelligence-led approach which will not only reduce crime, but reduce the perception of crime. Its long term intention is to find lasting solutions to problems by assisting and coordinating all stakeholders and the resources they are able to make available.*

*The Northern Police District role in Street Safe is facilitating a combined approach as a member of the Northern Safer Communities Partnership (NSCP) and identifying different strategies to make the community safer.*

*These strategies run parallel and have included the following:*

- Utilising a series of forums and discussions within the greater Launceston area to heighten community awareness of issues and how they impact on one another.*
- A combined approach to the 'at-risk' youth by running projects and funding initiatives to change youth behaviour by way of case working, involving youth in projects and giving them a feeling of "belonging" in the community.*
- The use of an Inter Agency Task Force, represented by the Launceston City Council (Health), Licensing Commission, Tasmania Fire Service and Tasmania Police and to conduct joint audits on licensed establishments.*
- A task oriented group of Police to target specific problem areas with different strategies. This task force has identified opportunities to work with, and obtain assistance from, other stakeholders.*
- This Task Force has been split into two teams of six personnel and targets both day time and night time activities as identified from intelligence gathered. ...*

*The Street Safe Task Force is delivering the tangible short term, tactical results the different stakeholders expect from a policing perspective. By setting this example Police are in a stronger negotiating position to encourage other stakeholders to "come on board" and commit resources towards the longer term strategies aimed at harm minimisation, re-direction of youth behaviour and a more responsible attitude of the Community in general.*

## **Operation Order**

An *Operation Order* was written for the conducting of *Operation Street Safe* in Launceston. The *Operation Order* was written in accordance with standard protocols and was framed around the SMEAC model (Situation, Mission, Execution, Administration and Logistics, and Command).

### **Situation and Mission**

The *Situation* provided an overview of the aim of the operation and drew linkages to key stakeholders. The *Mission* (in this case called the *Aim*) ‘*To make Launceston a safer place to be*’ was clear, concise, easily understood and provided an overall direction.

### **Execution**

The *Execution* included a general outline of all strategies to be employed at both the policy and tactical level. It forecast extensive involvement with stakeholders and made it clear that Tasmania Police was facilitating the *Operation* as a member of the Northern Safer Communities Partnership (NSCP). Importantly, the *Execution* detailed that the *Operation* was not the only strategy that was being employed but that it fitted within a raft of strategies that were occurring across government, council, business, education, health and the wider community. The Police Task Force was described as:

*A task oriented group of Police to target specific problem areas with different strategies. This task force will identify opportunities to work with, and obtain assistance from, other stakeholders.*

### **Personnel**

The Task Force was allocated thirteen personnel from across the Northern Police District: one inspector, two sergeants and ten constables. The personnel were drawn from criminal investigation, drug investigation, licensing, and country, suburban and city police stations. They were a mixture of age, gender and experience (five were relatively new to policing).

The Task Force was divided into two teams (Alpha and Bravo) of six, each under the direction of a sergeant. The inspector’s role was to co-ordinate activities and be the information conduit for both the police hierarchy and the NSCP.

### **Foci**

Police activities were divided into two: those that were to be focussed on during the day and those that were to be focussed on during the night. Whilst there was some similarity (refer Table 5.6 below) within the broad activities the tactics employed were different.

**Table 5.6 Task Force Activities: Day and Night**

<b>Activity/Focus</b>	<b>Day</b>	<b>Night</b>
Anti-Social Behaviour in public areas	✓	✓
Enforcement of Misuse of Drugs Act	✓	✓
Safety on public transport	✓	✓
Shoplifting	✓	
Truancy (Project Roll Call)	✓	
Business Liaison	✓	
Licensed Premises		✓
Driver Behaviour in CBD area		✓

## **Strategies**

### **Intelligence Led Policing**

The Northern Crime Management Unit (CMU) was tasked with identifying target areas for the Task Force. The CMU was responsible for the analysis of intelligence holdings, the identification of trends, the conducting of surveys with business and the police.

### **High-visibility Policing**

Task Force members were to undertake foot and mobile patrols in allocated areas. Moreover, they were to be *‘highly visible by their presence and direct action’*. High visibility was to be enhanced through the Stop, Walk and Talk Program and the activities of the bike squad. The Stop, Walk and Talk Program involved police officers whose core role might be office-based, undertaking a period of twenty minutes (or so) foot patrol in the CBD. The intention of the foot patrol was to engage with members of the public (businesses, pedestrians, students, youth, etc.). This had the effect of supplementing the numbers of those engaged in day time Task Force activities. Further supplementation was to occur on nights (Thursday, Friday and Saturday) when both the afternoon shift and the night shift were on duty between 11.00pm and 2.00am. The afternoon shift was to be amalgamated into the Task Force.

### **Covert Policing**

Notwithstanding the focus on high-visibility policing, the sergeants had the discretion to approve plain clothes patrols and other activities that could be defined as *‘covert’*.

### **Low Tolerance to Anti-social Behaviour**

All police were to *take appropriate action against any offence detected during patrols*. The intention of this strategy was to ensure that there was increased public awareness that police were targeting anti-social behaviour.

### **Liaison with Hotel Security**

Given the success of the mobile phone contact that was facilitated in Operation Level, licensed premises had direct access to the sergeant on duty through a mobile phone. This enabled *pre-warning of potential hotspots* and would ensure appropriate attention could be given to the area promptly.

### **Closed Circuit Television**

Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) functioned in the CBD and was able to be monitored at Launceston Police Headquarters. *Operation Street Safe* was to focus on strategies for staffing the monitoring station (including the feasibility of utilising members of the community). It was noted that some police utilised Neighbourhood Watch volunteers for this purpose.

### **Intelligence Form**

It had become apparent that members of the community did not always report offences or other matters (information) to police. To facilitate the flow of information a form was developed for information that might not normally be reported (because it was seen as irrelevant or low-level and not 'worth' reporting). The form had two caveats; it was not for the reporting of official complaints (crimes or offences) and would not 'activate' a police response.

The form was accompanied by an explanatory note. That stated:

*This form is designed to promote communication between Northern Safer Community Partners, other stakeholders and Tasmania Police in an attempt to identify trends, behavioural patterns and incidents that are adversely affecting the feeling of safety within the community.*

*... the information will assist with the identification of potential problem locations, groups or individuals allowing the "Street Safe" Police Task Force to target problem (sic)...*

*...The information may range from, but is not limited to:*

- a group tending to form and cause concern in a particular public area*
- a suspicious vehicle or person observed in strange areas*
- vehicles that are driven continually in an annoying manner*
- areas or locations where drug activity is suspected*
- description of persons who are suspected of shoplifting*
- the names of persons causing nuisance on public transport.*

### **Administration and Logistics**

General issues of accommodation, overtime, dress, and police vehicles were catered for and are, in the main, self explanatory. Several areas were given altered emphasis and they are dealt with below.

### **Hours of Duty**

Alpha and Bravo teams were allocated a two week rotating roster that was outside the normal rostering provisions of the *Police Award*. This was a position that each member of the Task Force agreed to. An additional rest day off (RDO) was provided as compensation for the non-compliance with the *Police Award* (including the increased flexibility to roster changes that was required).

Task Force members were rostered, over a fourteen day period, to work seventy-two hours:

- five day shifts (40 hours)
- one afternoon shift (8 hours)
- three night shifts (24 hours)
- five rest days off.

It also ensured that high-visibility policing was provided during both the day and the night.

### **Briefings and Debriefings**

Particular attention was given to ensuring that each team was briefed at the commencement of each shift and debriefed at the conclusion of the shift. The focus of the debrief was to ensure that strategies utilised were assessed and, if necessary, altered for future shifts.

### **Command**

The command component of the Operation Order was consistent with general practice. It assigned responsibility for the overall Operation to an inspector and day-to-day responsibility for the teams (Alpha or Bravo) to the respective sergeant.

## **Operational Phase**

### **Week One**

Following the initial briefing, attention was paid to business checks in the Launceston CBD. The focus was on informing businesses of the establishment of Street Safe and each was provided with a *Street Safe Information Sheet*. The opportunity was also extended to businesses to register (after hours contact details) with Tasmania Police. Foot patrol was a focal point and, as with Operation 'Level', high-visibility policing was the key. Police were also allocated to public (Metro) buses and a joint operation was conducted with Traffic Police and Transport Tasmania. Covert policing also occurred with a focus on alcohol being provided to, or purchased by, young persons.

### **Week Two**

Covert policing was employed to focus on stealing offences within the CBD and the gathering of intelligence. Consultation with stakeholders also occurred following the identification of issues in week one. This consultation attempted to negotiate a position between business and police to reduce the risk of anti-social offences. The businesses consulted were those that involved youth, alcohol or both youth and alcohol. Attention was also paid to ensuring a high profile police presence and to youths who were potential truants.

### **Week Three**

Use of covert and overt policing strategies were again employed and operational decisions were being guided by increased information being received from the public.

## **Week Four**

High visibility policing was the focus of this week with particular attention paid to dishonesty offences around the CBD. Importantly, police became aware of policies that are applied by some businesses (e.g. whether to charge or not charge offenders) that had the effect of understating the number of occurrences. Police attention was focussed on this issue. Attention was also paid to a rumoured planned brawl and ‘open invite’ party. Police presence is felt to have positively impacted on both and no issues arose from them.

## **Week Five**

Activities were focussed on liaising with key-stakeholders and holding strategy meetings with senior police. Actions were largely directed by intelligence holdings and, again, the focus was on high visibility policing.

## **Week Six**

Attention to high visibility policing was maintained with a focus on business checks, licensed premises checks and a presence on public buses.

## **Performance Measures**

The measurement of performance was aligned to the Tasmania Police Corporate Priorities and, hence, to *Tasmania Together*. This saw a ‘return of activities’ that were categorised as:

- Policing Support to the Community
- Crime Detection and Investigation
- Traffic Law Enforcement

Table 5.7 provides an overview of the *Return of Activities*.



**Table 5.7 Return of Activities: Street Safe Launceston**

<b>Policing Support to the Community</b>							
	<b>Number</b>						<b>Total</b>
	Wk 1	Wk 2	Wk 3	Wk 4	Wk 5	Wk 6	
Briefs (other than Crime/Traffic)	13	10	4	10	17	6	60
Arrests (Street Offences)	13	5	0	9	6	11	44
Truants (Truancy Program)	0	18	8	3	4	N/A	33
Business Premises Visited	259	133	36	59	117	99	703
Licensed Premises Checked	31	16	27	57	75	51	257
Metro/Police Bus Trips	1	2	3	5	7	10	28
<b>Crime Detection and Investigation</b>							
Persons Charged (Crime/Assault)	3	3	8	9	9	1	33
Persons Charged (Drugs)	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
Drug Diversions	0	5	4	3	10	2	24
Video Interviews Conducted	1	2	0	2	3	0	8
Search Returns	1	3	13	6	18	7	48
Information Reports	N/K	15	6	7	9	3	40
<b>Traffic Law Enforcement</b>							
Persons Charged (Traffic)	3	7	0	0	9	0	19
Traffic Infringement Notices	26	18	21	6	11	13	95
Exceed Breath Analysis Limit	1	2	0	3	5	2	13
Traffic Briefs	3	3	4	3	9	1	23
Defect Notices	1	1	0	0	0	0	2
Random Breath Tests	14	25	45	123	58	47	312

Whilst Tasmania Police uses both benchmarks and performance indicators, in the first three weeks neither was applied. Instead, activities were more generally focussed and categorised purely as a ‘return of activities’: a reporting of what had occurred, not a target to be achieved (benchmark) or a comparative measurement (performance indicator). Benchmarks and performance indicators were set during week four and are detailed in Table 5.8.

**Table 5.8 Benchmarks and Performance Indicators: Street Safe Launceston**

<b>Policing Support to the Community</b>		
	<b>Number</b>	
	Benchmark	Performance Indicator
Briefs (other than Crime/Traffic)	15	
Arrests (Street Offences)		Monitor (Comparative)
Truants (Truancy Program)	150	
Business Premises Visited	60	Monitor (Comparative)
Licensed Premises Checked		Monitor (Comparative)
Metro/Police Bus Trips	10	
<b>Crime Detection and Investigation</b>		
Persons Charged (Crime/Assault)	5	
Persons Charged (Drugs)	2.5	
Drug Diversions	2.5	
Video Interviews Conducted		Monitor (Comparative)
Search Returns	5	
Information Reports	20	
<b>Traffic Law Enforcement</b>		
Persons Charged (Traffic)	10	
Traffic Infringement Notices	20	
Exceed Breath Analysis Limit	50	
Traffic Briefs	3	
Defect Notices	5	
Random Breath Tests		Monitor (Comparative)

## Overview

Operation Street Safe was considered to be a success and has continued. To this end, the Operation Order for 3 February 2003 until 9 March 2003 identified that:

*The formation of previous Task Forces has proven to be very effective in targeting specific problem areas. It has been further identified that an holistic and intelligence-led approach will not only reduce crime – it will reduce the perception of crime. Recent successes by the Street Safe Task Force have identified the value of this coordinated approach.*

Importantly, the level of acceptance for the model is high. As one officer succinctly noted, you:

*... could pick this model up and put it down anywhere (Police Officer 4).*

Launceston reported that the level of crime and anti-social behaviour has been reduced significantly. Notwithstanding this, the focus of the Task Force remains on public place assaults, social order and hooning.

*The basics are still being complied with: security audits and high profile policing still happen. The Task Force is really well known in Launceston and the Launceston Safety Community Partnership love its report in general on performance (Police Officer 4).*

In interviews with local managers and supervisors there was an overt view that the Task Force, now known as the “*Safer Community*” Task Force was:

*... very handy all the time. District Management Group controls it [and it is] no longer Launceston focussed, but District wide. It always operates with one sergeant and three-four constables (Police Officer 3).*

*An extremely valuable tool(Police Officer 3)..*

*It continues to pay dividends through the blending of experience and inexperience. Works on a five week roster that is prepared by the Launceston Station sergeant. Rostering is now as per the Police Award. Regular briefings occur. Flexibility is still the key (Police Officer 3).*

The direction for the Task Force also comes from the Northern Community Safety Partnership Group. Whilst Task Force members are in place for a minimum period of five weeks and do not attend the partnership meeting, direction is funnelled to them through the District Management Group. In this respect, the intention is for the Task Force to:

*... target policing to problem areas [and give it a] ‘red hot’ go. It is about reassurance, regular patrols and visits ... [with a] focus on being proactive (Police Officer 3).*

Whilst the key to success in Launceston is reported to be vested in the supervisor, it must also:

*be intelligence driven and the traditional [law enforcement] approach [must] be very carefully applied (Police Officer 3).*

Managers reported that selection for the Task Force is considered to be a reward for efforts; a reflector of good performance. Although the ‘reward’ aspect is not a hard and fast rule, it is recognised that there are status benefits attached to role incumbency. There are many calls for secondments in Launceston and, of all the positions that require filling, the Task Force is the least problematic – officers want to do it.

Media coverage of the Task Force was also positive. *The Examiner* Editorial Opinion for 22 August 2002, stated:

*... Police in Launceston have worked with business and community groups over the past two years to overcome crime in the city. Launceston, whether statistics supported it or not, had developed a disturbing reputation for street crime ranging from petty vandalism to violence. ... [I]nitiatives like security cameras and a task force, which has been part of a renewed police focus, have reduced the problem. ...the statistics show a downturn in the number of incidents ... [but police say] the focus on beating crime in the city has not diminished (The Examiner, 22 August 2002).*

# Chapter 6: Styles and Organisational Capacity

## 6.1 Styles

‘Reassurance’ policing (aimed primarily at reducing fear of crime) and the more recent ‘neighbourhood’ policing (seeking also to provide reassurance, but incorporating the wider aim of establishing closer police-resident relationships and involving residents in policy decisions) are increasingly (Maguire and John 2006: 74) utilised to engage with the community as part of an overarching community safety strategy. Both emphasise the need for policing to move in the direction of “localism”, “citizen focus” and “community engagement” (Maguire and John 2006: 74)

Of course:

*“community”, “intelligence-led”, “problem-oriented” and “zero-tolerance” policing have all enjoyed periods of media and political prominence as “the” answer to crime, with “partnerships” working in a “joined-up” manner being the most recent example (Rogers 2003; Hale et al 2004: 293).*

Other prominent styles include geographic policing, hotspot policing, and crime prevention. The styles are not mutually exclusive (Hale et al 2004: 298) and, as discussed previously, many police agencies adopt a situational approach (Nolan, Conti et al. 2004) to policing. To this end, and mindful of Bayley’s 1999 recommendation that “...police should concentrate their resources on recurrent problems that generate crime, on 'hot spots' where police resources are repeatedly needed...” (Bayley 1999: 3), policing must adopt a style that is appropriate for a given situation and able to be modified if (or when) circumstances alter. Such flexibility fits comfortably within the Task Force paradigm.

## 6.2 Organisational Capacity

### Leadership

The (then) Chief of the New York Police Department, William Bratton, ably demonstrated that organisational capacity relies heavily on the abilities and attitudes of the leaders. In our context, leadership need not rest solely in the upper echelon of the organisation. Indeed it must rest with the actions and behaviours of the supervisors and managers. Only then can the theory of ‘tipping points’ be effected as it:

*...hinges on the insight that in any organisation, once the beliefs and energies of a critical mass of people are engaged, conversion to a new idea will spread like an epidemic, bringing about fundamental change very quickly” (Chan and Mauborgne 2003: 62).*

Police interviewed for this research expressed their view on the importance of leadership and what it meant and required in practical terms. These included:

*Harness the skills of others – lead by consultation (not direction), be flexible in your approach. Provide opportunities to air grievances, concentrate on the interpersonal skills of the group and of individuals (Police Officer 2).*

*Give credit where credit is due (Police Officer 6)*

*Leadership style – across the spectrum sit somewhere just under autocratic but they need solid direction (Police Officer 6)*

*Person in charge of Task Force needs to be picked (Police Officer 2)*

*Manage up: provide regular briefings, understand that the pressure is to do the job well, not just to do the job. Keep everyone focussed on the result, not the journey (Police Officer 2).*

## **Human Resources**

Within policing, human resources have been much maligned in Royal Commissions and the like. Concern is vested, quite properly, in what is described as the ‘cone of silence’ or the ‘brotherhood’. In effect this draws attention to the reality that policing has relied heavily on collegiality and close working relationships. There is much evidence to support the fact that many police have ‘crossed the line’ and whose actions have been corrupt. Notwithstanding this, respondents viewed their colleagues positively and noted no concerns in relation to illegality. Indeed the converse is true. There was general recognition that ethics, professionalism and loyalty to the organization were more important than loyalty to a colleague.

Moreover, the outputs that Task Forces aspire too prompted a general recognition that:

*Regardless of the nature of a task force, the key determinants of success are people, time, resources and remaining focussed on the mission (Police Officer 2).*

*The importance of ensuring the Operation Commander has the prerogative to identify the skill-set required and select individuals for the task cannot be understated (Police Officer 2).*

*Ensure that the Task Force has a guru for each aspect being policed (e.g. traffic, drugs, licensing, street offences)*

*The right people, the right people, the right people (Police Officer 2).*

*People who are prepared to put in more than is required and who are prepared to be flexible in enterprise agreement arrangements. There is also a need to ensure that they have ‘drive’ and derive satisfaction from their work (Police Officer 2).*

*Picking of experienced officer and development of young people (Police Officer 5)*

## **Teams**

Sound team building recognizes that it is not possible to fully separate one's performance from those of others (Bateman 1990). Bateman also states that:

*Team building is an effort in which a team studies its own process of working together and acts to create a climate that encourages and values the contributions of team members. Their energies are directed toward problem solving, task effectiveness, and maximizing the use of all members' resources to achieve the team's purpose (Bateman 1990).*

The interviews clearly demonstrated that working as a team is of significant importance in a Task Force. The following comment is illustrative:

*If the people are right cohesion is not a problem. Work in small teams (Police Officer 2)*

## **Resources**

It is trite to suggest that ensuring Task Forces are properly resourced is important. Appropriate resourcing is a powerful message of:

*...organisational commitment, demonstrated through the allocation of sufficient resources and a clear direction are also important (Police Officer 2).*

In the main, the Task Forces that have been analysed were, aside from some operational issues (e.g. access to a police radio), well resourced. Indeed the commitment shown by the respective District Management Groups is likely to have fostered confidence and added to the prestige that officers felt was attached to being selected.

## **Effecting Change**

As Lumb and Breazeale postulate:

*Change in a tradition bound organisation must be considered thoroughly, planned meticulously, and implemented with care and attention. Change of any magnitude generates anticipation, anxiety and a variety of other emotions ranging from curiosity to anger. One way of implementing programs is to consider police officer attitudes toward change, in general, and the specific programmatic change to be implemented, in particular (Lumb and Breazeale 2002: 93).*

Central to the success of effecting change in police organisations is the hub of the administrative process: communication. In this context, communication is described as ‘a critical process that profoundly influences the interpretation of the feasibility, motivation for and consequences of change’ (Kanter *et al.*, 1992; Kanter, 1983; Azumi and Hage, 1972 cited in Duncan *et al.*, 2001; 12). Moreover, the importance of clear, honest and regular communication is obvious. It can develop a sense of urgency and instil a sense of ownership (Strebel, 1996; Kanter *et al.*, 1992; Sims *et al.*, 1986 cited in Duncan *et al.*, 2001; 12).

Within the Task Force environment, especially within one that has community policing and partnership policing as hallmarks, there is a need to ensure that members are alert to, and supportive of, the direction that the Task Force is taking: how they will represent themselves and the organisation. Understanding that police functions include crime fighting, order maintenance, and social services (Cole & Smith, 1999), there is significant evidence (Kellow *et. al.*, forthcoming) that police tend to value the crime-fighting function, which is associated with masculinity, the most and the social

service function, which is associated with femininity, the least (Bell, 1982; Crank & Caldero, 2000; Drummond, 1976; Heidensohn, 1992; Miller, 1999; Perez, 1997). In so doing, crime fighting has been identified as the norm for police activity and social service as the 'other' (Garcia 2005: 66). Interestingly, the evidence (Kellow et. al., forthcoming) suggests that persons who self-select (apply) for the job of police officer are pre-disposed to the crime-fighting role. Hence, police officers must be given an opportunity to be both informed and aware; to know the 'what, where, why and how'. For too many years, the traditional hierarchical structure of policing ignored the 'why' relying instead on rank and directions.

## **Control**

How police organisations exercise "control" has been the subject of significant debate. Most notably, the movement to a managerialist framework has caused a degree of consternation within and beyond police agencies.

## **Managerialism**

The term 'managerialism' also known as 'new public management' (Hood cited by Hughes, 1998) is an extension of 'management' and, for our purposes, includes the traditional 'administrative' domain of the public sector. Conceptually, however, it extends the sphere of the public sector to the achievement of objectives with maximum efficiency, and the acceptance of responsibility for decisions taken and results achieved (Hughes, 1998).

This fundamental shift, the ascribing of business principles to the policing sector, has been much maligned. Theorists are critical of the imposition of attempts at measuring efficiency and effectiveness in policing. For example, Waddington (1999) states that policing responsibilities 'defeat attempts to impose rational management'. He advocates that '[i]nstead of emulating the flawed models of commercial management, policing needs to develop organisational forms appropriate to its distinctive task' (Waddington 1999). This, however, is problematic as the intense complexity of policing can present a stumbling block for appropriate qualitative and quantitative measurement.

The impact of managerialism on policing services has not been entirely negative however. The capacity to measure and compare specific areas of performance, whilst problematic and much maligned, is a valuable tool. Mazerolle (2001) believes the process of corporate performance reporting provides an 'ideal management structure to implement problem-oriented policing, hotspots policing and third party policing'. The capacity to compare performance with policing organisations in Australia and overseas serves to demonstrate relative efficiency, effectiveness and accountability.

## Chapter 7: The Model: Essential Elements

It is instructive to consider the elements that are common to each Task Force. An examination of these, together with the identification of fundamental differences, is important to determine what is essential (critical success factors). Much of practical policing is vested in experiential knowledge. The merging of theory (academia) and practice (practitioner) provides valuable insights. Pragmatically, the police desire is to return to basics – to ensure the KISS (keep it simple stupid) principle is applied liberally.

This Chapter explores the Task Force considerations and builds on some of the organisational capacity factors that were identified in the previous chapter.

### 7.1 Considerations

#### Offences

Interpreting the extent to which the various Task Forces had a sustained impact on offence data has not been attempted. To do so would, it is argued, assert that the impact on offences was solely attributable to the activities of the Task Forces. This promotes cognitive dissonance when one considers that other policing activities continued to occur during and after the Task Forces and these also impact on offence data. Suffice to say that the increased emphasis given to particular issues did have an impact (as evidenced by the return of activities data). Indeed the increased vigilance, and hence the increased arrest data, given to the offence of *committing a nuisance by urinating* in Launceston is strongly illustrative of the impact that focussed policing can have.

#### Offence Analysis

The analysis of offence data is very much a hallmark of the *intelligence-led* approach that permeates police agencies. Importantly, this enables a spatial-temporal analysis that can enhance the allocation of police resources. Identification of offence type, location and time enables calculation, based on probabilities, of when and where that sort of offence is likely to occur.

Of itself however, this is not enough. Deployment of police resources on a spatial-temporal methodology misses a fundamental point: the community wants to see high-visibility policing that is tailored to their needs, not resource allocation on a probabilistic or risk management basis.

#### Partnerships and Surveys

Partnerships are the key to the success of any community safety strategy. Only through collaboration and cooperation can the community address substantive issues in a sustainable way.



Community audits and surveys, whether conducted by partners or police should be the key driver for Task Forces that are community safety focussed. Police should not think they know what the community wants: they should ask them and, together with all other considerations, tailor policing services appropriately. Surveys could include the following:

- Business Security Survey
- Capacity building: responsibility resting with the wider community
- Community Safety issues
- Designing out crime (Crime Prevention through Environmental Design)
- Fear of Crime Issues
- Identification of behaviour (or offences) of most concern
- Intelligence (information) gathering
- Liaison with key-stakeholders (e.g. licensees, security)
- Perception of crime issues
- Policing needs
- Residential Security Survey
- Vehicle Security Survey

## **Community Safety Operation Orders**

Preparing an *Operation Order* for Task Forces is fundamental to their success. The application of the standard protocols is essential and they should be framed around the SMEAC model (Situation, Mission, Execution, Administration and Logistics, and Command).

Whilst there is an administrative burden associated with this, it is argued that the preparation of a focussed (not general) Operation Order provides the clarity of direction and blue-print for operation that is vital to success.

Regularly reviewing the operation order (or changing focus) will mitigate the risk of a Task Force becoming complacent. Communication of the mission and taskings will ensure a focus on strategy and maximise benefits.

### **Situation**

The *Situation* should provide an overview of the aim of the operation. This should place the operation in context and describe, in broad terms, the ‘problem’ the Task Force is seeking to address. Moreover, contextually, the *Situation* should detail that the Task Force is not the only strategy being employed but that it fits within a raft of strategies that are occurring across government, council, business, education, health and the wider community.

### **Partnerships**

Included in the *Situation* should be an overt statement on who the partners are and where the Task Force fits within the overall strategic direction of the District and other plans. Linkages should also be drawn to key stakeholders.

## **Mission**

The *Mission* (or *Aim*) must be clear, concise, easily understood and provide an overall direction. Respondents succinctly captured the importance of having a clearly defined objective:

*Understanding the nature of the problem and investing time and energy in developing an investigation plan or operation order are fundamental (Police Officer 2).*

*Need clear terms of reference that are approved, for instance in an investigation plan or operation order (Police Officer 2).*

*Operations like this will be more a way of life ... (Police Officer 6)*

*'The mist of an operation' ... (Police Officer 6)*

## **Execution**

### **Outline**

The *Execution* should include an outline of all strategies to be employed at both the policy and tactical level. It should describe where the involvement with partners is to be managed and who is responsible for same. It should also describe, in general terms, the strategies to be applied.

### **Personnel**

Allocation of personnel should be carefully considered (refer Human Resources in Chapter 7). Teams of six, each under the direction of a sergeant, appear appropriate to ensure that supervision is effectively applied across the span of control. Allocation of an inspector with command responsibilities and another with partnership responsibilities is appropriate given the likely workload. The District Commander is required to be proactively involved to ensure widespread acceptance of the importance the Task Force is given.

### **Focus**

Intended police activities should be focussed on 'the problem'. This fundamental issue of identifying the problem(s) and ensuring strategies are focussed on mitigating it is essential. The problem should be considered from all viewpoints. Strategies and tactics will fall from this analysis.

### **Strategies and Tactics**

#### **Intelligence Led Policing**

The analysis of intelligence holdings, offence reports, identification of trends and analysis of audits and surveys is critical.

### **High-visibility Policing**

Some theorists are critical of police patrolling as '*the traditional weapon designed to prevent crime*' (Waddington 1999, 6). The elevation of patrolling to this lofty height occurs without evidence to support the claim. To assert that patrolling occurs to prevent crime is to misdirect oneself. Patrolling has a range of applications only some of which relate to crime prevention. At a symbolic level, patrolling achieves a considerable amount - the least of which is to reassure the public through an overt policing presence. Many members of the public (refer Devonport survey) draw great comfort from a highly visible police service. This in itself justifies patrolling in the eyes of the community. Whilst *aimless* patrolling would easily fall within an inefficient mantra, the extent of aimless patrolling in a Task Force environment is minimal. The importance of patrolling was captured, for instance, by Bahn (1974). In *The Reassurance Factor in Police Patrol*, he defines reassurance as 'the feelings of safety and security that a citizen experiences when he sees a police officer or police patrol car nearby' (Bahn, 1974:341). Bahn expands on this by arguing that police 'visibility' and 'accessibility' are the key factors behind citizen reassurance (Dalglish and Myhill 2004: 1).

Community Safety Task Forces mandate high visibility policing - patrolling. This should not be seen to restrict the capability of the Task Force to undertake covert activities; merely to ensure that cognisance is given to high-visibility policing. The opportunity to co-ordinate activities of other groups to assist with the high-visibility intention must be considered and applied.

Strategies for delivering high-visibility should not be restricted to ensuring a 'blue-line' on the streets. Perception is an important consideration and attention must be given to innovative strategies. These should include utilisation of the media and other strategies to communicate the areas of focus (including the distribution of forms to enable businesses and the public to advise police on matters they might not otherwise report.

### **Covert Policing**

Notwithstanding the focus on high-visibility policing, scope must be given to allow for plain clothes patrols and other activities that could be defined as 'covert' to be approved.

### **Expectations**

Once the focus of the Task Force has been clearly expressed, the opportunity exists to, within the parameters of the Constables Oath, provide a detailed briefing on the expectations that the supervisors and managers have in relation to the delivery of policing services. This can be focussed on the various approaches to policing (discussed earlier) but should include overt statements on ensuring that the aim is achieved within the law, policy and guidelines.

### **Closed Circuit Television**

Closed Circuit Television (CCTV), whilst labour intensive, is a valuable tool. The Operation Order should ensure that every effort is made to have the review or monitoring of CCTV as a priority. This enables a wider part of a central business district to be viewed concurrently and can promote timely police responses.

## **Administration and Logistics**

General issues of accommodation, overtime, dress, and police vehicles should be catered for in this area. In the main they are self explanatory. Other areas under Administration include:

### **Hours of Duty**

Rostering should occur to deliver the policing services required based on the assessment of all information. Police officers conditions of employment under the *Police Award* should, wherever possible, be adhered to or alternative strategies found. Should a departure from the *Award* be required every endeavour should be made to ensure it is of minimum duration.

### **Briefings and Debriefings**

Briefings and debriefings are fundamentally important and particular attention should be given to ensuring they occur. The focus of the debrief should be to ensure that strategies utilised are assessed and, if necessary, altered for future shifts.

### **Command**

Clearly delineated areas of responsibility are required. Inter-relationships should also be described.

### **Control**

Control is most easily delivered through the application of formal reporting mechanisms and assessment against target outcomes.

### **Performance Measures**

The measurement of performance should be aligned to the broader strategic directions of the organisations involved and the overall community focus. Whilst a 'return of activities' enables a week-by-week comparison of performance, it is important to fully consider the mission, strategy and tactics and devise appropriate benchmarks and performance indicators. These should be regularly reviewed to ensure that there are no unintended consequences and amended as appropriate.

## **Chapter 8: Conclusion**

Policing has, over the last few decades, undergone rapid and significant change. This change has been led by community and government expectations and a re-defining of the role that police play in contemporary society.

Interestingly, theories of policing have sought to define, in an arguably more specific manner, the role and functions of various players. This has seen a move beyond our understanding of the traditional law enforcement model to conceptualisations of community policing and, more recently, partnership policing. There can be no doubt that 'joined-up' solutions are being pursued to ensure collaboration, foster cooperation and, importantly, impose obligations.

To properly service the obligations under the mantra of 'community safety', police must ensure delivery and be prepared to report on performance. One mechanism to achieve this is through a cohesive and coordinated approach. This can be most easily achieved through the establishment of Task Forces that exist for a specific purpose and have a clearly defined mission. The utilisation of SMEAC in the construction of operation orders provides an overarching framework for understanding and delivering community safety.

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# **List of Appendices**

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Appendix C: Consent Form



Appendix A:



UNIVERSITY  
OF TASMANIA

Tasmanian Institute of Law Enforcement Studies (TILES)

## **Comparative Analysis of Streetsafe in Hobart and Launceston**

### **Information Sheet for Community Members**

TILES, which is part of the University of Tasmania, has been awarded a grant from NRMA Insurance Australia Ltd, to conduct a comparative analysis of the Streetsafe Program in Hobart and Launceston

The project involves an independent comparative analysis of two community safety programs (known as Streetsafe), one in Hobart and one in Launceston, with the aim of developing a best practice model that would be transferable to other sites in Tasmania and other Australian states and territories

Community members have been key informants in this program, on this basis you have been invited to participate to comment on Streetsafe and to provide information that may assist in the development, improvement and expansion of programs that increase community safety in Tasmania and elsewhere.

To do this we would like to interview you for approximately 20-30 minutes. During this interview we will ask a range of questions relevant to the program's aims, its operational success and the nature of participation by all community members. A written record of your responses will be taken by the principal researcher. We will not record your name on the information that we collect and any data published in reports will not divulge the identity of those who choose to participate.

The data collected via this study will be stored in a locked cabinet at the Tasmanian Institute of Law Enforcement Studies (TILES) at the University of Tasmania for a period of 5 years from the date of publication. After the expiry of the 5-year period, the data will be shredded.

Participation is entirely voluntary, if you wish to participate, we would like you to contact Inspector Richman, who will be conducting the interviews. You may choose not to answer questions. You also may have all the data you have supplied withdrawn should you wish. You may withdraw or choose not to participate in this research without prejudice.

This evaluation has received ethical approval from the Human Research Ethics Committee (Tasmania) Network.

If you have any further questions or complaints please contact the Chief Investigator of the project:

Associate Professor Roberta Julian  
Director, Tasmanian Institute of Law Enforcement Studies  
Email: [Roberta.Julian@utas.edu.au](mailto:Roberta.Julian@utas.edu.au)  
Phone: (03) 6226 2331

Or the principal researcher on this the project:

Inspector Matthew Richman  
Department Police and Public Safety  
Email: [matthew.richman@police.tas.gov.au](mailto:matthew.richman@police.tas.gov.au)  
Phone: 62302851

Please contact one of the Chief Investigators if you wish to be kept informed during the course of the research of any significant findings that might affect you, or if you wish to receive a copy of the final overall results.

Associate Professor Roberta Julian  
Chief Investigator

Date:

Appendix B:



UNIVERSITY  
OF TASMANIA

Tasmanian Institute of Law Enforcement Studies (TILES)

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Police have been one of the key informants in this program, on this basis you have been invited to participate to comment on Streetsafe and to provide information that may assist in the development, improvement and expansion of programs that increase community safety in Tasmania and elsewhere.

To do this we would like to interview you for approximately 20-30 minutes. During this interview we will ask a range of questions relevant to the program's aims, its operational success and the nature of participation by all key informants. A written record of your responses will be taken by the principal researcher. We will not record your name on the information that we collect and any data published in reports will not divulge the identity of those who choose to participate.

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Or the principal researcher on this the project:

Inspector Matthew Richman  
Department Police and Public Safety  
Email: [matthew.richman@police.tas.gov.au](mailto:matthew.richman@police.tas.gov.au)  
Phone: 62302851

Please contact one of the Chief Investigators if you wish to be kept informed during the course of the research of any significant findings that might affect you, or if you wish to receive a copy of the final overall results.

Associate Professor Roberta Julian  
Chief Investigator

Date:

Appendix C:



UNIVERSITY  
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Tasmanian Institute of Law Enforcement Studies  
(TILES)

**Comparative Analysis of Streetsafe in Hobart and Launceston**

**CONSENT FORM**

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1. I have read and understood the 'Information Sheet' for this project.
2. I understand the project involves the following procedure:  

A face to face interview of 20-30 minutes
3. I understand that all research data will be securely stored on the University of Tasmania premises for a period of 5 years. The data will be destroyed at the end of 5 years.
4. Any questions that I have asked have been answered to my satisfaction.
5. I agree that research data gathered for the study may be published provided that I cannot be identified as a subject.
6. I agree to participate in this investigation and understand that I may withdraw at any time, and have any data I have supplied also withdrawn, without any adverse consequences to myself.

Name of Stakeholder: \_\_\_\_\_

Signature                      of                      Stakeholder: \_\_\_\_\_ Date: \_\_\_\_\_

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7. A statement by the investigator:  
I have explained this project and the implications of participation to this volunteer and I believe that the consent is informed and that he/she understands the implications of participation.

Name of Investigator: \_\_\_\_\_

Signature of investigator: \_\_\_\_\_ Date: \_\_\_\_\_