



An effective and efficient Tasmanian Integrity Commission

Submission the public consultation on the Integrity
Commission Amendment Bill 2026

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Acknowledgment of Country

We acknowledge the Palawa people of Lutruwita and the Gadigal people of Sydney, the traditional owners of the land upon which we live and work.

We pay respects to Elders past and present as the knowledge holders and sharers. We honour their strong culture and knowledges as vital to the self-determination, wellbeing and resilience of their communities.

We stand for a future that profoundly respects and acknowledges Aboriginal perspectives, culture, language and history.

Disclaimer

The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the University of Tasmania.

Introduction

The Tasmanian Policy Exchange welcomes the opportunity to provide feedback on the Exposure Draft of the *Integrity Commission Amendment Bill 2025* (Tas). The proposed Amendment Bill would enact a range of much needed and sensible process and administrative reforms. Specifically, we support the abrogation of the privilege against self-incrimination. This will align the Tasmanian Integrity Commission (TIC) with other Australian jurisdictions. We also broadly endorse the recommendations put forward by our colleagues from the Centre for Public Integrity in their submission.

However, there are two major areas fundamental to the effective functioning of the TIC that the Bill does not address.

Recommendation 1: Establishing adequate, stable funding for the Integrity Commission

Stable and sufficient resourcing is vital for the effective, independent functioning of integrity commissions and anti-corruption agencies (ACAs). This is specified in Article 6(2) and Article 36 of the *United Nations Convention against Corruption* (UNCAC), to which Australia is a signatory.¹ Similarly, Principle 11 of the *Jakarta Statement on Principles for Anti-Corruption Agencies* – which was developed by a group of experts to support countries’ in fulfilling their obligations under UNCAC – states that:

*ACAs shall have sufficient financial resources to carry out their tasks, taking into account the country’s budgetary resources, population size and land area. ACAs shall be entitled to timely, planned, reliable and adequate resources for the gradual capacity development and improvement of the ACA’s operations and fulfilment of the ACA’s mandate.*²

Further to this, supplementary commentary on the Principles suggests that ACAs should be provided with a minimum budget guaranteed under law, “to protect the ACA against any arbitrary reductions, an option that could otherwise be used to punish an effective ACA”.³ It notes that this budget guarantee “could be expressed as a percentage of the annual budget”⁴ to enable flexibility in challenging fiscal times.

International research also demonstrates a clear link between ACA resourcing and effectiveness. For example, De Jaegere finds higher ACA budgets are correlated with better scores on the global Corruption Perception Index,⁵ while Transparency

¹ United Nations, 2004, ‘United Nations Convention Against Corruption’.

² United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2020, ‘Colombo Commentary on the Jakarta Statement on Principles for Anti-Corruption Agencies’.

³ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2020, ‘Colombo Commentary on the Jakarta Statement on Principles for Anti-Corruption Agencies’.

⁴ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2020, ‘Colombo Commentary on the Jakarta Statement on Principles for Anti-Corruption Agencies’.

⁵ Samuel De Jaegere, 2012, ‘Principles for Anti-Corruption Agencies: A Game Changer’.

International's review of six ACAs in the Asia Pacific many ACAs in the region are under-resourced (in terms of funding and specialized personnel), which limits their capacity to detect, investigate and prosecute corruption.⁶

In line with international evidence and best practice, the Tasmanian Government should ensure that the TIC has a guaranteed budget that is sufficient for it to deliver its functions in an effective and timely manner. Although not an explicit recommendation of the Cox Review, the report did note that "The Commission's written submissions in relation to resources, which I have set out in full, speak for themselves. I respectfully urge the Government to give them full consideration".

The TIC's budget increased at an annual average of 1.42% from 2011-12 to 2024-25,⁷ well below the average annual inflation rate of 2.6% over the same period.⁸ This amounts to a significant funding cut in real terms. Notably, the TIC's budget as a proportion of the overall state budget has fallen by approximately 39% (see Figure 1).




Figure 1: TIC funding as a share of the state budget, 2010-11 to 2024-25

⁶ Transparency International, 2017, 'Strengthening Anti-Corruption Agencies in Asia Pacific: Regional Synthesis Report'.

⁷ Authors' calculations using Tasmanian Government Budget Papers.

⁸ Calculated using the RBA's Inflation Calculator, <https://www.rba.gov.au/calculator/financialYearDecimal.html>

Recommendation 2: Establish a monitoring and evaluation framework aligned with international best practice

Effective monitoring and evaluation (M&E) is vital to the effectiveness and legitimacy of ACAs. According to the Anti-Corruption Resource Centre's research, there are several reasons for this:

“Transparency: *Visibility and outreach are important in attracting public support. Public ignorance about the existence and functioning of an ACA lays the conditions for its marginalisation or gradual death. M&E generates written reports and concrete performance figures that contribute to transparency and visibility.*

Accountability: *ACAs are publicly funded bodies. Therefore, they need to report on their activities, capacity problems, and results to those who fund their activities, that is, taxpayers and donors. M&E provides reliable information on performance and helps to track progress more easily and systematically.*

Institutional memory: *M&E enables governments and donors to ascertain whether an ACA is able to fulfil its mandate by tracking its performance and growth in capacity over a period of time. It also allows the ACA to develop an in-house memory about the different phases of institutionalisation.*

Learning: *M&E provides solid evidence for questioning and testing assumptions and integrating important lessons and experiences into policy and practice. It offers a basis and a process for self-reflection. Finally, it also provides ACAs with a more robust basis for raising funds and influencing policy.*

Improving policy: *Strong M&E frameworks give the heads of ACAs and governments indications of whether a policy option is working as intended, by detecting operating risks and problems. Where do the problems originate? How is the agency's performance affected? What capacities/resources are available to reduce those risks and problems and can those be strengthened?*

Better performance: *All of the above should lead to better performance of ACAs in fighting corruption.”⁹*

Whereas best practice M&E reveals outcomes and impact, ACAs typically concentrate on “organisational performance at the levels of inputs, activities, and outputs”. The TIC's annual reporting falls into the latter category, focusing on outputs such as the number of complaints received and number of training sessions delivered. Therefore,

⁹ Jesper Johnsen et al., ‘How to Monitor and Evaluate Anti-Corruption Agencies: Guidelines for Agencies, Donors, and Evaluators’, Anti-Corruption Resource Centre.

there is an opportunity for the TIC to shift the emphasis of its M&E to outcomes and impact.

We recommend that the Tasmanian Government creates a legislative requirement for the development of an M&E framework for the TIC based on the Anti-Corruption Resource Centre's guidelines (see Table 1 for an example). Reporting against the framework should be integrated into the TIC's annual reporting. This more robust approach to understanding and communicating the TIC's impact will help to build trust in the institution, and identify areas for improvement.

Table 1: Example guidance for developing an M&E framework for an ACA

Function: Enforcement			
Desired outcome	Possible indicators	Sources of verification	Comments & assumptions
Investigation capacity is better quantitatively and qualitatively	- Investigations-to-prosecutions ratio - Investigations-to-convictions and prosecutions-to-convictions ratio	- Internal records - Court records	This indicator measures not only the effectiveness of the investigators but also the effectiveness of the ACA's case-selection system
	Number of active cases under investigation by the ACA	Internal records	This indicator measures the workload of the ACA in terms of investigations.
	Number of cases dismissed or people acquitted due to procedural flaws or incompetent investigation by the ACA	Official police, court, and prosecution statistics	The number of serious procedural mistakes or poor investigatory practices by the ACA should be minimised. This indicator may also reflect the interaction between prosecution/courts and the ACA. If the relationship is not cooperative the indicator is not good.
	Number of cases dismissed or people acquitted due to lack of evidence	Official police, court, and prosecution statistics	This indicator does not necessarily reflect poor performance by the ACA (evidence cannot always be established, for example, if people are innocent) but it provides useful information.